Source-linked AI summary

Penalizing side effects using stepwise relative reachability

Victoria Krakovna, Laurent Orseau, Ramana Kumar, Miljan Martic, Shane Legg

arXiv:1806.01186v2cs.LGcs.AIstat.ML

TL;DR

Safe reinforcement learning needs to avoid unnecessary environmental disruptions without relying on exhaustive hand-coded penalties. This paper separates penalty design into baseline and deviation choices, and reports that relative reachability or attainable utility paired with stepwise inaction avoids three identified incentives, unlike unreachability.

  • Problem

    General side-effect penalties are needed because enumerating disruptions or predefined features demands human input and may not scale, while reachability approaches can mis-incentivize agents in dynamic environments.

    Source: §1 · p. 2
  • Method

    The paper decomposes penalties into a baseline state and deviation measure, proposing stepwise inaction with relative reachability and comparing combinations that include attainable utility.

    Source: §1 · p. 2
  • Results

    Unreachability retains magnitude insensitivity under every baseline, whereas relative reachability and attainable utility with stepwise inaction avoid the three identified undesirable incentives.

    Source: §1 · p. 2
  • Takeaways & Limitations

    The paper concludes that bad incentives can arise from baseline or deviation-measure choices, and that its proposed choices avoid them in preliminary experiments.

    Source: §5 · p. 13

    With noop-defined stepwise inaction, side effects that would also occur under noop may escape penalty; defining a better task-independent baseline can be challenging.

    Source: §5 · p. 13

Abstract

from arXiv · show

How can we design safe reinforcement learning agents that avoid unnecessary disruptions to their environment? We show that current approaches to penalizing side effects can introduce bad incentives, e.g. to prevent any irreversible changes in the environment, including the actions of other agents. To isolate the source of such undesirable incentives, we break down side effects penalties into two components: a baseline state and a measure of deviation from this baseline state. We argue that some of these incentives arise from the choice of baseline, and others arise from the choice of deviation measure. We introduce a new variant of the stepwise inaction baseline and a new deviation measure based on relative reachability of states. The combination of these design choices avoids the given undesirable incentives, while simpler baselines and the unreachability measure fail. We demonstrate this empirically by comparing different combinations of baseline and deviation measure choices on a set of gridworld experiments designed to illustrate possible bad incentives.

1. Introduction

The introduction frames avoiding unnecessary disruptions as a safety goal and argues that general penalties must distinguish baseline choice from deviation measure to avoid bad incentives in dynamic settings.

1. Introduction

  • General approaches are needed because listing disruptions, defining state features, or using trial and error requires human input and may not scale to diverse environments.Source: §1 · p. 1
  • Starting-state reachability treats one and many broken vases alike and can prompt interference with spontaneous changes, limiting methods that assume agent-only change.Source: §1 · pp. 1–2
  • The paper separates side-effect penalties into baseline-state and deviation-measure choices, attributing interference and offsetting to baselines and magnitude insensitivity to measures.Source: §1 · p. 2

1.1. Preliminaries

  • The setup assumes a discounted Markov Decision Process and a special noop action equivalent to turning the agent off for one timestep.Source: §1.1 · p. 3

1.2. Intended effects and side effects

  • A useful penalty should discourage breaking a vase when a detour remains, yet permit breaking eggs required for an omelette; a hard reachability constraint would block both.Source: §1.2 · p. 3
  • An impact penalty measures deviation from a baseline and balances that penalty against task reward using a scaling parameter.Source: §1.2 · p. 3

2. Design choices for an impact penalty

An impact penalty separates the baseline state from the measure of deviation, and these choices can produce different bad incentives. The section proposes a stepwise inaction baseline and relative reachability to address interference, offsetting, and magnitude insensitivity.

2. Design choices for an impact penalty

  • The impact penalty’s baseline state and deviation measure are separate design choices that can be selected independently.The paper analyzes how each choice contributes to side-effect incentives.Source: §2 · p. 3

2.1. Baseline states

  • Starting-state penalties in dynamic environments can make the agent interfere with other agents or processes to prevent irreversible changes it did not cause.The Sushi environment illustrates this interference incentive.Source: §2.1 · p. 4
  • The inaction baseline avoids penalizing changes that would occur without the agent, but can incentivize offsetting by making the agent return the environment toward its counterfactual state.In the Vase environment, the agent may put the vase back after taking it off the belt and collecting the reward.Source: §2.1 · pp. 4–5
  • The stepwise inaction baseline follows the agent’s policy through step t−1, then takes an inaction action at step t, so each transition is penalized once when rewarded.Inaction rollouts from the current and baseline states can account for delayed action effects that a direct state comparison misses.Source: §2.1 · p. 5

2.2. Deviation measures

  • Unreachability assigns the maximum penalty to any irreversible action, regardless of its magnitude, and can therefore fail to favor the safer path in the Box environment.The paper reports that this penalty fails there for all baseline choices.Source: §2.2 · pp. 6–7
  • Relative reachability measures average reductions in states’ reachability from the current state relative to the baseline, making the penalty sensitive to effect magnitude.In the Box environment, pushing the box down makes more states unreachable than pushing it right, favoring the rightward move.Source: §2.2 · p. 7
  • Attainable utility compares attainable values across reward functions, while value-difference measures summarize weighted differences in value between current and baseline states.For relative reachability, the sources of value are states’ reachability; for attainable utility, they are maximum attainable rewards under reward functions.Source: §2.2 · pp. 7–8

3. Experiments

Across the gridworld experiments, the strongest combinations were relative reachability (RR) or attainable utility (AU) with stepwise inaction, and undiscounted RR with inaction. The experiments also show how baseline and measure choices affect interference, offsetting, and sensitivity to disruption magnitude.

