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A Critical Analysis of Deployed Use Cases for Quantum Key Distribution and Comparison with Post-Quantum Cryptography

Nick Aquina, Bruno Cimoli, Soumya Das, Kathrin Hövelmanns, Fiona Johanna Weber, Chigo Okonkwo, Simon Rommel, Boris Škorić, Idelfonso Tafur Monroy, Sebastian Verschoor

arXiv:2502.04009v2cs.CR

TL;DR

The paper addresses the lack of comprehensive practical security analysis in published QKD use cases. It evaluates documented deployments and compares QKD with alternatives, finding that QKD offers limited or no advantage in most analyzed cases and has significant practical constraints.

  • Problem

    Available QKD use-case sources often omit security requirements, key use, protected data and duration, protocols, topology, guarantees, additional cryptographic components, and comparisons with alternatives.

    Source: §1 · p. 3

  • Method

    The paper systematically selects sufficiently documented fiber-network use cases and analyzes their technology, security goals, and protected data before comparing them with classical cryptographic alternatives.

    Source: §1 · p. 3

  • Results

    In most sufficiently documented use cases, QKD provides limited or no advantage over PQC or pre-shared keys, while the analysis identifies theoretical and practical constraints including physical assumptions, cost, and poor scaling.

    Source: §7 · p. 31

  • Takeaways & Limitations

    The comparison suggests QKD's possible advantage is narrow, while PQC offers a more direct transition path for existing systems and infrastructure.

    Source: §7 · p. 31

    One analyzed use case leaves its protected data, protection duration, and threat scope unclear, and cryptographic protocols cannot address code execution or privilege escalation.

    Source: Analysis and recommendation · p. 27

Abstract

from arXiv · show

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is currently being discussed as a technology to safeguard communication in a future where quantum computers compromise traditional public-key cryptosystems. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive security evaluation of QKD-based solutions, focusing on real-world use cases sourced from academic literature and industry reports. We analyze these use cases, assess their security and identify the possible advantages of deploying QKD-based solutions. We further compare QKD-based solutions with Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), the alternative approach to achieving security when quantum computers compromise traditional public-key cryptosystems, evaluating their respective suitability for each scenario. Based on this comparative analysis, we critically discuss and comment on which use cases QKD is suited for, considering factors such as implementation complexity, scalability, and long-term security. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the role QKD could play in future cryptographic infrastructures and offer guidance to decision-makers considering the deployment of QKD.

1 Introduction

Quantum computing threatens current cryptography, including data captured today for later decryption, while QKD has infrastructure, distance, and deployment constraints. Existing use-case reports leave key security details and comparisons underexamined; this paper evaluates documented deployments and compares QKD with alternatives.

1 Introduction

  • A Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later attack can record encrypted data in transit and decrypt it once a quantum computer becomes available.The introduction distinguishes this confidentiality risk from retroactive breaches of authentication, which relies on real-time verification.Source: §1 · pp. 1–2
  • QKD may avoid PQC's computational assumptions, but distance, wireless, infrastructure, and standardization constraints prevent it from serving as a general-purpose public-key replacement.QKD also requires quantum-secure authentication and symmetric encryption to provide confidentiality and authenticity.Source: §1 · p. 2
  • Government agencies generally prioritize PQC, with some describing QKD as suitable only for niche use cases or cautioning against sole reliance on it.The introduction reports positions from the NSA, ANSSI, BSI, NLNCSA, Swedish authorities, and NCSC.Source: §1 · p. 2
  • Investments by governments and companies are advancing quantum communications, while identifying relevant use cases is presented as important for adoption and research.The introduction reports a global quantum communication market valuation of USD 1.1 billion in 2023 and a projection of USD 8.6 billion by 2032.Source: §1 · p. 2
  • Prior surveys, industry reports, and deployments describe QKD applications across sectors, but do not provide a comprehensive practical security analysis of the use cases.The cited examples span backup, enterprise and critical-infrastructure networks, healthcare, genome data security, finance, and government communications.Source: §1 · p. 3
  • The paper evaluates sufficiently documented fiber-network use cases against security goals, technology, and protected data, then compares them with classical alternatives and offers recommendations.Use cases lacking adequate information are excluded from the analysis but listed in the appendix.Source: §1 · p. 3

Acronyms

This section expands technical and institutional abbreviations used in the paper, including cryptographic algorithms, network concepts, and organizations.

