Source-linked AI summary

Fighting Deepfake by Exposing the Convolutional Traces on Images

Luca Guarnera, Oliver Giudice, Sebastiano Battiato

arXiv:2008.04095v1cs.CV

TL;DR

Deepfake detection is challenging, while CNN-based approaches can lack robustness, generalization, and independence from image semantics. This paper extracts GAN-related Convolutional Traces with Expectation-Maximization and uses them for detection. The authors report strong discrimination, robustness to attacks, and results that surpass state of the art in almost all comparisons.

  • Problem

    CNN-based Deepfake detectors can lack robustness and generalization, remain context-specific, and rely on image semantics rather than a unique fingerprint.

    Source: B. Deepfake detection methods · p. 3
  • Method

    Expectation-Maximization extracts Convolutional Traces as a fingerprint of GAN generation, which a Random Forest classifier uses for fakeness detection.

    Source: §I · p. 2, §III · p. 4
  • Results

    The approach achieves the best classification results in almost all state-of-the-art comparisons and is reported to be robust to attacks and independent of image semantics.

    Source: §I · p. 2, §VII · p. 12
  • Takeaways & Limitations

    The extracted Convolutional Traces can identify whether an image is a Deepfake and which GAN architecture generated it.

    Source: §VII · p. 12

    The improved classification after a 90-degree anticlockwise rotation may relate to a major CT direction and warrants further investigation.

    Source: 5) JPEG compression with quality… · p. 11

Abstract

from arXiv · show

Advances in Artificial Intelligence and Image Processing are changing the way people interacts with digital images and video. Widespread mobile apps like FACEAPP make use of the most advanced Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) to produce extreme transformations on human face photos such gender swap, aging, etc. The results are utterly realistic and extremely easy to be exploited even for non-experienced users. This kind of media object took the name of Deepfake and raised a new challenge in the multimedia forensics field: the Deepfake detection challenge. Indeed, discriminating a Deepfake from a real image could be a difficult task even for human eyes but recent works are trying to apply the same technology used for generating images for discriminating them with preliminary good results but with many limitations: employed Convolutional Neural Networks are not so robust, demonstrate to be specific to the context and tend to extract semantics from images. In this paper, a new approach aimed to extract a Deepfake fingerprint from images is proposed. The method is based on the Expectation-Maximization algorithm trained to detect and extract a fingerprint that represents the Convolutional Traces (CT) left by GANs during image generation. The CT demonstrates to have high discriminative power achieving better results than state-of-the-art in the Deepfake detection task also proving to be robust to different attacks. Achieving an overall classification accuracy of over 98%, considering Deepfakes from 10 different GAN architectures not only involved in images of faces, the CT demonstrates to be reliable and without any dependence on image semantic. Finally, tests carried out on Deepfakes generated by FACEAPP achieving 93% of accuracy in the fake detection task, demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed technique on a real-case scenario.

I. INTRODUCTION

GANs have made realistic, easily produced Deepfakes a safety concern. The paper proposes extracting Convolutional Traces as a fingerprint to address CNN detectors’ limits in robustness, generalization, and semantic dependence.

  • GAN-generated Deepfakes are realistic, increasingly easy for non-experts to create, and can raise safety concerns.The introduction describes mobile apps such as FACEAPP as enabling realistic face transformations with a few taps.Source: §I · pp. 1–2
  • CNN-based detectors can be context-specific, lack robustness and generalization, and rely on image semantics rather than a unique fingerprint.The paper identifies these as limits of recent detection approaches.Source: §I · p. 2
  • The paper uses Expectation-Maximization to extract GAN-related Convolutional Traces and Random Forest classification for fakeness detection.The approach is also tested for robustness to image attacks and generalization across ten GAN architectures.Source: §I · p. 2
  • The approach achieves the best classification results in almost all reported state-of-the-art comparisons while running on a common laptop CPU.The paper contrasts this computational demand with CNN-based methods that require substantial hardware and time.Source: §I · p. 2

II. RELATED WORKS

The section describes GANs as an adversarial framework with a generator and discriminator trained together. Their objective is to make generated samples follow the training-data distribution.

  • A GAN consists of a generative model G and discriminative model D, which are trained simultaneously in a min-max two-player game.G captures the data distribution, while D estimates whether samples come from training data rather than G.Source: §II · p. 2
  • G maps random input z to output x, while D estimates whether x comes from the training-data distribution pdata.The figure is described as a schematic of the GAN learning framework.Source: §II · pp. 2–3, Figure 2 · p. 3
  • Training aims for G to make D unable to distinguish generated samples from training samples, so the generated distribution pg follows pdata.The section notes that GANs can use different generative-model implementations and lists image translation, super-resolution, completion, and text-to-image generation.Source: §II · p. 3

A. Deepfake Generation Techniques for Faces

The section surveys GAN architectures for face generation and manipulation, from multi-domain attribute changes to increasingly realistic synthetic faces.

