PaperlayerView exact revision on arXiv

Source-linked AI summary

Security, Privacy, and Access Control in Information-Centric Networking: A Survey

Reza Tourani, Travis Mick, Satyajayant Misra, Gaurav Panwar

arXiv:1603.03409v3cs.NIcs.CR

TL;DR

ICN addresses scalability pressures in host-centric networking by delivering named content independently of its origin, but its caching and stateful forwarding introduce security, privacy, and access-control concerns. The paper surveys the literature across these domains, categorizes proposed mechanisms, examines their drawbacks, and identifies open directions. It concludes that pervasive caching creates a central access-control challenge while enabling content reuse and low-latency delivery.

  • Problem

    Host-centric networking faces scalability pressures from growing video traffic, mobile devices, and IoT, while pervasive ICN caching complicates publishers’ control over replicated content.

  • Method

    The paper provides a comprehensive survey of ICN security, privacy, and access-control research, organizing threats, risks, mechanisms, drawbacks, and open challenges.

  • Results

    The survey identifies ICN-specific threats including PIT-targeting DoS, cache pollution, content poisoning, and naming attacks, and reviews access-control mechanisms based on encryption, identities, attributes, and sessions.

  • Takeaways & Limitations

    ICN’s named-content model supports content placement independent of hosts, while pervasive caching requires access control that enables cached-content reuse and prevents unauthorized access.

Abstract

from arXiv · show

Information-Centric Networking (ICN) is a new networking paradigm, which replaces the widely used host-centric networking paradigm in communication networks (e.g., Internet, mobile ad hoc networks) with an information-centric paradigm, which prioritizes the delivery of named content, oblivious of the contents origin. Content and client security are more intrinsic in the ICN paradigm versus the current host centric paradigm where they have been instrumented as an after thought. By design, the ICN paradigm inherently supports several security and privacy features, such as provenance and identity privacy, which are still not effectively available in the host-centric paradigm. However, given its nascency, the ICN paradigm has several open security and privacy concerns, some that existed in the old paradigm, and some new and unique. In this article, we survey the existing literature in security and privacy research sub-space in ICN. More specifically, we explore three broad areas: security threats, privacy risks, and access control enforcement mechanisms. We present the underlying principle of the existing works, discuss the drawbacks of the proposed approaches, and explore potential future research directions. In the broad area of security, we review attack scenarios, such as denial of service, cache pollution, and content poisoning. In the broad area of privacy, we discuss user privacy and anonymity, name and signature privacy, and content privacy. ICN's feature of ubiquitous caching introduces a major challenge for access control enforcement that requires special attention. In this broad area, we review existing access control mechanisms including encryption-based, attribute-based, session-based, and proxy re-encryption-based access control schemes. We conclude the survey with lessons learned and scope for future work.

1. INTRODUCTION

ICN replaces host-centric communication with named-content delivery to improve scalability and delivery efficiency, while introducing distinct security, privacy, and access-control challenges. This survey organizes the state of the art across those three domains and reviews proposed mechanisms, drawbacks, and open research directions.

  • 1. INTRODUCTION: 90% of Internet traffic was forecast to be video by 2019, increasing pressure on host-centric networking alongside mobile-device and IoT growth.CDNs reduce core traffic and delivery latency, but the paper argues that the current paradigm will not continue to scale with these trends.
  • 1. INTRODUCTION: Many-to-many IoT communication increases routing-table size and requires per-node multicast-tree maintenance, undermining scalability.The paper identifies efficient content delivery as the primary objective motivating ICN research.
  • 1. INTRODUCTION: ICN decouples uniquely named content from its hosting devices, enabling content to be stored and requested anywhere in the network.Representative architectures include DONA, CCN/NDN, PSIRP/PURSUIT, and NetInf; shared properties include unique content names, name-based routing, and pervasive caching.
  • 1. INTRODUCTION: The survey covers ICN security threats, privacy risks, and access-control enforcement, including DoS, cache pollution, content poisoning, and naming attacks.It also discusses proposed mechanisms, their drawbacks, open challenges, and future research directions.
  • 1. INTRODUCTION: Pervasive caching improves content proximity, network load, and retrieval latency but leaves publishers unable to arbitrate access to replicated copies.The survey therefore examines access control based on content encryption, client identities, content attributes, and authorized sessions.
  • 1. INTRODUCTION: The survey reviews representative ICN architectures and prior surveys before organizing its analysis around security, privacy, and access control.The architecture discussion includes DONA, CCN, NDN, PSIRP/PURSUIT, NetInf, and MobilityFirst, with particular focus on CCN, NDN, and PSIRP/PURSUIT.