Acronyms

  • AES means Advanced Encryption Standard; AKE means Authenticated Key Exchange; ANSSI is Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information; AONT means All-or-nothing transform; ASIC means Application-Specific Integrated Circuit.Source: Acronyms · p. 3
  • BSI is Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik; Ciemat is the Research Centre for Energy, Environment and Technology; COW means Coherent One Way; CRQC means Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer; CSIC is the Spanish National Research Council.Source: Acronyms · p. 3
  • CV-QKD means Continuous Variable QKD; CWDM means Coarse Wavelength Division Multiplexing; DHKX means Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange; DM means Discrete Modulation; DPS-QKD means Differential Phase Shifted QKD; DRC means Disaster Recovery Center; DV-QKD means Discrete Variable QKD.Source: Acronyms · pp. 3–4
  • FN-DSA means FFT over NTRU-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm; FPGA means Field-Programmable Gate Array; GM means Gaussian Modulation; GMAC means Galois Message Authentication Code; HMAC means Hash-based Message Authentication Code; HNDL means Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later.Source: Acronyms · p. 4
  • HQC means Hamming Quasi-Cyclic; HSM means Hardware Security Module; IPsec means Internet Protocol Security; IRTF means Internet Research Task Force; ITS means Information-theoretic security; KEM means Key Encapsulation Mechanism; KM means Key Management; KMS means Key Management System.Source: Acronyms · p. 4
  • LMS means Leighton–Micali Signatures; LWE means Learning With Errors; M-LWE means Module Learning With Errors; MAC means Message Authentication Code; MACsec means Media Access Control security; MAN means Metropolitan Area Network; MDI-QKD means Measurement-Device-Independent QKD.Source: Acronyms · p. 4
  • ML-DSA means Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm; ML-KEM means Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism; NCSC means Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum; NEC means Nippon Electric Company; NICT means National Institute of Information and Communications Technology; NIST means National Institute of Standards and Technology.Source: Acronyms · p. 4
  • NTRU means N-th degree Truncated polynomial Ring Units; OTP means One-Time Pad; P2P means Point-to-point; PCS means Post-Compromise Security; PKI means Public Key Infrastructure; PQ means Post-Quantum; PQC means Post-Quantum Cryptography; QKD means Quantum Key Distribution.Source: Acronyms · p. 4

2 Background

This section establishes the security properties and assumptions relevant to QKD, PQC, and pre-shared-key alternatives, including QKD’s authenticated quantum-channel model and practical assumptions. It outlines QKD service models and network constraints, including deployment limitations and trade-offs among protocol families.

2.1 Security properties

  • Confidentiality hides message content or makes keys indistinguishable from random, while authenticity verifies parties and message content; forward secrecy protects past messages and PCS enables recovery after compromise.Both forward secrecy and PCS can be supported by regularly refreshing session keys, for example through QKD; PCS can also use an authenticated key exchange.Source: §2.1.1 · p. 5, §2.1.2 · p. 6

2.2 Computational and information-theoretical security; 2.3 One-Time Pads and Message Authentication Codes

  • Information-theoretic security covers perfect or statistical guarantees, whereas computational security bounds attackers’ success; OTPs provide unconditional confidentiality but require one-use keys, and universal-hash MACs provide statistical authenticity.An OTP alone provides no authenticity, so it must be paired with an authentication mechanism such as a MAC.Source: §2.2 · p. 6, §2.3 · p. 6

2.4 Encryption with pre-shared keys

  • Pre-shared keys can suit a small number of known endpoints, but OTP use requires repeated trusted distribution of data-length keys; symmetric encryption needs fewer key bits, while pre-shared schemes lack PCS.A 1 TB card can store almost 60,000 years of 256-bit AES keys used once per minute; after a breach, compromised future key material may remain unavailable until another exchange.Source: §2.4 · pp. 6–7

2.5 Asymmetric cryptography, PQC; 2.5.1 Strengths

  • Asymmetric cryptography scales across existing networks but RSA and DHKX rely on computational assumptions vulnerable to quantum attacks; PQC runs on classical systems and can integrate into existing protocols, though authentication is harder for QKD.The paper lists standardized PQC key-establishment and signature schemes, including ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA.Source: §2.5 · p. 7, §2.5.1 · p. 7

