Source-linked AI summary

Quantum random number generation on a mobile phone

Bruno Sanguinetti, Anthony Martin, Hugo Zbinden, Nicolas Gisin

arXiv:1405.0435v1quant-ph

TL;DR

Cryptographic protocols rely on high-quality unpredictable randomness, which deterministic computation cannot ensure. This paper extracts quantum-origin bits from illuminated image sensors, including a mobile-phone camera, and reports that the generated RNG passed all tests.

  • Problem

    Cryptographic protocols need high-quality random numbers, while deterministic algorithms cannot ensure random, unique bit strings.

    Source: INTRODUCTION · p. 1
  • Method

    The paper extracts quantum-origin random numbers from illuminated image sensors, including a mobile-phone CMOS camera.

    Source: INTRODUCTION · p. 1, EXPERIMENT · p. 2
  • Results

    The extracted bit strings from both cameras passed the full “die harder” battery, including NIST and diehard tests.

    Source: RESULTS AND TESTS · p. 4
  • Takeaways & Limitations

    The authors argue that the generator’s simplicity and performance could make quantum random numbers widespread using technology compatible with consumer and portable electronics.

    Source: CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK · p. 4

    The security analysis assumes technical noise is completely known to an adversary, so it relies only on generated quantum entropy.

    Source: CONCEPT · p. 2

Abstract

from arXiv · show

Quantum random number generators (QRNGs) can significantly improve the security of cryptographic protocols, by ensuring that generated keys cannot be predicted. However, the cost, size, and power requirements of current QRNGs has prevented them from becoming widespread. In the meantime, the quality of the cameras integrated in mobile telephones has improved significantly, so that now they are sensitive to light at the few-photon level. We demonstrate how these can be used to generate random numbers of a quantum origin.

INTRODUCTION

Cryptographic security depends on high-quality random numbers, but deterministic algorithms cannot ensure random, unique bit strings. The paper presents a way to extract quantum-origin randomness from illuminated image sensors, including those common in mobile devices.

INTRODUCTION

  • High-quality random numbers support classical and quantum cryptographic protocols, including asymmetric keys, one-time pads, and quantum key distribution.A one-time pad requires a perfectly random key as long as the data, while quantum key distribution also requires many random numbers.Source: INTRODUCTION · p. 1
  • Failures in random-number generation have compromised operating-system security, communications, digital rights management, and financial systems.Kerckhoffs’s principle places cipher security in the key, which must be chosen at random.Source: INTRODUCTION · p. 1
  • Deterministic algorithms cannot ensure randomness and uniqueness, motivating physical generators; QRNG output cannot be predicted even by an attacker with complete device information.Earlier QRNGs used specialized hardware, while prior image-sensor generators based on moving scenes or readout noise had low randomness and throughput.Source: INTRODUCTION · p. 1
  • The proposed approach extracts quantum-origin randomness from common illuminated image sensors, modeling each pixel as a lossy photon detector whose digitized signal enters extraction.The paper notes that cameras are integrated into phones, tablets, and laptops.Source: INTRODUCTION · p. 1, Figure 1 · p. 1

CONCEPT

Random photon arrivals produce Poisson-distributed shot noise that can supply quantum entropy. The method models detector losses and technical noise, credits only quantum entropy against an informed adversary, and uses an extractor to produce high-entropy bits.

CONCEPT

  • Random photon arrival times produce shot noise; photon counts follow a Poisson distribution with standard deviation √n̄, which a resolving detector can exploit for QRNG.The passage identifies shot noise as a property of the light field, not the detector.Source: CONCEPT · p. 1
  • The detector model combines photon loss with photon-to-electron conversion and digitization; ζ≥1 ensures distinct digital codes for each electron count.Thermal, leakage-current, and readout noise generally add linearly to the signal and follow a normal distribution.Source: CONCEPT · pp. 1–2
  • A measured output combines independent quantum and technical noise, but the security model treats technical noise as fully known to Eve and credits only quantum entropy.A single-shot measurement cannot distinguish the two noise components.Source: CONCEPT · p. 2, Figure 2 · p. 2
  • Quantum entropy corresponds to the Poisson photon-count distribution, while encoding it over b bits yields average entropy H(Xq)/b<1, so an extractor is required.The detector must have ζ≥1 to collect the quantum entropy entirely.Source: CONCEPT · p. 2
  • The extractor maps l>k lower-entropy input bits to k output bits by multiplying them modulo 2 by a random l×k matrix that is pre-generated and constant.The paper also bounds how far the output vector can deviate from a perfectly random bit string.Source: CONCEPT · p. 2

EXPERIMENT

The experiment uses an astronomy CCD and a mobile-phone CMOS camera, illuminated by an LED and followed by randomness extraction. Before generation, the cameras are checked for linear operation and adequate digital resolution.