B. Review of Existing ICN Surveys and Overview Literature

Earlier ICN surveys addressed architectures, mobility, security, privacy, or specific attack classes, but generally omitted comprehensive ICN-specific coverage and access-control mechanisms. This survey organizes the literature across security, privacy, and access control, including attacks, mitigations, drawbacks, and future directions.

  • Earlier surveys covered ICN architectures, mobility, denial-of-service attacks, or general security concerns, but not the full security, privacy, and access-control landscape.
  • The survey claims the first comprehensive review of ICN security, privacy, and access control, including state-of-the-art mechanisms, shortcomings, lessons learned, and research directions.
  • Security: Security coverage classifies vulnerabilities and mitigations by denial of service, content poisoning, cache pollution, secure naming and routing, application security, and other attacks.
  • Denial of Service: Interest-flooding DoS attacks target routers or providers by generating requests for unavailable, fake, or dynamic content that consumes state or provider resources.
  • Denial of Service: DoS countermeasures include rate limiting, statistical modeling, stateless forwarding, and client proof-of-work, with rate limiting further divided by monitored faces or PIT size.
  • Denial of Service: Rate limiting can reduce attacked-router PIT size more effectively than notification, but notification can improve request satisfaction and neither approach reliably distinguishes attackers from legitimate clients.

2) Statistical Modeling-Based Countermeasures:

Statistical and structural countermeasures detect abnormal PIT or interface behavior, modify router state, or slow clients with proof-of-work. Their reported benefits are offset by assumptions, scalability costs, residual DDoS feasibility, and possible harm to legitimate traffic.

  • Statistical modeling: Statistical-modeling approaches use router PIT and interface statistics to identify abnormal traffic patterns and trigger mitigation.Fuzzy-logic detection uses PIT Occupancy Rate and PIT Expiration Rate as inputs to inference rules.
  • Statistical modeling: Simulation results show fuzzy-logic cooperation can reduce PIT memory consumption and increase legitimate-interest satisfaction.
  • Statistical modeling: The fuzzy-logic mechanism assumes attackers target a specific name prefix, limiting effectiveness against attacks on network infrastructure and leaving distributed DDoS feasible.
  • Other countermeasures: Other countermeasures modify PIT or cache structures, use per-interest proof-of-work, or apply statistical hypothesis testing to constrain request flooding.
  • Other countermeasures: Structural and request-based mechanisms can impose extra router processing, packet overhead, storage requirements, or unfair penalties on legitimate clients.
  • Other countermeasures: PIT architectures including SimplePIT, HashPIT, and DiPIT remain vulnerable to DDoS and perform similarly under attack.

4) Summary and Future Directions in DoS Mitigation:

ICN DoS mitigation largely relies on rate limiting, while alternative methods add proof-of-work, statistical detection, caching changes, or PIT handling. The survey highlights fairness, scalability, cross-architecture coverage, and coordinated network-wide detection as open concerns.

  • DoS mitigation research targets routers or content providers and is summarized by attack model, implementing entity, mitigation type, router functionality, and required router collaboration.
  • Most interest-flooding solutions use rate limiting on suspicious interfaces or prefixes, but may penalize legitimate clients and lack per-flow fairness.
  • Proof-of-work, fuzzy logic, hypothesis testing, and longer caching times either require per-content router statistics or are not computationally scalable in real time.
  • The survey proposes removing suspicious requests from the PIT and combining self-routing for suspicious interests with stateful routing for legitimate interests.
  • An SDN controller with an aggregated network view could detect and mitigate DoS early through coordinated filtering of flows sharing malicious name prefixes.
  • Publish/subscribe DoS through z-filter manipulation remains underexplored, while rate limiting and proof-of-work may also apply to DONA and NetInf resolution entities.
  • Content poisoning: Content poisoning fills caches with invalid named content, and proposed countermeasures include collaborative signature verification and consumer-dependent mechanisms.

1) Collaborative Signature Verification Countermeasures:

Collaborative and consumer-dependent mechanisms use signature, hash, or feedback checks to limit content poisoning, but impose verification, trust, scalability, or cache-efficiency costs.