2.5.2 Challenges; 2.5.3 Assumptions of classical cryptography (including PQC)

  • PQC can impose larger data footprints, slower computation, compatibility problems, and difficult hardware updates; its security still depends on computational hardness assumptions and correct implementations.The assumptions include lattice, hash, and decoding-error problems; classical implementations can also leak through timing, power, or other side channels.Source: §2.5.2 · p. 8, §2.5.3 · pp. 8–9

2.6 Quantum Key Distribution

  • QKD establishes shared secrets over a quantum channel, but requires an authenticated channel and provides Q-ITS only under quantum-mechanical and implementation assumptions.Using those keys with OTPs and statistical authentication can provide quantum-information-theoretic confidentiality and authenticity, while computationally secure symmetric encryption retains computational assumptions.Source: §2.6 · pp. 9–10

2.6.1 Assumptions about QKD

  • QKD assumes quantum theory’s relevant correctness and completeness, no useful device leakage, an authenticated classical channel, and correct protocol implementation; long-distance links require repeaters or trusted nodes.Pre-shared-key authentication can fail after key compromise, while signature-based authentication retains computational assumptions; repeaters are not yet practical at scale and trusted nodes introduce compromise risk.Source: §2.6.1 · pp. 10–11

2.7 Types of QKD service; 2.8 QKD network topology

  • QKD services range from customer-operated equipment to provider-operated keys, data transport, or QKD-secured services; network deployments can share classical and key-management infrastructure, but quantum channels face fiber-sharing challenges.WDM can support shared KM and application layers, while the quantum layer encounters crosstalk, scattering, and the need for filters that bypass optical amplifiers.Source: §2.7 · p. 11, §2.8 · pp. 11–12

2.8 QKD network topology

  • Operators face integration challenges because service channels must synchronize with quantum channels, and no QKD protocol has yet been standardized for adoption.Using the same or parallel fibers is preferred; the passage identifies DV-QKD and CV-QKD as the two main protocol families.Source: §2.8 · p. 12
  • QKD’s low key rates trail fiber data rates, limiting real-time OTP use; distance limits and the lack of quantum repeaters require chains of trusted intermediate nodes.QKD and classical transmission remain virtually separated despite sharing fiber, in part because QKD is incompatible with components such as amplifiers and because their signal powers differ substantially.Source: §2.8 · pp. 12–13
  • DV-QKD is the most technologically mature family, but costly single-photon detectors and crosstalk sensitivity limit deployment; MDI-QKD removes receiver-implementation dependence, while TF-QKD extends distance beyond 500 km in field deployment.MDI-QKD has significantly lower key rates than BB84, and measurement-independent systems remain less mature than other DV-QKD deployments. TF-QKD’s reported rate was significantly lower.Source: §2.8 · p. 13
  • CV-QKD can lower costs and improve telecom and WDM compatibility; discrete-modulation variants offer simpler implementation and higher capacity at very low SNR, but losses limit distance [87].CV-QKD also shows greater resilience to classical noise [88], while significant signal post-processing and calibration effort is required.Source: §2.8 · p. 13
  • Field demonstrations of GM and QAM-DM CV-QKD used deployed links below 20 km, while DM CV-QKD achieved key rates beyond 1 Mbps at short distances; practical security assumes perfect state separation [92].The passage notes that real-network deployment still needs significant effort and that perfect state separation cannot be guaranteed in practical CV-QKD systems.Source: §2.8 · p. 14

3 Comparison of communication protocols.

The section compares protocols by security properties, key management, complexity, and scalability. It contrasts highly secure but difficult-to-scale approaches with more practical options whose security depends on computational assumptions or quantum infrastructure.

