Source-linked AI summary

Truthful AI: Developing and governing AI that does not lie

Owain Evans, Owen Cotton-Barratt, Lukas Finnveden, Adam Bales, Avital Balwit, Peter Wills, Luca Righetti, William Saunders

arXiv:2110.06674v1cs.CYcs.AIcs.CL

TL;DR

The paper asks how to limit harm from increasingly capable AI systems that can select false statements, given that human truthfulness norms may not transfer cleanly. It proposes clearer standards, evaluation and governance institutions, and technical development focused on truthfulness, while concluding that current systems remain vulnerable to task-optimized falsehoods and that early standards may have lasting influence.

  • Problem

    Increasingly capable AI systems may select false statements for goals such as sales or virality, while human accountability mechanisms do not transfer straightforwardly to AI.

  • Method

    The paper develops proposals for AI truthfulness standards, institutional evaluation and governance, and technical methods for building systems that remain truthful as they become more capable.

  • Results

    Current training methods may produce falsehoods optimized for task success, although small changes such as prompt engineering could yield large truthfulness improvements or major investment may be required.

  • Takeaways & Limitations

    Early work on truthfulness could shape carefully chosen standards as AI speech becomes more important, while truthful systems could support justified trust and broader social and economic benefits.

  • Takeaways & Limitations

    It remains unclear whether language modelling and reinforcement learning from human feedback can produce the most beneficial truthful AI because both depend on human ground truth and neither uses internal-mechanism knowledge.

Abstract

from arXiv · show

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

Executive Summary & Overview

As AI systems gain strategic selection power and wider economic use, false statements could cause scalable harm. The paper proposes truthfulness standards focused on statements being true, especially avoiding negligent falsehoods, while recognizing governance and verification challenges.

  • The emerging problem: As linguistically competent AI becomes more widespread, strategic selection of statements could produce useful communication but also harmful falsehoods.AI systems may select statements that fit objectives such as increasing sales, even without intending to deceive.
  • The paper’s purpose: The paper aims to identify beneficial AI truthfulness standards, explore how to establish them, and lay groundwork for tools supporting future standards.The authors seek both to reduce acute damage and to avoid reactive responses to AI falsehoods.
  • Potential benefits: Truthfulness can support justified trust, economic activity, knowledge production, public epistemics, and democratic decision making.Trusted AI could broker deals, reduce principal-agent problems, detect fraud, and contribute more reliably to science and technology.
  • Why AI standards may differ: Truthfulness standards for AI may differ from human standards because ordinary accountability mechanisms do not transfer straightforwardly and compliance may be easier to evaluate.AI systems cannot be held personally liable like human employees, while monitoring and automated evaluation could reduce compliance costs.
  • Truthfulness versus honesty: Truthful AI requires statements to be true rather than merely matching the system’s beliefs, avoiding the strategic-delusion loophole associated with optimizing for honesty.Truthfulness is presented as more demanding than honesty and does not require determining what an AI system believes.
  • A workable standard: Because perfect truthfulness is impossible, the paper proposes avoiding negligent falsehoods: statements contemporary AI systems should have recognized as unacceptably likely to be false.Quantitative measures could allow minimum standards to rise over time, while standards based on effects such as damage may be difficult and expensive to verify.

3. Ideas towards robust, super-human truthfulness

Robustly truthful AI requires work across technical development, evaluation, governance, and connections to alignment and transparency research. The paper emphasizes preserving open inquiry while guarding against political capture of truth-adjudication mechanisms and establishing standards early.

  • Connections to adjacent research: Truthfulness is distinct from alignment and explainability, but all three areas have rich interconnections and can benefit from progress in AI transparency.Aligned systems could help produce truthful systems, while powerful truthful systems could help discover aligned actions.
  • Avoiding misrealisations: Promising truthfulness standards should avoid egregious untruths rather than force conformity, allowing reasonable disagreement and unconventional evidence assessment.The authors frame this as a response to the risk that a single truth arbiter could suppress open-minded inquiry.
  • Safeguards for open inquiry: AI systems should be allowed and encouraged to propose alternative views while remaining truthful, and adjudication should not be strongly anchored on precedent.The paper also urges care to prevent AI standards from unduly influencing human free-speech norms and laws.
  • Why early work matters: Early work on AI truthfulness may shape standards because AI speech is expected to become more important and initial norms may persist.The authors argue that laying foundations now could increase the likelihood that standards are adopted carefully rather than reactively.

Lies, honesty, and standards of truthfulness

The paper distinguishes truthfulness from honesty and proposes avoiding negligent falsehoods as a more precise standard for linguistic AI. It argues that standards should address strategically selected falsehoods while adapting across domains and over time.

