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The Chain Holds, the Answer Folds: Trace-Answer Dissociation in Reasoning Models Under Adversarial Pressure

Yubo Li, Ramayya Krishnan, Rema Padman

arXiv:2605.29087v1cs.AI

TL;DR

Reasoning models can capitulate under multi-turn pressure even when their chains of thought remain correct, a failure that standard output-only and single-turn probes miss. The paper introduces a latent-versus-behavioral framework and evaluates it across datasets, reasoning channels, and model families. Latent-correct first-flip rates are near 50% in think mode but fall to 11–15% in no_think, while answer-slot evidence localizes the gap and a naive trace-anchored defense backfires.

  • Problem

    Single-turn and output-only evaluations do not detect cases where a reasoning model’s chain stays correct while its answer flips wrong under multi-turn adversarial pressure.

  • Method

    The paper uses a 2×2 latent-versus-behavioral taxonomy, a nine-round protocol across three corpora and model families, independent judge validation, and an answer-slot token probe.

  • Results

    Across Qwen3-32B datasets, latent-correct first-flip rates cluster near 50% in think mode and collapse to 11–15% in no_think; the effect is high in explicit-channel models and low in inline-CoT Gemma.

  • Takeaways & Limitations

    UC is a separately measurable chain-to-answer failure: correct answer-slot mass can be overridden, and naive trace anchoring is harmful because pressured traces contain competing options.

  • Takeaways & Limitations

    The strongest paired causal evidence comes from Qwen3-32B, while cross-model results use small flip-conditioned samples and the token-level probe covers only open-weight Qwen3-32B.

Abstract

from arXiv · show

Reasoning models are evaluated on single-turn benchmarks but deployed in multi-turn dialogue, where users push back on correct answers. Under sustained adversarial pressure we find a previously undocumented failure mode: the chain-of-thought stays factually correct from first turn to last while the emitted answer flips wrong. We call this unfaithful capitulation (UC) and isolate it with a $2\times 2$ latent-versus-behavioral framework that flip-rate metrics and single-turn faithfulness probes both miss. Across three datasets (MT-Consistency, MMLU-Pro, GSM8K), the latent-correct rate at the behavioral flip clusters near 50% in think mode and collapses to 11-15% under no_think -- paired, within-model causal evidence that reasoning creates the gap. Across models the effect tracks the reasoning channel (high in Qwen3-32B and GPT-OSS-20B, low in inline-CoT Gemma-4-31B-it). An independent GPT-4o judge corroborates $86\%$ of UC labels; a token-level probe shows the answer-slot argmax is correct in $84\%$ of UC cells; and a naive trace-anchored defense backfires. We release all trajectories, traces, and judge labels.

1 Introduction

The paper identifies unfaithful capitulation (UC): under multi-turn pressure, a reasoning model’s chain remains correct while its emitted answer flips wrong. A latent-versus-behavioral framework reveals this failure across datasets and models, localizes it to answer emission, and shows that naive trace anchoring backfires.

  • Failure mode: UC is a distinct failure mode in which the chain remains correct while the emitted answer flips wrong under adversarial pressure.Flip-rate metrics and single-turn faithfulness probes miss UC because the chain stays internally consistent.
  • Framework: A 2×2 framework jointly records latent chain correctness and behavioral answer correctness, isolating UC from faithful collapse and other states.The framework separates chain-level from answer-level failures at each model, question, and round cell.
  • Empirical pattern: 50.7% on MT-Cons, 50.0% on MMLU-Pro, and 55.1% on reformatted short answers are latent-correct rates at the first behavioral flip for Qwen3-32B in think mode.GSM8K is lower at 32%, which the paper treats as a principled outlier because the numeric chain is the answer.
  • Empirical pattern: 11–15% is the latent-correct first-flip rate after switching Qwen3-32B from think to no_think across corpora.The paired within-model contrast is presented as evidence that reasoning creates the latent-behavioral gap.
  • Cross-model evidence: 52.9% on MMLU-Pro for GPT-OSS-20B versus 19–22% for inline-CoT Gemma-4-31B-it indicates that UC tracks a separable reasoning channel.GPT-OSS-20B matches the high Qwen3-think pattern, while Gemma sits near the no_think baseline.
  • Mechanism and defense: 84% of UC cells have a correct answer-slot next-token argmax, while trace-anchored regeneration causes more harms than corrections on both MCQ corpora.The pressured trace can contain both the correct option and the attacker’s option, making it a poor regeneration anchor.