Experimental setup

  • The experiments use tabular Q-learning, tune penalty scale on the final 100 episodes, and evaluate designer-defined performance that the agent does not observe.A perfect environment model supplies noop outcomes for inaction baselines; model-free baseline computation is left to future work.Source: §3 · pp. 8–9
  • The comparison varies starting-state, inaction, and stepwise-inaction baselines; UR, RR, and AU measures; and discounted or undiscounted penalties where available.Undiscounted AU is omitted because of convergence issues.Source: §3 · p. 8

Sushi environment

  • In Sushi, inaction and stepwise inaction penalties reach near-optimal performance, while starting-state RR and AU produce interference and score 0.The interference is removing sushi from the belt; starting-state UR also avoids interference, but because its penalty is always maximal.Source: §3 · p. 9

Overall results

  • RR and AU with stepwise inaction, and undiscounted RR with inaction, perform best overall across the environments.Figure 7 scales performance from 0 for unsafe behavior to 1 for optimal behavior.Source: Figure 7 · p. 10, §3 · p. 11

Vase environment

  • In Vase, all stepwise inaction penalties perform well, while absolute-function penalties produce offsetting by penalizing removal of the vase.Undiscounted truncation avoids offsetting because taking the vase off the belt is reversible and is not penalized.Source: §3 · pp. 9, 11

Box environment

  • In Box, RR and AU achieve near-optimal performance across baselines, while UR scores 0 because it does not distinguish recoverable from irrecoverable box positions.The safe longer path scores 1 and the unsafe shorter path scores 0; an agent without a penalty also scores 0.Source: §3 · p. 11

Effects on interruptibility

  • With the inaction baseline, decrease-penalizing RR and AU disable the off switch, while difference-penalizing variants do not.The experiments report only inaction-baseline results because the implementation's deterministic assumption for recursive inaction rollouts does not hold in this environment.Source: §3 · p. 11
  • Difference-penalizing reachability or attainable utility can impede desirable environmental changes more than penalizing decreases.This is a trade-off of penalizing differences, even though the decrease-penalizing inaction variants preserve interruptibility in the tested environment.Source: §3 · pp. 11–12

4. Additional related work

Related work addresses side effects through safe exploration, state-feature criteria, empowerment, uncertainty about objectives, and human oversight. The paper contrasts their assumptions and limitations with intrinsic side-effect penalties.

Safe exploration

Side effects criteria using state features

  • State-feature approaches query or reward changes to features, but rely on assumptions about allowed features or the environment's starting organization [Zhang et al., 2018, Shah et al., 2019].The passage describes these approaches as not general in their present form because they rely on state features.Source: §4 · p. 12

Empowerment

Uncertainty about the objective

  • Inverse Reward Design and quantilization address uncertainty about objectives, but do not provide a way to quantify side effects [Hadfield-Menell et al., 2017, Taylor, 2016].Inverse Reward Design assumes the training-environment reward is correct, so it does not prevent side effects caused by a misspecified training reward.Source: §4 · p. 13

Human oversight

5. Conclusions

The paper identifies interference, offsetting, and magnitude insensitivity as bad incentives tied to baseline or deviation-measure choices, and proposes design choices that avoid them in preliminary experiments.

  • The authors attribute interference and offsetting to baseline choice, and magnitude insensitivity to deviation-measure choice.They report that proposed choices avoid these incentives in preliminary experiments.Source: §5 · p. 13
  • Exact relative reachability is not tractable beyond gridworlds because it requires all-pairs reachability and a simulator-computed baseline.The authors suggest using representative states as a more practical alternative.Source: §5 · p. 13
  • A noop-based inaction baseline can miss agent-caused effects that would also occur under noop, while a task-independent alternative can be difficult to define.The paper gives following the road as a possible alternative to noop while driving.Source: §5 · p. 13
  • The authors call for theoretical work to characterize and formalize undesirable incentives from different side-effect-penalty design choices.Source: §5 · p. 13
  • Discounted relative reachability accounts for the time needed to reach states but not the reward costs incurred along the way.The authors suggest adding a reward-cost term; a one-step route may still incur a large negative reward.Source: §5 · pp. 13–14
  • The measure could weight states differently to reflect that some states’ reachability matters more, with weights potentially learned from human feedback.Source: §5 · p. 14
  • The work aims to lay foundations for a practical approach to avoiding side effects in more complex environments.Source: §5 · p. 14

A. Relationship between discounted and undiscounted reachability

This section relates discounted and undiscounted reachability: as the discount factor approaches one, discounted reachability approaches undiscounted reachability.

B. Reachability variant for large state spaces using a measure of similarity between states

For large state spaces, the paper extends reachability to states similar to a target under a distance measure; similarity-based discounted reachability converges to its undiscounted version as γr approaches 1.

C. Relative reachability computation example

The example computes relative reachability in a two-vase environment where the agent’s goal is to do nothing and can break either vase.

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