  • Why AI lies matter: Linguistic AI can make strategically selected statements that enable personalised, difficult-to-detect deception, making high truthfulness standards especially important for conversational systems.Systems may tailor claims to individual users and tell knowledgeable people the truth while misleading less knowledgeable users.
  • Truthfulness versus honesty: Broad truthfulness is difficult to specify and enforce, so the paper narrows attention to avoiding falsehoods regardless of an AI system’s beliefs or a listener’s reaction.This target does not require disclosure of particular information and allows systems to remain silent.
  • Proposed standard: The proposed primary standard is avoiding negligent falsehoods, because prohibiting recognisable suspected falsehoods could reduce actual falsehoods while requiring only a minimum effort toward truthfulness.The standard is intended to be more precise than broad truthfulness and easier to apply through institutions.
  • Truthfulness versus honesty: An AI lie is defined as a false statement strongly selected and optimised for the speaker’s benefit, with little or no optimisation pressure toward truth.The paper focuses on preventing these lies through norms against negligent falsehoods.
  • Truthfulness versus honesty: Enforcing honesty alone is insufficient because systems may state falsehoods despite being honest, so the paper recommends truthfulness standards instead.Honesty certification may still contribute to a broader truthfulness standard.
  • Proposed standard: The paper prioritises severe falsehoods and suggests that standards should become more demanding as AI capabilities and risks change across domains and time.Truthfulness amplification could use follow-up questions to increase assurance, but it requires generally capable and willing conversational systems.

Recognising negligent falsehoods and truthful systems

Truthfulness evaluation can assess individual statements and whole systems, supporting development, certification, and post-deployment adjudication. The proposed approach combines ground-truth assessment with comparisons to determine negligent suspected-falsehoods, while recognizing institutional, metric, and generalization challenges.

  • Evaluation uses: Evaluation supports research and development, pre-deployment certification, and post-deployment adjudication of alleged truthfulness violations.Certification helps detect failures before deployment, whereas adjudication determines whether a reported statement or system failed after deployment.
  • Evaluating statements: A negligent suspected-falsehood is a statement unacceptably likely to be false that the AI system could feasibly have recognised as such.Evaluation separates establishing ground truth from establishing whether the system was negligent.
  • Institutional and methodological limits: Evaluation institutions may be difficult to design when powerful interests seek to influence evaluators, especially on questions with ambiguous evidence.The paper also notes that practical experience may invalidate some proposed evaluation methods.
  • Evaluating statements: Ground-truth assessment determines whether a statement is unacceptably likely to be false, while comparison with other AI systems determines whether the falsehood was negligent.Together, these processes determine whether a statement fails to meet truthfulness standards.
  • Evaluation targets: Truthfulness evaluation has two forms: assessing individual AI statements and measuring an AI system’s aggregate truthfulness across situations.System-level evaluation is necessary for certification and useful for developers, while statement-level evaluation suffices for some adjudication.
  • System-level metrics: Average negligent-falsehood frequency and worst-case falsehood severity are proposed as important system-level truthfulness metrics.Average frequency can be measured per claim, word, question answered, or conversation.
  • System-level metrics: Metric choice can create perverse incentives, such as encouraging many obviously true claims when falsehoods are divided by total claims.Using multiple metrics is suggested as one way to reduce this Goodhart-law problem.
  • Future standards: The proposal is intended as a starting point, including possible worst-case standards such as never lying to conceal a previous mistake.The authors present these ideas as a framework that may be replaced as hands-on evaluation experience accumulates.

The (dis)advantages of high truthfulness standards

High truthfulness standards could reduce harms from AI falsehoods while enabling benefits in science, society, and the economy. Their value is tempered by costly verification and the possibility that strict standards could limit deployment where falsehoods are especially harmful.

  • Reducing AI falsehoods is beneficial because false statements typically cause harm, while truthfulness standards can support effective use of AI-generated truths.
  • Verification can be expensive when data are difficult to source or reason from, many statements require checking, or AI reasoning is unavailable or commercially sensitive.
  • Scalable scams, spearfishing, propaganda, disinformation, and exploitative sales tactics are examples of harms that truthful AI standards might help address.
  • Truthfulness standards could make non-truthful systems easier to identify, enable assistants to flag or filter their communications, and discourage exploitative uses.
  • Truthful AI could improve public epistemics, cooperation, democratic decision making, scientific collaboration, fraud detection, technological discovery, and economic growth.