  • Routers can distribute signature verification by flagging validated chunks for peers or verifying signatures on cache hits.
  • Self-certifying interest/data packets attach a chunk’s hash, name, and signature to interests so routers can validate returned content.
  • Cached-content verification randomly or collaboratively checks chunks, while segmented caching verifies serving content after a cache hit and marks validated chunks.
  • Signature-based approaches can add latency and computation, enable verification-triggered DoS/DDoS, require advance key acquisition, and lack scalable overhead analysis.
  • Consumer-dependent exclusion mechanisms rank content using exclusions, exclusion time, and interfaces, but depend on client feedback and architecture-specific support.
  • Interest-Key Binding links content names to provider keys; routers forward content only when the KeyLocator key hash matches the interest’s PPKD.
  • All countermeasures add router checks or content ranking, while proposed hash verification is considered promising because of its low amortized router cost.

1) Locality Disruption Mitigation Approaches:

Locality-disruption countermeasures regulate or detect cache popularity, spanning high- and moderate-overhead methods, but face detection, evasion, memory, and scalability limitations.

  • Locality Disruption Mitigation Approaches: Routers mitigate locality disruption by caching content with selected popularity or periodically evaluating cached-content popularity, with high or moderate computation overhead.
  • Locality Disruption Mitigation Approaches: Matrix-ranking detection uses two cryptographic hashes and iterative rank evaluation to detect low-rate attacks, but excludes popular content and is computationally heavy.
  • Locality Disruption Mitigation Approaches: CacheShield combines probabilistic shielding with request-frequency tracking and caches a chunk after its frequency exceeds a threshold.
  • Locality Disruption Mitigation Approaches: Machine-learning detection was proposed to address CacheShield’s shortcomings while evaluating cache pollution across replacement policies and network topologies.
  • Locality Disruption Mitigation Approaches: The attack test compares calculated τ with δm, a function of request frequency and measurement-interval parameters, to detect an attack.
  • False Locality Mitigation Approaches: False locality can be orchestrated by malicious consumers or producers seeking to alter local-cache popularity or preferentially cache their own content.
  • False Locality Mitigation Approaches: ANFIS-based replacement outperformed CacheShield on hit damage-ratio, valid-content delivery to honest consumers, and communication overhead, but required substantial historical memory and iterative computation.

3) Summary and Future Directions in Cache Pollution Mitigation:

The survey finds cache-pollution defenses heterogeneous and costly, while secure naming and routing remain open areas requiring scalable verification and stronger mobility support.

  • Summary and Future Directions in Cache Pollution Mitigation: Cache pollution comprises false-locality and locality-disruption attacks that degrade cache effectiveness and increase content-retrieval latency.
  • Summary and Future Directions in Cache Pollution Mitigation: Several defenses incur high computation costs, while others only detect pollution or address the less severe malicious-provider scenario.
  • Summary and Future Directions in Cache Pollution Mitigation: The survey proposes collaborative caching that exchanges cache states and content popularity to reduce unpopular-content caching and potentially contain pollution attempts.
  • Secure Naming: Secure naming binds content names to providers to support provenance and mitigate content poisoning; proposed naming schemes use RSA or identity-based cryptography.
  • Secure Naming: Naming schemes face transmission and signature-verification overheads, while identity-based approaches require a trusted private-key generator and additional infrastructure.
  • Secure Routing: Secure routing research covers NetInf and publish/subscribe architectures, including gateway-based and alternative-identifier approaches for public-private communication.
  • Secure Routing: Temporal link identifiers mitigate z-filter reuse but trade attack mitigation against topology-manager computation and packet-header size.

3) Secure Forwarding:

Secure forwarding addresses forwarding-plane attacks and namespace resolution, while application-layer filtering broadens protection but retains mobility, scalability, and feedback limitations.

  • Secure Forwarding: Secure forwarding either protects the forwarding plane or enables interest forwarding for name prefixes absent from router FIB tables.
  • Secure Forwarding: Interest NACKs help address prefix hijacking and PIT overload by signaling unsatisfied requests caused by congestion, absent content, or duplicates.
  • Secure Forwarding: Signed link objects and NDNS provide namespace mappings from content prefixes to globally routable prefixes, supporting provider mobility.
  • Secure Forwarding: The mobility scheme wastes bandwidth after provider movement because stale FIB entries continue routing interests to the former location until timeout.
  • Summary and Future Directions: Secure naming and routing remain computationally expensive because complete binding verification requires signature checks for each chunk, preventing line-speed verification.
  • Application-Layer Security: Application-layer security is organized into filtering, anomaly detection, and security suites spanning cyber-physical, application, and trust-oriented mechanisms.
  • Request Filtering: Publisher-and-subscriber voting filters spam better than publisher-only ranking, but user feedback can be sparse or manipulated and adds communication overhead.
  • Request Filtering: A semantic firewall filters by provider or content name and monitors abnormal peers, though large content universes and chunk populations remain unevaluated.