  • STARGAN performs image-to-image translation across multiple domains, while ATTGAN uses latent-space constraints to modify attributes.Examples include changing hair color or facial expression.Source: A. Deepfake Generation Techniques for… · p. 3
  • GDWCT uses group-wise deep whitening and coloring to improve image translation and style-transfer efficiency and quality.Source: A. Deepfake Generation Techniques for… · p. 3
  • STYLEGAN produced images for the “this person does not exist” website, and STYLEGAN2 improved its generator to fix some imperfections and create more realistic images.The described changes include redesigned normalization, multi-resolution, and regularization methods.Source: A. Deepfake Generation Techniques for… · p. 3

B. Deepfake detection methods

Prior detection methods analyze frequency anomalies, train CNNs, or classify images hierarchically. The section also describes a persistent need for methods that capture GAN-specific traces without semantic reliance or high computational cost.

  • Fourier-domain analysis uses frequency anomalies for detection; Guarnera et al. [4] reported preliminary insights, while Zhang et al. used a simple strategy with good performance.Wang et al. [18] proposed FakeSpotter, monitoring the behavior of a dedicated CNN to detect generated faces.Source: B. Deepfake detection methods · p. 3
  • Wang et al. trained ResNet-50 on ProGAN images and reported generalization to other architectures and robustness to JPEG compression, blurring, and scaling.Source: B. Deepfake detection methods · p. 3
  • DAD-HCNN uses three hierarchical levels to distinguish real from altered images, retouched from GAN-generated images, and then identify the GAN architecture.The passage reports high accuracy for detecting retouching and GAN-generated images.Source: B. Deepfake detection methods · p. 3
  • CNN methods can achieve good results but tend to discriminate image semantics over GAN-specific traces and are computationally intensive and difficult to control.The paper identifies these as motivations for analytical fingerprint-based detection.Source: B. Deepfake detection methods · p. 3
  • The paper evaluates ten generation architectures, with 2,000 images generated for each, to test generalization and robustness.The architectures include CYCLEGAN, STARGAN, ATTGAN, GDWCT, STYLEGAN, STYLEGAN2, PROGAN, FACEFORENSICS++, IMLE, and SPADE.Source: B. Deepfake detection methods · p. 4

III. EXTRACTING CONVOLUTIONAL TRACES

The method estimates local pixel correlations to capture traces left by GAN transpose-convolution layers. It uses an EM model to extract a Convolutional Trace (CT) from each RGB channel, then concatenates the channel features.

III. EXTRACTING CONVOLUTIONAL TRACES

  • The EM-derived CT represents local pixel correlations associated with GAN transpose-convolution layers, providing a feature vector that encodes image-generation structure.The method models natural pixels and other pixels as separate distributions and estimates the correlation kernel using weighted least squares.Source: §III · p. 4
  • EM alternates between estimating each pixel’s probability of belonging to the natural model and updating model parameters, including the kernel.The natural model is Gaussian with zero mean and unknown variance; the alternative model is uniform.Source: §III · p. 4
  • The kernel feature vector excludes k0,0 and is concatenated across the three RGB channels to form the image’s CT.For a 3×3 kernel, the resulting vector has 24 elements.Source: §III · p. 6
  • CT extraction requires no training and is not a deep-learning architecture, so it does not encode high-level image semantics.The finalized pipeline applies EM to each RGB channel, concatenates the features, and uses Random Forest for real-versus-Deepfake classification.Source: §III · p. 6, Figure 4 · p. 6

IV. CLASSIFICATION OF DEEPFAKES

The section tests Convolutional Traces (CTs) across ten GAN architectures, comparing real images with generated images and evaluating both pairwise and combined detection. A Random Forest reaches 98% accuracy on the combined real-versus-deepfake task, while additional tests examine similar generators and FACEAPP images.

IV. CLASSIFICATION OF DEEPFAKES

  • For real-versus-GAN pairings, maximum accuracy was 92.99% for ATTGAN and 93.59% for CYCLEGAN, both using KNN with a 3×3 kernel.ATTGAN used KNN with K = 5 or 7; CYCLEGAN used K = 3.Source: §IV · pp. 7–8
  • Maximum pairwise accuracy was 97.31% for FACEFORENSICS++, 91.58% for GDWCT, 97.76% for IMLE, and 95.85% for PROGAN.Each result used KNN with a 3×3 kernel; the K values were 3, 9, 3, and 5, respectively.Source: §IV · p. 8
  • Maximum pairwise accuracy was 96.72% for SPADE, 90.55% for STARGAN, and 99.48% for STYLEGAN.SPADE used KNN with K = 3 and a 3×3 kernel; STARGAN used linear SVM and a 7×7 kernel; STYLEGAN used KNN with K = 3 and a 5×5 kernel.Source: §IV · p. 8
  • A 3×3 kernel achieved the best average results across the classification tests, although the best kernel varied by task.The reported maximum for STYLEGAN2 was obtained with a 5×5 kernel.Source: §IV · p. 8
  • CTs distinguished STYLEGAN from STYLEGAN2 with 99.31% maximum accuracy, despite the architectures being similar.The authors note that even a slight generator modification leaves different traces; on the separate real-versus-STYLEGAN2 task, accuracy reached 99.64%.Source: §IV · p. 8
  • 98% accuracy was obtained with Random Forest for real-versus-deepfake classification across all 10 architectures.The task used a 70% training split and five-fold cross-validation.Source: §IV · p. 8, Table III · p. 8
  • The experiments include four non-face generators, and the authors report that CTs also detect deepfakes that do not depict faces.Those architectures are CYCLEGAN, PROGAN, IMLE, and SPADE.Source: §IV · pp. 6, 8
  • FACEAPP testing correctly classified 437 of 471 generated images as deepfakes, using the previously trained Random Forest without further training.The authors attribute some errors possibly to low light or minimal changes to source images.Source: §IV · pp. 8–9

