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Laboratories of Oligarchy? How the Iron Law Extends to Peer Production
Aaron Shaw, Benjamin Mako Hill
TL;DR
Peer production is often treated as a democratic organizational model, but the paper asks whether growing projects instead become oligarchic. Using exhaustive longitudinal records from 683 Wikia wikis, it operationalizes Michels’ iron law and tests growth-related changes in governance. The models support the iron law, showing entrenched authority and restrictions on experienced contributors as wikis grow.
Problem
Peer production is promoted as democratic, yet many projects show entrenched leadership and inequalities; limited empirical research has formally tested their governance.
Method
The study analyzes exhaustive internal-process records from 683 Wikia wikis and uses hierarchical linear models to test structural and goal-transformation components of Michels’ iron law.
Results
The models support Michels’ iron law: as wikis grow, a small early group monopolizes formal authority, performs more administrative activity, and restricts experienced members’ contributions.
Takeaways & Limitations
The findings conclude that peer production entails oligarchic organizational forms rather than robustly democratic, participatory institutions.
Takeaways & Limitations
Some wikis appear more robustly democratic than others, leaving the sources of this variation for future research.
Abstract
from arXiv · showhide
Peer production projects like Wikipedia have inspired voluntary associations, collectives, social movements, and scholars to embrace open online collaboration as a model of democratic organization. However, many peer production projects exhibit entrenched leadership and deep inequalities, suggesting that they may not fulfill democratic ideals. Instead, peer production projects may conform to Robert Michels' "iron law of oligarchy," which proposes that democratic membership organizations become increasingly oligarchic as they grow. Using exhaustive data of internal processes from a sample of 683 wikis, we construct empirical measures of participation and test for increases in oligarchy associated with growth. In contrast to previous studies, we find support for Michels' iron law and conclude that peer production entails oligarchic organizational forms.
1. INTRODUCTION
Peer production was promoted as a democratic model of open online collaboration, yet many projects exhibit entrenched leadership and deep inequalities. The paper tests whether growing peer production communities instead follow Michels’ iron law of oligarchy.
- Peer production aggregates many contributions through digital communication networks to create freely accessible information resources.
- Projects such as Wikipedia and Linux inspired organizations, social movements, and scholars to adopt open online collaboration as a democratic organizational model.
- Many peer production projects nevertheless exhibit entrenched leadership and deep inequalities, challenging their democratic ideals.
- The study empirically tests whether large peer production projects become increasingly oligarchic as they grow, as Michels’ iron law predicts.
2. BACKGROUND
The paper addresses limited empirical testing of democratic governance in peer production by adapting Michels’ iron law to this setting. Oligarchy is assessed through structural concentration of authority and leaders’ divergence from members’ interests.
- Previous research has rarely formally tested claims that peer production projects have democratic organizational governance.
- Organizational democracy means active participation by multiple constituencies in negotiating and exercising legitimate authority.
- Michels’ theory identifies structural complexity and professional leaders’ authority monopoly as drivers of increasing oligarchy in growing voluntary organizations.
- Goal transformation occurs when leaders’ interests diverge from members’ interests and reshape organizational goals and activities.
- Applying the iron law to peer production requires both entrenched minority control and leaders’ imposition of interests on other members.
3. RESEARCH DESIGN
The study examines publicly accessible Wikia wiki communities and their internal governance records. It analyzes administrator activity across 683 large wikis using longitudinal multilevel models to test three iron-law hypotheses.
- Wikia hosts publicly accessible, volunteer-produced wikis where anyone can create an account, enabling variation in participatory and democratic behavior.
- The dataset contains every revision by registered and non-registered users across 683 largest Wikia wikis from 2004 through April 2010.
- The analysis focuses on administrators, formal authorities within the projects, and uses hierarchical linear models with random intercepts to model change.
- Three hypotheses test whether growth reduces administrator addition and increases administrative activity and reversals of experienced users’ contributions.
4. RESULTS
Across fitted models, wiki growth is associated with fewer new administrators and more administrator activity and reversals of experienced users’ contributions. Figure 1 presents model-predicted weekly outcomes across account counts with controls fixed at sample medians.
- 0.81 times: one log-unit increase in registered contributors is associated with odds of adding a new administrator that are only 0.81 times as high.
- 3% increase: a 1% increase in total wiki accounts is associated with a 3% increase in administrators’ administrative contributions, controlling for administrative edits.
- 5% increase: a 1% increase in total wiki accounts is associated with a 5% increase in administrator-reverted contributions by experienced editors, controlling for experienced-user edits.
- Figure 1 plots predicted values and 95% confidence intervals from the three models for prototypical wikis as account counts vary.The plots hold control variables at sample medians and represent estimated dependent-variable values for a single week.
- The plotted account range runs from 0 to 793, the 95th percentile of observations in the dataset.
5. CONCLUSION
Across the 683-wiki comparison, larger wikis show stronger oligarchic organization: early participants monopolize authority, perform more administrative work, and restrict experienced contributors. Although some wikis are more democratic than others, the findings support Michels’ iron law and caution that adopting peer-production tactics may entrench oligarchies.
- Larger wikis show strong evidence of early participants monopolizing formal authority and administrative activity while restricting experienced contributors.These patterns persist despite many wikis’ limited bureaucratic structure and unclear roles.
- The findings support Michels’ iron law and challenge prevailing accounts of peer production as democratic organizations.
- Some wikis appear more robustly democratic than others, leaving the sources of this variation as an area for future research.
- Appropriating peer-production tactics may facilitate entrenched oligarchies led by self-selecting early adopters.