2) Anomaly Detection:

ICN anomaly detection mechanisms classify router behavior using statistical information, while related security suites span multiple architectural and application-level designs. These approaches face scalability, overhead, and trust-management limitations.

  • Anomaly Detection: Anomaly detectors use router statistics with SVM, clustering, particle-swarm optimization, or fuzzy logic to classify traffic as normal or abnormal.Features include FIB, PIT, and CS activity, bytes sent or received, content items, and interest outcomes.
  • Anomaly Detection: Fuzzy detection can reduce false positives, but its increased false-negative rate allows resourceful attackers to evade detection with sufficient traffic.
  • Security Suites: Proposed ICN security suites address cyber-physical systems, application-layer services, and trust or integrity models.Examples include lighting control, secure sensing, secure email, covert channels, information sharing, and dedicated security planes.
  • Trust and Integrity Model: Some security-plane designs are unnecessary when simple content-signing schemes already provide integrity assurances.
  • Trust and Integrity Model: Trust models bind names, identities, keys, and authorization through Web-of-Trust graphs or recursively evaluated trust rules.Trust-rule complexity and iterative key verification can burden mobile or power-constrained devices.

4) Summary and Future Directions in Application Security:

Application-level ICN security research spans filtering, anomaly detection, cyber-physical control, and other services, but no comprehensive suite covers all available functionalities. Privacy research categorizes attacks and examines timing-based cache leakage and its trade-offs.

  • Summary and Future Directions in Application Security: Application-level mechanisms include content filtering, anomaly detection, voting-based spam detection, firewall filtering, cyber-physical control, and information-sharing applications.
  • Summary and Future Directions in Application Security: No surveyed application incorporates all ICN security functionalities or provides a comprehensive application-level security suite.The survey identifies comprehensive integration as a future research interest.
  • Privacy Risks: Privacy attacks target routers, cached contents, names, signatures, and clients, with timing, monitoring, censorship, protocol, and naming-signature categories.
  • Timing Attack: Timing attacks infer cached content from latency differences between cache hits and misses, although they are less effective in publish-subscribe architectures.
  • Timing Attack: Artificial forwarding delays mislead timing attackers but reduce caching’s latency benefit and can degrade clients’ quality of experience, especially for popular content.

2) Summary and Future Directions in Timing Attack Mitigation:

Timing and communication-monitoring attacks exploit cache behavior to infer content popularity or individual requests. Existing mitigations trade privacy protection against caching efficiency, latency, communication cost, or architectural functionality.

  • Summary and Future Directions in Timing Attack Mitigation: Timing mitigations commonly add artificial delays, but this undermines caching’s latency advantage and can degrade quality of experience.
  • Summary and Future Directions in Timing Attack Mitigation: Collaborative caching can enlarge clients’ anonymity sets, improve performance, reduce retrieval latency, and avoid artificial delays.The survey identifies efficient collaborative caching as a natural future direction.
  • Communication Monitoring Attack: Communication-monitoring attacks target a specific victim’s requested contents, unlike timing attacks that identify content popularity.
  • Communication Monitoring Attack: Monitoring-attack models distinguish non-invasive probing, which assumes unchanged cache state, from invasive probing, where attacker requests create cache entries.
  • Summary and Future Directions in Communication Monitoring Mitigation: Mitigations include selective caching, secure tunnels, disabling caching for sensitive content, randomized naming, encrypted manifests, and strengthening vulnerable matching features.These measures can increase communication complexity and cost or reduce caching efficiency.

2) Proxy-based Mechanisms:

Proxy-based mechanisms hide requester identity, content names, or both through layered encryption, coding, and anonymizers. They provide anti-censorship or privacy benefits but commonly impose cryptographic, infrastructure, caching, or latency costs.