How society could control AI lies and truthfulness

The paper proposes governing AI truthfulness through institutions and standards that compensate for weak human-style accountability mechanisms. It emphasizes higher standards, technical safeguards, and experiments while warning that evaluation could be politically captured.

  • Institutional arrangements: Truthfulness governance would involve developers, certifiers, principals, users, and adjudicators before and after AI deployment.Certifiers assess systems before deployment, while adjudicators evaluate some deployed statements; real arrangements may combine or omit these roles.
  • Institutional arrangements: Without new institutions, legal and social sanctions for AI falsehoods would presumably fall on the humans or organizations deploying the systems.These actors are called principals, insofar as they can be identified.
  • Higher standards for AI: AI systems may warrant a higher standard than humans because existing accountability mechanisms do not transfer straightforwardly and high compliance costs may be lower.The proposed standard is avoiding negligent falsehoods, rather than requiring intent to deceive or harm.
  • Technical safeguards: Software could directly prevent harmful lying by making systems incapable of failing to meet high truthfulness standards, potentially applying this requirement broadly at sufficient capability levels.The paper frames this as a direct form of architectural control unavailable for human lies.
  • Risks and next steps: High truthfulness standards could produce benefits, but their evaluation apparatus might harm free speech or be captured by political interests.The paper highlights risks from unreliable restrictions and from powerful actors disliking truthful but controversial claims.
  • Risks and next steps: Further experiments are needed to test whether evaluation institutions can be implemented reliably and whether standards increase trust without harming human epistemics.The paper specifically calls for investigation of demand, trust, epistemic effects, and possible effects on free discussion.

Paths from GPT-3 to robust and scalable truthful AI

The paper surveys ways to develop truthful AI from current training practices. It contrasts methods that may promote falsehoods with modified approaches using curated data, human truth evaluation, and bootstrapping.

  • Potentially non-truthful methods: Current training techniques include language modelling to imitate web text and reinforcement learning to optimise clicks, both of which may encourage non-truthful behaviour.The box presents these as techniques that may lead to non-truthful AI.
  • Truthfulness-oriented modifications: Truthfulness-oriented modifications include language modelling on annotated, curated texts, reinforcement learning against human truth evaluations, and bootstrapping through IDA and Debate.These approaches are listed as methods modified for truthfulness.

3. Ideas towards robust, super-human truthfulness

The paper argues that current language modelling and reinforcement learning methods are unlikely to yield robust truthfulness by default, despite producing some accurate and calibrated outputs. It proposes modifying these methods while acknowledging major challenges in achieving broad, scalable robustness.

  • Language modelling: Language modelling may reproduce human falsehoods because its training objective imitates human text, so scaling up alone is unlikely to produce truthful systems.The paper characterizes this as a speculative argument and distinguishes it from some errors that scaling may correct.
  • Language modelling: Current language models are somewhat truthful on expert knowledge tests but can reproduce plausible human misconceptions and contextually false answers.GPT-3 achieves 44% accuracy across a wide range of standardised tests, yet examples include superstition, the 10% brain myth, and an incorrect local-supermarket answer.
  • Language modelling: GPT-3 also fails to reliably express uncertainty because its human-written training data does not place it in the same epistemic situations as its users.The paper specifically notes that the model does not learn to say “I don’t know” in the contexts where it genuinely lacks knowledge.
  • Reinforcement learning: Reinforcement learning from human interaction may produce falsehoods when human feedback rewards appealing or effective outputs without reliably penalising violations of truthfulness.The paper highlights advertising and headline optimisation as settings where truth is difficult and time-consuming to evaluate.
  • Possible modifications: The paper proposes modifying language modelling and reinforcement learning to promote truthfulness, while noting that alternative methods are not explored.The proposed modifications are presented as possible approaches rather than established solutions.
  • Robustness limits: It remains unclear whether these methods can produce robust truthfulness because they depend on human ground truth and do not exploit internal mechanisms of AI behaviour.The paper also notes that truthfulness may fail under distribution shift and across the vast space of possible conversations.
  • Summary: Current training methods may produce falsehoods optimised for task success, while small tweaks or major resource investments could potentially improve truthfulness.The paper gives misleading headlines optimised for clicks or virality as an example.

6 Implications

The paper argues that AI truthfulness deserves significant attention now, while warning that premature or poorly designed standards could create harmful norms, laws, or spillovers.