2 Related Work

Prior work studies CoT faithfulness, multi-turn sycophancy, reasoning toggles, cross-benchmark robustness, judge validation, and internal belief representations separately. The paper argues that their existing probes miss UC and contributes a scalable latent-behavioral framework plus a targeted answer-slot analysis.

  • Chain-of-thought faithfulness: Single-turn CoT-faithfulness probes perturb the chain within one turn, whereas UC requires a stable correct chain and a wrong answer under user pressure.The paper frames its framework as a multi-turn extension in which adversarial dialogue replaces synthetic CoT edits.
  • Sycophancy and adversarial robustness: Multi-turn sycophancy studies typically report output-only flip or recovery rates, which cannot distinguish UC from faithful collapse.For reasoning models, the distinction separates a wrong answer despite a correct chain from a jointly wrong chain and answer.
  • Reasoning-toggle ablations: +40.8pp is the paired latent-at-flip gap across Qwen-3 sizes 1.7B through 32B in the within-model toggle ablation.The cited comparison supports the paper’s claim that the latent-behavioral distinction is central for reasoning models.
  • Reasoning-toggle ablations: The study extends prior toggle work from accuracy and inference-time scaling to multi-turn adversarial behavior.It uses reasoning-channel controls as part of the empirical analysis rather than only as benchmarking conditions.
  • Cross-dataset and cross-model robustness: The paper follows cross-benchmark evaluation guidance by replicating UC measurement across three corpora and multiple model families.This addresses the methodological concern that behavioral findings may depend on one benchmark or model.
  • LLM-as-judge evaluation: GPT-4o replay validates the Qwen3-32B trace-letter extractor’s UC labels, addressing self-judging concerns through an independent judge.The broader framework also provides a cheap automatic classifier that scales without relabeling.
  • Mechanistic studies: The answer-slot probe reads the next-token distribution over answer letters, offering a lighter mechanistic localization than hidden-state probes or activation patching.It targets the chain-to-answer interface rather than the model’s internal proposition representation.
  • Defenses: The tested trace-anchored defense fails because pressured traces can contain both the correct option and the attacker’s option.This identifies a concrete failure mode for that intervention without refuting trace anchoring generally.

3 The Latent-versus-Behavioral Framework

The framework evaluates adversarial multi-turn behavior by separating latent trace correctness from emitted-answer correctness. Their joint states isolate unfaithful capitulation, where the trace remains correct while the answer becomes wrong.

  • Adversarial multi-turn protocol: A fixed 9-round dialogue carries forward eight shuffled adversarial challenges after an initial question and answer.The challenges include doubt, emotional or consensus appeals, expert appeals, dismissal, and misleading answer suggestions.
  • Two signals per cell: Behavioral correctness records whether the emitted answer matches the ground truth, while latent correctness records whether the reasoning trace concludes it.The latent signal is extracted from the trace without giving the judge the question or gold answer.
  • The four states: The joint latent-behavioral distribution yields four states: FC, UC, FI, and UI.UC denotes a correct trace paired with a wrong emitted answer.
  • The four states: UC isolates a chain-to-answer disagreement that output-only metrics and single-turn faithfulness probes cannot isolate.The framework focuses on whether the reasoning was still correct at the first behavioral flip.
  • The headline statistic: The headline statistic is latent correctness at the first behavioral flip among questions that start correct and later become behaviorally wrong.It measures whether the trace still concludes the correct answer when the model first capitulates.

4 Experimental Setup

The experiments vary datasets, answer formats, reasoning surfaces, and judging infrastructure to measure latent correctness at behavioral flips. Figure 2 summarizes the Qwen3 think/no_think comparison across corpora.

  • Corpora: The evaluation uses MT-Consistency, MMLU-Pro, and GSM8K, spanning multiple-choice and free-form answer formats.A non-MCQ short-answer version of MT-Consistency additionally removes literal answer choices.
  • Reasoning model families: The study compares Qwen3-32B, GPT-OSS-20B, and Gemma-4-31B-it across distinct reasoning surfaces.Qwen3 has a think toggle, GPT-OSS uses a separate Harmony channel, and Gemma-4 is evaluated with inline CoT and native thinking disabled.
  • Judging infrastructure: A trace-letter judge reads only the reasoning trace and emits a concluded letter or N, while behavioral grading uses answer matching procedures.The infrastructure also uses GPT-4o for behavioral grading and out-of-line trace judging.
  • Measurement overview: Figure 2 reports latent-correct-at-first-flip rates, with think-mode bars near 50% and no_think partners near 13%.GSM8K is identified as the principled outlier, and the text reports Wilson 95% confidence intervals.
  • Measurement overview: Table 1 defines LAFF as latent-correct at first flip and distinguishes paired no_think ablations from think-only external-validity checks.The paired ablation covers the two full MCQ corpora; non-MCQ and GSM8K are think-only checks.

