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Large Language Models in Cybersecurity: State-of-the-Art
Farzad Nourmohammadzadeh Motlagh, Mehrdad Hajizadeh, Mehryar Majd, Pejman Najafi, Feng Cheng, Christoph Meinel
TL;DR
LLMs create defensive opportunities in cybersecurity while also being usable for malicious activity, and the literature leaves offensive risks less examined. This review categorizes defensive and offensive applications using the NIST cybersecurity and MITRE attack frameworks, finding many defensive evaluations but a lack of research examining offensive risks.
Problem
Method
Results
The review finds numerous evaluations of defensive applications but a lack of research examining offensive risks, with published defense studies concentrated on detection and protection.
Source: §3.4 · p. 5, §5 · p. 8Takeaways & Limitations
The review calls for future research assessing risks associated with LLMs in cybersecurity and developing solutions for post-attack scenarios.
Source: §3.4 · p. 5, §5 · p. 8SecureFalcon’s adaptability is limited because its FormAI dataset focuses exclusively on C code.
Source: §3.3 · p. 4
Abstract
from arXiv · showhide
The rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) has revolutionized our comprehension of intelligence bringing us closer to Artificial Intelligence. Since their introduction, researchers have actively explored the applications of LLMs across diverse fields, significantly elevating capabilities. Cybersecurity, traditionally resistant to data-driven solutions and slow to embrace machine learning, stands out as a domain. This study examines the existing literature, providing a thorough characterization of both defensive and adversarial applications of LLMs within the realm of cybersecurity. Our review not only surveys and categorizes the current landscape but also identifies critical research gaps. By evaluating both offensive and defensive applications, we aim to provide a holistic understanding of the potential risks and opportunities associated with LLM-driven cybersecurity.
1 INTRODUCTION
LLMs offer cybersecurity practitioners defensive capabilities while also giving malicious actors new ways to attack. This review examines both sides and organizes applications using established cybersecurity frameworks.
1 INTRODUCTION
- LLMs’ ability to process complex natural-language patterns lets security experts explore attack vectors involving textual data.The paper situates this capability amid broader LLM adoption across fields including education, entertainment, business, and healthcare.Source: §1 · p. 1
- LLMs can support cybersecurity defense through log analysis, anomaly detection, vulnerability identification, and automated fixes.These applications aim to identify emerging vulnerabilities and improve organizations’ security posture.Source: §1 · p. 1
- LLMs can also be misused to execute malware, evade defenses, obtain credentials, and generate personalized phishing messages.WormGPT is described as automating personalized phishing emails, while FraudGPT generated content to persuade users to click a link.Source: §1 · p. 1
- The paper frames LLM-enabled offensive approaches with the MITRE attack framework and defensive strategies with the NIST cybersecurity framework.It also surveys major LLM functionalities and potential cybersecurity applications.Source: §1 · pp. 1–2
2 BACKGROUND
The background traces LLMs from earlier language-processing developments to transformer-based models and describes deployment approaches. It situates this review among prior surveys by focusing on cybersecurity applications, both defensive and offensive.
2 BACKGROUND
- LLMs are neural networks trained on textual data to perform language-related tasks.The background traces NLP developments from early chatbots through long short-term memory systems and Stanford CoreNLP to transformer architecture.Source: §2 · p. 2
- Transformer advances enabled diverse LLMs, while fine-tuning adapts general-purpose models to industry-specific criteria.The background also notes deployment challenges such as high costs, hardware requirements, and slow training, alongside retrieval, parameter tuning, and distillation approaches.Source: §2 · p. 2
- Unlike prior surveys of LLM architecture or safety, this review focuses on LLM applications in cyberdefense and cyberattack.The cited prior literature includes surveys addressing LLM safety and architecture.Source: §2 · p. 2
3 DEFENSIVE APPLICATIONS OF LLMS
The survey maps defensive LLM work onto NIST’s five functions, describing applications from risk identification through incident response and highlighting sparse post-attack coverage.