3 Comparison of communication protocols

  • The comparison considers classical, quantum, and post-quantum protocol combinations across security properties, key management, complexity, and scalability.The protocols are summarized in Table 3.Source: §3 · p. 14, Table 3 · p. 15

3.1 Pre-shared keys + OTP + ITS-MAC

  • Pre-shared keys with OTP and ITS-MAC provide perfect confidentiality and statistical authenticity, but equal-length keys and in-person exchange make the method poorly scalable.Key exposure compromises communications encrypted with that key; the method suits highly sensitive, low-frequency communication.Source: §3.1 · p. 14

3.2 Pre-shared keys + Symmetric encryption

  • Pre-shared keys with symmetric encryption reduce key-size demands relative to OTP, but advance exchange and quadratic key distribution keep scalability poor.This approach is occasionally used for secure messaging among a fixed group of users.Source: §3.2 · p. 14

3.3 Pre-shared authentication keys + ITS-MAC + QKD + OTP

  • Pre-shared authentication keys with QKD, OTP, and ITS-MAC provide Q-ITS confidentiality and PCS, but require quantum infrastructure and quadratic in-person exchanges.The approach is feasible only in specific settings, such as some government and military communications.Source: §3.3 · p. 14

3.4 QKD + OTP + Signatures

  • QKD with OTP and signatures provides Q-ITS confidentiality and computational authenticity, while quantum-channel distance and network-operator trust constrain deployment.Star networks can alleviate some challenges but require trust in the operator.Source: §3.4 · p. 14

3.5 QKD + Symmetric encryption + Signatures

  • QKD plus symmetric encryption and signatures provides PCS, but retains poor scalability because quantum channels are required; star topologies can improve feasibility.Its confidentiality depends on both computational and quantum-information-theoretic assumptions.Source: §3.5 · p. 15

3.6 Authenticated key exchange + Symmetric encryption

  • Authenticated key exchange with symmetric encryption offers computational confidentiality and authenticity, straightforward key management, and excellent scalability for large networks.PKI enables efficient, automated authentication-key distribution; TLS and VPNs commonly use this protocol type.Source: §3.6 · pp. 15–16

4 Current use cases

The paper selects use cases with sufficient technical information and presents them chronologically. They span elections, finance, data sharing and backup, genome data, industrial data, vehicles, and energy systems.

4 Current use cases

  • The authors analyze technically detailed use cases selected from literature and other sources, ordering them by year and summarizing them in Table 4.They note that limited details make analysis of all available use cases impractical.Source: §4 · p. 16, Table 4 · p. 19

4.1 Authenticity of election results (2007)

  • In Geneva’s 2007 election, QKD keys supported AES-256 confidentiality and HMAC-SHA-256 authenticity for transmitting vote-count totals over 4 km of fiber.ID Quantique supplied the devices.Source: §4.1 · p. 16

4.3 Financial data (2019)

  • The 2019 Wall Street–New Jersey demonstration multiplexed QKD and commercial data over one dark fiber, avoiding a dedicated fiber for the quantum channel.The demonstration transmitted an uncompressed live video stream using CWDM, with the quantum channel in the O-band and other channels in the C-band.Source: §4.3 · p. 16

4.4 Distributed information sharing and backups

  • Distributed storage cases combine secret sharing with QKD-protected transfers, including facial-recognition data, cryptocurrency key shares, medical images, and medical-record backups.The cases describe different sharing and encryption designs, including Shamir’s Secret Sharing, AES with QKD keys, and an all-or-nothing transform.Source: §4.4 · p. 16, §4.4.1 · p. 17, §4.4.2 · p. 17

4.5 Connecting data centers (2020)

  • The SIG data-center link used QKD keys to augment AES encryption and retained functionality by falling back to non-augmented keys when QKD keys were unavailable.The connection protected sensitive data processed in cloud applications.Source: §4.5 · p. 17

4.6 Genome data (2020)

  • In Toshiba’s genome-data trial, transmitting 24 OTP-encrypted genome datasets took under four minutes after sequencing had taken over 117 hours.The broader trial transmitted genome data over 7 km of fiber and reported stable communication above 10 Mbps.Source: §4.6 · p. 17

4.7 Metrics of an overbraider machine (2020)

  • QKD-generated keys protected overbraider production metrics over 7 km of fiber, while a self-driving-car demonstration exchanged key material with QKD-enabled charging stations for an OpenVPN connection.The car’s connection was intended for remote software updates and telemetry transmission.Source: §4.7 · p. 18, §4.8 · p. 18

4.9 Grid network (2022)

  • Energy and genome-sharing cases applied QKD to smart-grid links and SCADA authentication, and to encrypted evolutionary distances computed without revealing institutions’ genome sequences.The smart-grid demonstrator connected two power stations; the SCADA case authenticated non-confidential control and measurement traffic.Source: §4.9 · p. 18, §4.10 · p. 18, §4.11 · p. 18

5 Method of analysis

The analysis structures comparisons around how QKD keys are used, network topology, and security guarantees. It examines protocols and devices alongside the data and protections relevant to each use case.