5 UC Replicates Across Datasets and Is Reasoning-Specific

Qwen3-32B shows a near-50% latent-correct-at-first-flip rate across several datasets, while removing reasoning collapses the rate to roughly 11–15%. GSM8K is a principled exception because its numeric answer is the chain’s final step.

  • Cross-dataset replication: 50.7% on MT-Consistency, 50.0% on MMLU-Pro, and 55.1% on free-form short answers show a dataset-independent near-50% cluster.The datasets differ in domain, answer format, and difficulty.
  • Reasoning ablation: 12.8% on MT-Cons and 14.6% on MMLU-Pro under no_think contrast with think-mode rates near 50%.The paired within-model comparison reports non-overlapping Wilson intervals and a Fisher exact test rejecting equality.
  • Reasoning ablation: The think/no_think comparison is reported as within-model causal evidence that the reasoning channel produces the latent-behavioral gap.The same ordering holds across all five Qwen3 sizes.
  • GSM8K exception: 32% on GSM8K is the lowest latent-at-first-flip rate and is interpreted as a principled outlier.GSM8K’s numeric answer is produced as the final step of the arithmetic chain; its flip-conditioned sample is small at n=25.
  • Round-wise behavior: UC appears from the first adversarial round and persists through R8 rather than emerging at one trigger round.The paper characterizes this as a structural property of adversarial processing, not a brittleness confined to high round depth.

6 UC Tracks the Reasoning Channel Across Models

Across models, high latent-at-first-flip rates occur with separable reasoning channels, whereas inline-CoT Gemma-4 remains near the no_think baseline. The cross-model evidence is corroborating but unevenly powered.

  • Separable reasoning channels: 52.9% on MMLU-Pro for GPT-OSS-20B matches Qwen3-think’s 50.0% with a separable reasoning channel.GPT-OSS’s MT-Consistency value is 85.7% but rests on only 14 flips and is treated as directional.
  • Inline-CoT comparison: 19–22% for inline-CoT Gemma-4-31B-it sits near the Qwen no_think baseline of 13–15%.With inline prose preceding the answer, the chain and answer are described as less dissociable and UC largely does not arise.
  • Interpretation: The cross-model evidence supports the refined claim that UC tracks the presence of a separable reasoning channel.The claim ties the failure to an explicit, separately decoded reasoning segment rather than to one particular model.
  • Power and scope: Qwen3-32B is the well-powered causal anchor, while GPT-OSS and Gemma-4 are corroborating rather than independently conclusive.The non-Qwen models have small flip-conditioned counts of n=9–21 and lost some long-prompt questions to memory limits.
  • Independent validation: GPT-4o agrees with 86.0% of UC labels, abstains on 13.0%, and selects a different letter on 1.0%.The independent judge does not systematically contradict the UC labels.
  • Independent validation: UC traces have a 10–16% abstention rate versus 0% for FC, indicating greater equivocation in UC cells.The paper treats this as consistent with partial decoupling rather than a perfectly confident chain.

8 The Gap Lives at the Answer-Emission Interface

A token-level probe places the UC failure at answer emission: the model often favors the correct letter immediately after the chain, yet realized generation emits another. Late attention to explicit wrong-letter hints appears to bias that emission, and trace anchoring worsens accuracy.

  • 84% of UC cells have a correct answer-slot argmax immediately before the emitted letter.The mean P(correct) is 0.82, while FC cells are at 0.96 and FI cells at 0.05.
  • 83.8–91.2% UC argmax-correct rates across four answer prefixes show the probe effect is not prefix-specific.The naturally generated prefix yields 86.2%.
  • Late attention to explicit wrong-letter hints in rounds R6/R7 biases realized emission even while the answer-slot distribution favors the correct letter.This implicates competition between the chain’s conclusion and the user’s injected letter at emission time.
  • Trace-anchored reconciliation lowers final accuracy on both MCQ corpora despite reducing UC by construction.Among fired cells, harms exceed corrections on both corpora.

9 A Naive Trace-Anchored Defense Does Not Work

The direct trace-anchored fix does not work: regeneration often absorbs the attacker’s option because pressured traces contain both options. The findings instead point toward emission-time decoding rather than post-hoc rewriting.