3 DEFENSIVE APPLICATIONS OF LLMS
- The review classifies defensive LLM approaches using NIST’s functions: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover.It uses the framework to organize studies according to their role in managing cybersecurity threats and incidents.Source: §3 · p. 2
3.1 Identify
- LLMs support risk identification by analyzing diverse sources, classifying application-review risks, and synthesizing organizational data into risk profiles and plans.The reviewed work also describes LLM-generated risk assessments, contingency plans, and reporting.Source: §3.1 · p. 2
3.2 Protect
- Protect applications include web-content filtering, GPT-3 honeyword generation, and LLM-assisted cybersecurity education and team collaboration.The honeyword approach depends on preserving password components, or “chunks”; models also face limitations on conceptual queries.Source: §3.2 · pp. 2–3
- LLM-assisted vulnerability repair uses Bounded Model Checking before and after code generation, but real-world fixing remains sensitive to defect definition and prompt phrasing.The reviewed work reports that simulated vulnerabilities were fully fixed, while real-world scenarios presented performance challenges.Source: §3.2 · p. 3
3.3 Detect
- Other detection work spans CTI models, penetration-testing support, phishing-site analysis, and smart-contract auditing, where a separate study reported frequent false positives.The smart-contract studies include analysis of 52 compromised DeFi protocols and evaluation on 10,000 contracts across nine vulnerability types.Source: §3.3 · pp. 3–4
- Detection approaches include adaptive broken-access-control analysis, log anomaly scoring, and SecureFalcon code-flaw detection, whose adaptability is limited by its C-only dataset.Log analysis is described as real-time and as reducing false positives without significantly affecting unusual-behavior detection.Source: §3.3 · pp. 3–4
3.4 Respond
- Respond approaches include honeypot interfaces that maintain attackers’ interest and automated email engagement, though the latter requires substantial storage and computation.ShelLM also retains terminal-session content as context for later sessions.Source: §3.4 · pp. 4–5
- Most reviewed work addresses Protect and Detect, while Identify, Respond, and especially Recover have comparatively sparse coverage.The authors identify post-attack response and recovery as research gaps.Source: §3.4 · p. 5, Figure 1 · p. 5
4 ADDVERSARIAL APPLICATION OF LLMS
The review analyzes LLM-enabled cyberattacks through the MITRE attack framework, covering attacker tactics from reconnaissance to command and control.
4.1 Reconnaissance
- LLM-enabled reconnaissance includes scraping target information and prompting models to adopt target personas.These approaches are described as supporting collection and analysis of potential victims.Source: §4.1 · p. 5
4.2 Initial Access
- Studies cover LLM-generated phishing forms, persona-adapted messages, guided password modeling, and malware-generation tests.The malware tests included broad and specific prompts and checks by AV, EDR, and VirusTotal.Source: §4.2 · pp. 5–6
4.3 Execution
- LLM-modified malware samples varied in antivirus detection, and reported LLM-generated executables sometimes evaded commercial antivirus and EDR tools.A described script hid PowerShell and scheduled daily execution; it also added a registry value to run at startup.Source: §4.3 · p. 6
4.4 Defense Evasion
- Only three of twelve antivirus applications identified the turnkey malware studied, and generated non-obfuscated malware had a reduced detection rate.The review also describes process injection, encryption, and other evasion techniques, plus phishing-site tactics that mask content from crawlers.Source: §4.4 · pp. 6–7
4.5 Credential Access
- PassGPT uses GPT-2 to estimate password strength and guess passwords, with guided generation allowing constraints such as length and fixed characters.Source: §4.5 · p. 7
4.6 Collection
- LLMs can generate credential-taking input forms and iFrame injection code; one described ChatGPT scam used a hidden iFrame with a fake Amazon page.Source: §4.6 · p. 7
4.7 Command and Control
- An LLM-based plugin interfacing with GPT-2 generated executables and automated connections between victim machines and servers for command and control.The described method used a website-hosted attacker command and maintained valid user-agent lists to mask the server component.Source: §4.7 · p. 7
- Initial access, defense evasion, and execution are the primary concentration points among reviewed LLM-based attack methodologies.The paper says cybersecurity professionals should prioritize these phases when developing protection methods.Source: §4.7 · p. 7
5 CONCLUSION
The paper reviews LLM applications in cybersecurity and categorizes defensive and adversarial work using NIST and MITRE frameworks. It finds comparatively less research examining offensive risks.
- The review categorizes LLM applications in cyberdefense with the NIST cybersecurity framework and cyberattacks with MITRE.Source: §5 · p. 8
- The authors conclude that LLMs can strengthen defense, while their potential misuse cannot be underestimated.Source: §5 · p. 8
- The review finds numerous studies of defensive opportunities but a lack of research examining offensive risks, and calls for further risk assessment.Source: §5 · p. 8