5 Method of analysis

  • The analysis compares use cases through questions about key use, network topology, and security guarantees.These questions structure the later discussion.Source: §5 · p. 21

5.1 How is the key used?

  • The protocol determines which data is encrypted and can determine the symmetric cipher used, so the analysis asks what data and protocol the keys protect.It also considers additional cryptography and how long the data needs protection.Source: §5.1 · p. 21

5.2 What does the network topology look like?

  • Topology, QKD protocols, devices, and trusted-node configurations affect security guarantees, scalability, and deployment feasibility.The analysis checks whether the design aligns with the use case’s security requirements.Source: §5.2 · p. 21

5.3 What security guarantees does the system provide?

  • The security assessment focuses primarily on confidentiality and authenticity; correctness and availability are also defined, but analyzed cases showed no major issues with them.OTP provides secrecy independent of attacker computational resources under the stated key-secrecy and single-use assumptions, unlike AES’s computational security.Source: §5.3 · p. 21, §5.1 · p. 21

6 Use case assessment and recommendations

The assessment compares QKD deployments with traditional cryptography and PQC, examining their security goals, key use, protocols, devices, and alternatives. Across the cases, the authors identify settings where QKD adds little or where deployment choices leave important security concerns.

6 Use case assessment and recommendations

  • The assessment examines each use case’s key use, protocols, devices, security guarantees, and alternatives, summarizing its analysis in Table 5.The comparison largely treats quantum and computational assumptions as suitable for the security requirements.Source: §6 · p. 21, Table 5 · p. 29

Comment on backups in general

  • Backup deployments use QKD for transport protection, but backup data also needs protection at rest, and dynamically created keys may need to be stored with the backup.The authors recommend considering pre-existing encryption keys and, depending on the case, secret-sharing those keys among multiple parties.Source: Comment on backups in general · p. 22

Analysis and recommendation

  • For election totals sent after polls close, confidentiality is unnecessary; the authors conclude QKD adds no value when authentication alone suffices.They describe transmission of votes while they are being cast as a different, confidentiality-requiring scenario that could introduce additional attack vectors.Source: Analysis and recommendation · p. 22
  • For financial data, QKD provides transport security, while physical AES-key exchange is a viable, more secure but more labor-intensive alternative; facial-recognition data may require long-term protection.The authors note that authenticated key exchange could also provide transport security for biometric data.Source: Analysis and recommendation · pp. 23–24
  • For digital-asset keys, QKD cannot prevent a CRQC from recovering private keys from public keys, and the use case protects asymmetric secrets while assuming those cryptosystems are secure.The authors question the use case given QKD’s significant overhead compared with classical cryptosystems.Source: Analysis and recommendation · p. 24
  • For medical data, the authors identify long-term confidentiality needs but question a trusted server that secret-shares records, suggesting direct encryption under secret-shared keys instead.For medical-image shares, an attacker who breaks the TLS connection would still need a second share; physical AES-key exchange is also a viable alternative in one deployment.Source: Analysis and recommendation · pp. 24–25
  • The authors regard genome and exome transmission using one-time-pad encryption as among the more reasonable cases, while finding no fundamental problem with QKD’s use for manufacturing data.For the genome case, they also note that physically exchanging key material is an alternative given the short distance between endpoints.Source: Analysis and recommendation · p. 26
  • For cars, pre-installed keys updated during maintenance are presented as more practical alternatives; for smart-grid cases, the authors identify unclear threat goals and authentication-only uses where QKD adds no value.The smart-grid review recommends first specifying a threat model; one case’s AES-GMAC does not provide information-theoretic authentication.Source: Analysis and recommendation · pp. 27–28

sults

The listed use cases cover election links, financial data, facial recognition, key storage, medical data, data centers, utilities, and manufacturing. The passages describe the security aims and data handled, but provide only fragmented details for several entries.