  • Proxy-based Mechanisms: Proxy-based approaches require clients to share secrets with proxies that decode requests, retrieve content, and return encrypted or encoded responses.
  • Encryption based Mitigation: ANDaNA uses two encrypted proxy layers so the first proxy sees client identity while the second sees the requested content name.
  • Encryption based Mitigation: ANDaNA’s secure-channel setup induces significant content-delivery delays compared with Tor, partly because of channel establishment.
  • Coding based Mitigation: Coding-based mechanisms use a single proxy for interest and content encryption or decryption, but proposed designs can limit cache utilization and require costly asymmetric cryptography.
  • Coding based Mitigation: Prefix-free coding lets routers on opposite sides of an anonymizer identify either content or requester, while Tourani et al.’s approach has the lowest reported computation complexity and infrastructure cost.The approach lacks trade-off analysis for cache utilization and privacy preservation.
  • Proxy-based Mechanisms: Across anonymous-communication mechanisms, major pitfalls include expensive cryptography, secure back-channel requirements, and undermined in-network caching.Most approaches apply across ICN architectures, except the brokering-network approach targeting PSIRP and PURSUIT.

1) Summary and Future Directions in Discovery and Protocol Attacks:

ICN discovery and naming features can expose popular content, content namespaces, and provider identities. Proposed privacy-preserving naming approaches trade semantic privacy and untraceability against trusted infrastructure, latency, false positives, or reduced caching.

  • Discovery and protocol attacks: Prefix matching, exclusions, and scope fields can probe popular objects and explore the content namespace.The survey recommends redesigning rather than eliminating these features, including possible namespace-specific rate limiting and analytical or experimental trade-off studies.
  • Name privacy: Human-readable ICN names expose information about content and providers through semantic binding.This creates name privacy concerns distinct from architectures requiring explicit content-name requests.
  • Name and signature privacy: Name obfuscation replaces human-readable names with machine-readable forms, while overlay schemes map real identities to digital identities through resolution services.The surveyed obfuscation approaches include content digests, Bloom filters, and ephemeral names; overlays use domain-specific identities and trusted resolution infrastructure.
  • Name and signature privacy: Self-verifying hash names provide low-cost content authentication but require trusted catalogs and mainly support read-only, cacheable objects.The catalog maps human-readable names to hashes, while dynamic content cannot be cataloged ahead of time.
  • Name and signature privacy: Ephemeral names improve publisher privacy but undermine caching because expired names cause cached content to be purged.This limitation is especially relevant for popular content, which otherwise benefits most from caching.
  • Name and signature privacy: Overlay naming requires trusted entities and adds name-resolution latency, while hierarchical Bloom-filter naming suffers from false positives.These trade-offs are summarized alongside self-verifying names in the survey’s privacy-mechanism classification.

3) Summary and Future Directions in Name and Signature Privacy:

ICN access control mechanisms address host-agnostic dissemination and caching through encryption, sessions, and PKI-based designs. Their principal trade-offs involve cache usability, revocation cost, latency, scalability, false positives, and dependence on online authorities.

  • Access-control overview: ICN’s name-based routing and in-network caching make access control important because routers may disseminate cached content without checking requester authorization.The survey classifies mechanisms as encryption-based or encryption-independent, with encryption-based schemes further divided by cryptographic type.
  • Encryption-based access control: Encryption-based mechanisms encrypt content before dissemination, requiring clients to authenticate and obtain decryption keys.Broadcast encryption can support efficient client revocation without re-encrypting content, but enabling blocks add overhead and revocation updates consume bandwidth.
  • PKI-based access control: 10 seconds: edge-router re-encryption for a 256MB content, a cost that undermines scalability when routers perform encryption.The survey identifies this concern as especially relevant to anticipated large multimedia traffic.
  • Session-based access control: Session-based access control authenticates clients and authorizes requests through secure client-provider sessions.The reviewed design makes intervening caches effectively unusable, requires a secure tunnel, and leaves potential idle-connection DoS exposure unexplored.
  • Session-based access control: Renaming content per session undermines caching, creates multiple names for one content, conflicts with name immutability, and raises per-content access overhead.This behavior is described for an IP-like session-based design in which authorized clients receive secure network-addressable names.
  • PKI-based access control: Bloom-filter authorization reduces network load but permits false positives, can grow with client population, and requires an always-online credential verifier.Recommended client revocation also incurs costly content re-encryption and redistribution.

3) Attribute-Based Access Control:

Attribute-based access control binds encrypted content or keys to attributes and policies, allowing authorization decisions from client attributes. The surveyed designs address policy privacy, revocation, and broker privacy but add proxy, hashing, latency, or key-management costs.