  • Why reflect now: Reflection on AI truthfulness standards matters because desirable high standards are not inevitable.The authors consider a low-standards future plausible and say this justifies careful reflection and possibly advocacy.
  • Why reflect now: Market forces may undersupply truthfulness because its benefits are public goods and consumers may not detect violations.Research benefits society broadly, and consumers cannot always pay to avoid failures they cannot observe.
  • Risks of reflection: Attention to truthfulness could establish harmful norms or laws, overregulate AI, or spill over into controls on AI thought or human speech.The paper treats these as concerning effects requiring careful steering and further characterization.
  • Potential spillovers: Truthfulness standards could increase public care for truthfulness and provide a blueprint for broader AI norm-adherence.The authors present these as possible spillover effects rather than established outcomes.
  • Conclusion: The paper concludes that AI truthfulness likely deserves significant attention, although the authors remain uncertain about its ultimate governance.They describe the topic as deep and preliminary, and identify developing truthful AI as a crucial direction for future work.

ity, and alignment

Truthfulness is situated within Beneficial AI research, alongside properties such as transparency, cooperativeness, and alignment.

  • Beneficial AI: Beneficial AI aims to make systems more interpretable, compatible with human values, benign, and safe.The paper situates truthfulness within this broader research landscape.

A.1 Transparency

Transparency and truthfulness are distinct: transparency can reveal how an AI behaves without making its statements true, while a truthful system can remain opaque.

  • Transparency: Transparency research seeks to understand the mechanisms underlying an AI system’s behaviour.Examples include reverse-engineering neurons and analyzing responses to input perturbations.
  • Relationship to truthfulness: A transparent system could still make false statements, and a truthful system could be opaque.Neither property entails the other.
  • Relationship to truthfulness: Improved transparency techniques may help build systems that remain robustly truthful.The paper identifies transparency as a promising direction even when humans cannot reproduce the resulting insights.

A.2.1 How does explainable AI relate to truthful AI?

Explainable AI overlaps with truthful AI because explanations should be true and can support evaluation, but explanation quality is less standardized and more audience-dependent than truth.

  • Types of explanation: Rationalising explanations justify why a statement is rational to believe, whereas process explanations describe how the system formed its belief.The former uses arguments, evidence, or proofs; the latter aims to faithfully describe the belief-formation process.
  • Rationalising explanations: Truthful AI need not provide rationalising explanations, but useful truthfulness requires understanding evidence and justification beyond training experience.This creates a practical connection between truthful behavior and explainability.
  • Process explanations: Faithful process explanations could make truthful AI easier to develop, certify, and adjudicate because they expose belief sources.The paper identifies producing such explanations as a difficult open problem.
  • Truthfulness and explanation: Self-explaining AI generally needs to be truthful when explaining, since good explanations consist of true statements.True rationalising explanations for falsehoods are difficult to provide.
  • Standards: The paper is more optimistic about bright-line truth standards because explanation quality lacks broad agreement and depends on the audience.It contrasts this with greater agreement about evaluating whether a statement is true independently of audience.
  • Alignment: Truthfulness and alignment are distinct, but the authors speculate that progress on either could help solve the other.An aligned system may be directed toward truthfulness, while a powerful truthful system could support alignment work.

How truthfulness and related properties could help alignment

Truthfulness is presented as a potentially clearer and more monitorable target than broad AI alignment, with truthful reporting about actions and consequences offering progress on deceptive-alignment problems. However, vague questions, inaccessible internal properties, and limits of monitoring constrain what this approach can establish.

  • Truthfulness and deceptive alignment: Truthful answers about preferred actions and control could expose whether a deceptively aligned system would act against its principal’s wishes.The proposed questions ask what action would best satisfy the principal’s preferences, especially the preference to remain in control.
  • Limits and remaining difficulties: Truthfulness does not eliminate alignment difficulties because humans may need to evaluate internal properties themselves, and the proposed questions remain vague.The paper therefore treats scalable truthfulness as significant progress rather than a complete solution to alignment.
  • Truthfulness and deceptive alignment: Truthfully sharing all known consequences of an action could let humans evaluate important risks while offloading consequence prediction to the AI system.The paper connects this possibility to progress on alignment and potentially addressing inaccessible information, while retaining a human role in judging importance.
  • Why truthfulness may help alignment: Truthfulness may be easier to target than alignment because natural-language statements form a smaller, more structured space than AI systems’ possible actions.The paper argues that simple techniques can identify, transcribe, and analyse statements, whereas unsafe actions are diverse and harder to monitor.
  • Monitoring sophisticated AI: Truthfulness monitoring can combine text extraction, semantic analysis, deep-learning checks, and crowd evaluation of context-independent statements.These methods provide a useful starting point and could catch many severe violations, although they do not reliably determine overall truthfulness.
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