sults

  • The election-results entry concerns securing the link between ballot-counting stations and government data centers.Source: sults · p. 29

6.3 Financial

  • The financial-data entry protects transmissions between financial centers, including trading algorithms and customer accounts.Source: §6.3 · p. 29

6.4.1 Facial

  • The facial-recognition entry concerns transmitting biometric feature data and protecting it in a face-recognition system.Source: §6.4.1 · p. 29

6.4.2 Key stor-

  • The key-storage entry concerns protecting digital-asset private keys, which are described as secrets for computationally secure cryptography.Source: §6.4.2 · p. 29

6.4.3 Medical im-

  • The medical entries cover transmitting data fragments between hospitals and external storage, as well as medical-record backup.Source: §6.4.3 · p. 29, §6.4.4 · p. 29

6.5 Connecting

  • Other listed aims include symmetric key exchange between data centers, utility operations and customer data, and manufacturing-data transmission.Source: §6.5 · p. 30, §6.7 · p. 30

chine

The listed vehicle-related use cases concern secure software updates and telemetry, alongside securing communications between power stations and authenticating measurement and control data.

chine

  • The car-related entry concerns securing software updates and telemetry data.Source: §6.8 · p. 30
  • Another stated aim is quantum-protected software updates for an autonomous control system.Source: §6.8 · p. 30
  • The remaining fragments mention secure communication between power stations and authenticity for measurement and control data.Source: §6.8 · p. 30

tions

The listed genome-distance-sharing use case concerns securing transmission of genome Hamming distances with CV-QKD and one-time-pad encryption.

tions

  • The use case concerns sharing genome Hamming distances securely in transmission.Source: tions · p. 30
  • CV-QKD is listed for the genome-distance-sharing case.Source: tions · p. 30
  • One-time-pad encryption is also listed for the genome-distance-sharing case.Source: tions · p. 30

7 Conclusion

The paper finds that QKD’s theoretical security advantages are constrained by physical assumptions, cost, scalability, and applicability. Across the analyzed use cases, QKD usually offers little advantage over PQC or pre-shared keys, with possible benefits mainly for short-distance OTP links.

7 Conclusion

  • QKD avoids computational assumptions but requires physical assumptions, and current systems face high implementation costs, poor scaling, and limited applicability.Source: §7 · p. 31
  • Most analyzed use cases show very limited or no QKD advantage over PQC or pre-shared keys; possible benefits center on short-distance OTP links.Such links might protect data against attackers with unlimited computational resources; genome-data sharing is one example.Source: §7 · p. 31
  • PQC offers a more direct transition path for existing systems, while decision-makers must weigh the trade-offs between PQC and QKD.Source: §7 · p. 31

A Not considered use cases

Some use cases lacked relevant information, so the authors list them for completeness but cannot assess their potential impact.

A Not considered use cases

A.1 Madrid QCI use cases

The appendix distinguishes Madrid QCI cases that were excluded or lacked enough information from QuantumCTek use cases summarized from company materials. The latter claims could not be independently verified from the available technical information.

A.1 Madrid QCI use cases

  • Madrid QCI examples were excluded when they were not use cases, were out of scope, lacked information, or involved an insecure proof-of-transit protocol.The listed exclusions also include a cloud-service delivery model and system features rather than use cases.Source: §A.1 · p. 31

A.2 Quantum CTek use cases

  • QuantumCTek’s website descriptions lacked enough technical information to analyze the cases or verify the original project claims.Source: §A.2 · p. 32
  • The QuantumCTek examples span metro networks and communications for government, finance, research, events, and public security.Examples include the Hefei network’s three-tier topology and the Xinhua network’s simulated equity and bond transactions.Source: §A.2 · p. 32
  • Other listed cases include a Beijing–Shanghai backbone, database synchronization, Alibaba cloud interconnection, and banking data transmission.The ICBC description reports transmission over a thousand kilometers; the co-propagation test reports QKD over 100 kilometers without trusted nodes alongside an 8Tbps DWDM system.Source: §A.2 · pp. 32–33

Authors’ contributions

  • The literature search was conducted by NA, BC, and SD; multiple authors contributed to analysis, writing, review, and revision.Source: Authors’ contributions · p. 33

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