EXPERIMENT

  • The study uses an ATIK 383L astronomy monochrome CCD and a Nokia N9 CMOS phone camera, using only its green pixels.The sensors have readout noise of a few electrons, quantum efficiencies up to 80%, and intrinsically parallel, high-rate operation.Source: EXPERIMENT · p. 2
  • The camera checks verify that photon counts stay within the linear region and that each possible absorbed-photon count has enough digital codes, ζ≥1.The authors also check compliance with manufacturer specifications and appropriate operating conditions.Source: EXPERIMENT · p. 2
  • A LED illuminates the camera, and concatenated raw binary pixel values pass through an extractor to produce quantum random numbers.The setup is described as fully and homogeneously illuminating the camera.Source: EXPERIMENT · p. 2, Figure 3 · p. 3

Characterization

The cameras resolve individual electron increments and have an operating range where shot noise dominates and response is linear. Their Fano factors also reveal low-light technical noise and high-light saturation.

Characterization

  • The ATIK and Nokia cameras convert each added electron into at least one digital-code increment, measuring 2.3 and 1.9 codes/electron, respectively.Illuminating the cameras with a known amount of light was used to check the conversion.Source: Characterization · p. 3
  • A Fano factor near 1 marks the range where both detectors are most linear and shot noise dominates; Nokia N9 saturation occurs at 450 absorbed photons per pixel.At low illumination, technical noise drives the Fano factor above 1; saturation lowers it.Source: Characterization · p. 3, Figure 4 · p. 3
  • The cameras’ measured readout noise is 10 e− for the CCD and 3.3 e− for the CMOS sensor.The passage identifies readout noise as the dominant technical noise for short exposures.Source: Characterization · p. 3

Random number generation

The camera signals provide less than one bit of quantum entropy per encoded bit, so extraction is used to obtain random output. The Nokia example estimates strong resistance to detecting deviation from perfect randomness.

Random number generation

  • The ATIK yields 8.9 quantum-entropy bits encoded over 16 bits (0.56 entropy per output bit), while the Nokia yields 6.4 over 10 bits (0.64).The cameras were illuminated to generate 1.5 × 10^4 e− and 410 e−, respectively.Source: Random number generation · p. 3
  • At the operating conditions, quantum noise strongly dominates classical noise in both the ATIK and Nokia detectors.Figure 5 reports measurements for the ATIK (a) and Nokia (b).Source: Figure 5 · p. 4
  • With compression factor 4 (for example, k = 500 and l = 2000), it would take an impossible ∼10^118 trials to notice a deviation from a perfectly random bit string.If everybody on Earth used such a device constantly at 1 Gbps, it would take 10^80 times the age of the universe to notice a deviation from a perfectly random bit string.Source: Random number generation · p. 4

RESULTS AND TESTS

The extracted bit strings passed the reported randomness-test battery. The authors also report that extraction maintains high randomness quality when pixels are damaged, covered by dust, or otherwise affected.

RESULTS AND TESTS

  • The evaluation collected 48 frames, approximately 5 Gbits of raw numbers, and processed them through a 2,000-bit-input, 500-bit-output extractor to generate 1.25 Gbits.Before extraction, entropy per bit remained below unity, with possible dead-pixel errors and electrical-noise correlations between pixel values.Source: RESULTS AND TESTS · p. 4
  • Extraction is reported to maintain extremely good randomness quality when pixels are damaged, covered by dust, or affected by other problems.The extractor also increases mean entropy per bit.Source: RESULTS AND TESTS · p. 4
  • The extracted bit strings passed the “die harder” battery, which includes NIST, Diehard, and additional tests.The passage reports results for both extracted bit strings.Source: RESULTS AND TESTS · p. 4

Speed

Image sensors can support high random-bit rates, while software extraction on a consumer device is reported sufficient for most consumer applications. The authors frame affordability and portability as more important than speed for many uses.

Speed

  • Consumer-grade sensors acquiring 100 megapixels to 1 gigapixel per second can yield 300 Mbps to 3 Gbps after processing, at about 3 random bits per pixel.The passage suggests FPGA processing or an extractor embedded on a CMOS sensor chip for such rates.Source: Speed · p. 4
  • Software extraction on a consumer device can sustain more than 1 Mbps, described as largely sufficient for most consumer applications.The passage contrasts this with higher rates achievable using FPGA or on-sensor processing.Source: Speed · p. 4

CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK

The paper demonstrates a quantum-origin random-number generator built with technology compatible with consumer and portable electronics, and anticipates broad use with an important impact on information security.

  • The paper demonstrates a generator of random numbers of quantum origin using technology compatible with consumer and portable electronics.Source: CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK · p. 4
  • The authors expect the device’s simplicity and performance to make widespread use of quantum random numbers a reality.Source: CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK · p. 4
  • The authors anticipate an important impact on information security from widespread quantum random-number use.Source: CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK · p. 4
Loading 1405.0435v1…