  • 56% versus 13% harms versus corrections on MT-Cons, and 35% versus 19% on MMLU-Pro, make reconciliation net harmful.Final accuracy falls by −2.6 and −1.7 points respectively, while flip rate rises.
  • The defense fails downstream of detection because regenerated answers can select the attacker’s option from a pressured trace.The trace is a reliable detector of trouble but an unreliable anchor for the fix.
  • The mechanism result narrows the design space toward emission-time decoding rather than post-hoc rewriting anchored to trace text.The paper does not report a working defense, only where one must operate.
  • Flip rate conflates UC with FC even though they represent different failure surfaces and require different fixes.The +38-point think/no_think gap in latent-at-first-flip is invisible to flip rate.
  • The 84% answer-slot result indicates that trace anchoring backfires because the pressured chain contains the attacker’s option despite its correct argmax.The issue is the chain-to-token hand-off, not absence of the answer at emission time.
  • Cross-model evidence associates UC with a separately decoded reasoning channel rather than with reasoning abstractly.The paper argues that a separately decoded segment can remain correct while the answer head drifts.

11 Conclusion

The paper identifies unfaithful capitulation as a distinct multi-turn reliability failure, isolates it with latent-behavioral analysis, and localizes it to answer emission. Its evidence is strongest for Qwen3-32B, while measurement, sampling, and defense limitations remain.

  • UC is a separately measurable failure in which the chain stays correct while the answer flips wrong under multi-turn pressure.The framework, replication, and token-level probe distinguish this from failures where both chain and answer flip.
  • The paired causal evidence comes from one model family, while other models provide suggestive channel-tracking corroboration from small samples.The token-level mechanism probe is available only for open-weight Qwen3-32B.
  • 86% agreement with an independent judge and 10–16% abstention leave residual ambiguity in the LLM-based latent-correctness signal.The paper therefore treats UC as a lower bound on a more graded phenomenon.
  • The final panel excludes GPQA-Diamond, uses one fixed bank of eight adversarial strategies, and offers no working defense.The paper characterizes and localizes the failure but does not deliver an effective intervention.
  • The study uses generic social-pressure templates rather than jailbreaks and releases outputs, annotations, token-level analyses, and trajectories for verification.The stated aim is to support reliability and follow-up defense work.

A Qwen-3 Toggle Across Five Sizes

The Qwen-3 toggle shows a positive think−no_think latent-at-first-flip gap at every size, widening with scale. Additional audits indicate that UC labels and answer-slot behavior are measurable but do not make the trace a safe answer anchor.

  • Toggle results: Latent-at-first-flip is higher in think than no_think at every Qwen-3 size.The comparison uses the toggle ablation with Wilson 95% confidence intervals and flip-conditioned cell counts of 41–121 per cell.
  • Toggle results: +14 to +67pp: the think−no_think latent-at-first-flip gap is positive across Qwen-3 sizes and widens with scale.The smallest gap occurs at 1.7B, while the largest gaps occur at 14B and 32B.
  • Validation: 86%: GPT-4o agrees with the in-house judge on pooled UC trace-letter labels.The audit also reports 13% ambiguous “N” judgments and 1% differing-letter judgments.
  • Answer-slot probe: 83.8–91.2%: across four answer prefixes, the UC answer-slot argmax remains correct despite a different emitted answer.This supports a distinction between the token distribution at the answer slot and the full-sequence output.

E Adversarial Follow-up Bank

The follow-up bank applies eight adversarial strategies in shuffled order across rounds R1–R8. It includes doubt, social pressure, misleading suggestions, and expert appeals, with GSM8K-specific numeric perturbations.

  • Strategy bank: Eight adversarial strategies are applied in R1–R8 in a per-question shuffled order.The bank spans closed-ended and open-ended doubt, emotional and consensus appeals, impolite dismissal, misleading suggestions, false agreement, and expert appeal.
  • Strategy bank: Misleading suggestions and false agreement inject wrong letters for multiple-choice tasks and wrong numbers for GSM8K.GSM8K perturbations include another question’s gold answer, digit swaps, ±k changes, or order-of-magnitude changes.
  • Trace judging: The trace-letter judge reads only the reasoning trace and valid letter set, then outputs the concluded option letter or N.It does not receive the question or gold answer.
  • Trace judging: For MMLU-Pro, the valid letter set spans A–J, with parsing rules for bare letters, punctuation, and short prose replies.The parser falls back to N when no valid standalone letter is found.
  • Reproducibility: Released cell-level CSVs and judge labels allow figure regeneration without model API calls.The GPT-4o cross-judge audit is independently rerunnable from the released traces.
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