  • Attribute-based encryption: Attribute-based encryption encrypts content with attributes and gives clients keys derived from their attributes.Key-policy ABE places the policy in the decryption key, whereas ciphertext-policy ABE attaches required attributes to the encrypted content.
  • Attribute-based encryption: A trusted third party can manage attribute ontologies and policy-based encryption while encoding the encrypted symmetric key as the content name.Authorized clients recover the symmetric key using their attributes, while the naming scheme preserves access-policy privacy in caches.
  • Attribute-based encryption: Proxy-based ciphertext-policy ABE retrieves encrypted content and an access policy separately, with the proxy authenticating clients and decrypting the policy.The design uses two interests and forwards the decrypted policy to the client without caching it in the network.
  • Attribute-based encryption: Protecting pub/sub interests with hashing and ABE limits broker exposure but significantly increases content-retrieval latency.The added cost comes from interest hashing, ABE, and per-hop hash matching.
  • Identity-based access control: Identity-based hierarchical naming lets content subtrees inherit parent access policies, but chained encrypted keys make each revocation increase access cost.The scheme grants read or write access through encrypted root keys and supports lazy revocation.
  • Identity-based access control: An identity-based token scheme adds frequent name-resolution queries and challenge-response communication, while assigning content access decisions to the resolution service.The survey identifies both communication overhead and centralized decision authority as drawbacks.

B. Encryption Independent Approaches to Access Control

Encryption-independent access-control approaches use generic frameworks, trusted intermediaries, brokers, or interest-based disclosure rather than relying on one encryption primitive. Their limitations include extra state, latency, trust dependencies, incomplete revocation, and weakened caching.

  • Encryption-independent frameworks: Generic access-control frameworks can support multiple encryption mechanisms, including broadcast, attribute-based, and session-based schemes.One framework uses manifests and separates authorization structure from the underlying cryptographic choice.
  • Trusted intermediary approaches: Rendezvous-based access control uses an access-control provider to create policies and authenticate subscribers against them.The design requires policy-URI storage at rendezvous nodes or routers and introduces computation, communication, latency, trusted-provider, and revocation concerns.
  • Broker-based approaches: Trust-based pub/sub access control authenticates clients and publishers through brokers that evaluate trust and access levels.The proposal leaves client identification, revocation, communication overhead, and broker-network management insufficiently addressed.
  • Interest-based and disclosure approaches: Splitting content into a large cacheable portion and a publisher-held portion lets clients reconstruct content only after retrieving a client-specific share.The publisher-held share supports tracking, but the survey notes that identifying the leaking authorized client may not be possible.
  • Interest-based and disclosure approaches: Obfuscated names and authorized disclosure prevent unauthorized clients from obtaining content names and require responders to authenticate on the publisher’s behalf.Per-client or per-group name hashing can require inefficient precomputation and storage, while multiple names undermine caching effectiveness.
  • Token-based approaches: Token-based NDN access control combines provider-generated access tokens with Merkle-tree signatures for content access and integrity verification.Although faster than conventional RSA signing, it requires provider synchronization, token storage and refresh, and leaves client revocation unaddressed.

C. Summary and Future Directions in Access Control

The survey identifies availability, revocation, scalability, and privacy trade-offs as central challenges for ICN access control and security. It emphasizes mechanisms that preserve caching and address shortcomings through intrinsic protections and future research.

  • Access control availability: Online authorization can undermine cached-content availability when the authorization service is unavailable, motivating access control without an always-online entity.The survey identifies Misra et al. as an initial attempt in this direction.
  • Access control revocation: Efficient access-right revocation remains difficult because attribute-based schemes either require costly per-revocation re-keying or permit access after revocation.The survey treats revocation as a key design factor for scalable ICN access control.
  • Access control scalability: Router-enforced authentication can undermine scalability, while extensive communication and computation overheads burden proposed access-control mechanisms.Table X compares communication and computation overhead, burden-bearing entities, revocation, cache utilization, and enforcement entities.
  • Security and privacy trade-offs: Security and privacy countermeasures can harm legitimate clients, degrade QoS or QoE, increase network load, and raise download latency.Rate limiting can starve legitimate clients, privacy mechanisms can reduce caching effectiveness, and random delays trade protection for latency.
  • Security and privacy trade-offs: Name-based routing can improve DoS/DDoS resilience through interest distribution and request aggregation, but end-to-end privacy tunneling removes the benefit of in-network caching.The comparison contrasts CCN, NDN, and MobilityFirst with NetInf and PURSUIT.
  • Future directions: The survey recommends intrinsic protections, including strong cache verification and self-certifying naming, while noting unresolved questions about privacy architecture and access-control design.It also calls for mechanisms that protect content without undermining caching and other ICN principles.
Loading 1603.03409v3…