V. ROBUSTNESS EXPERIMENTS

The robustness experiments apply several image transformations to real and deepfake face images, then test real-versus-deepfake classification. The described attacks target pixel details or correlations that may carry CT information.

V. ROBUSTNESS EXPERIMENTS

  • The experiment applies attacks to CELEBA images and deepfakes from ATTGAN, GDWCT, STARGAN, STYLEGAN, and STYLEGAN2.Classifications compare attacked real images with attacked deepfakes for each architecture.Source: §V · p. 9
  • Random rectangles remove image details, potentially obscuring pixel correlations used by CTs.The authors expect this to be a concern when rectangles cover the few elements changed by ATTGAN or STARGAN.Source: §V · p. 9
  • Gaussian blur, rotation, and scaling are tested because their noise or interpolation may alter pixel correlations and CT information.The tested rotations are 45°, 90°, and 180°; scaling is +50% or −50%.Source: §V · p. 9

5) JPEG compression with quality factor equal to 50:

The robustness results report that CT classification withstands almost all tested attacks, with performance varying by image dataset and size. A 90° anticlockwise rotation unexpectedly improves classification for every considered architecture.

5) JPEG compression with quality factor equal to 50:

  • JPEG quality-factor-50 compression is included as a real-world-like test because the authors compare it with compression used by social networks and messaging apps.The section notes that compression removes high-frequency information that may matter for CT discrimination.Source: 5) JPEG compression with quality… · pp. 9, 11
  • CT extraction remains robust to almost all considered attacks in the real-versus-deepfake classification tests.The reported table uses the final classifier on an augmented dataset, with 70% for training and five-fold cross-validation.Source: 5) JPEG compression with quality… · p. 11, Table IV · p. 11
  • STYLEGAN and STYLEGAN2 images achieve the best attacked classification accuracies, which the authors attribute to their larger original image size.GDWCT images are the smallest and are least robust to attacks; their accuracy remains comparable to the un-attacked result only under JPEG compression.Source: 5) JPEG compression with quality… · p. 11
  • A 90° anticlockwise rotation, which introduces no interpolation, unexpectedly improves classification for every considered architecture.The authors suggest this may relate to a major CT direction and say it warrants further investigation.Source: 5) JPEG compression with quality… · p. 11

VI. COMPARISONS WITH DEEPFAKE DETECTION METHODS

The proposed approach outperforms Wang et al. on SPADE, IMLE, and CYCLEGAN, which do not produce face images, and exceeds FakeSpotter on average across five architectures. A VGG-16 baseline achieves only 53% accuracy on the binary task.

VI. COMPARISONS WITH DEEPFAKE DETECTION METHODS

  • 53% accuracy is the best result from VGG-16 on the Real-versus-all-10-Deepfakes binary task, similar to a random classifier.The passage also describes CNN methods as context-dependent, prone to overfitting, and likely to rely on image semantics.Source: §VI · p. 11
  • Accuracy exceeds 90% in all five tested architectures, and the proposed method beats FakeSpotter on average, though it is slightly lower on PROGAN and FACEFORENSICS++.The five architectures are STYLEGAN, STYLEGAN2, STARGAN, PROGAN, and FACEFORENSICS++.Source: §VI · p. 12, Figure 9 · p. 12
  • The proposed method obtains better results than Wang et al. on SPADE, IMLE, and CYCLEGAN, architectures that do not produce face images.The comparison reports Average Precision and mean Average Precision across architectures.Source: §VI · p. 12, Figure 10 · p. 12

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS

The paper concludes that Expectation-Maximization extracts Convolutional Traces as fingerprints with discriminative power, attack robustness, and independence from image semantics. It also points to input rotation as a way to improve results, leaving investigation of the most important direction to future work.

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS

  • Expectation-Maximization extracts Convolutional Traces that can identify Deepfakes and their generating GAN architecture, with reported discriminative power, attack robustness, and semantic independence.The authors state that rotating input images to find the most important direction can yield better results and plan to investigate this in future work.Source: §VII · p. 12
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