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CIVA: Critic-Induced Value-Subspace Attacks on Visual World-Model Agents
Jiancheng Wang, Mingli Zhu, Tong Zhang, Jiaqi Ruan, Wei Wang, Siyuan Liang, Dacheng Tao
TL;DR
Visual world-model agents’ recurrent latent dynamics weaken frame-wise attacks and create a need for temporally coherent, efficient perturbations. CIVA extracts a critic-induced low-dimensional subspace offline, optimizes its coefficients online with EMA smoothing, and consistently outperforms prior attacks across three visual control tasks, including a 26.07% reward drop on DMC walker walk.
Problem
Recurrent latent dynamics make frame-wise observation attacks poorly suited to shaping visual world-model agents over time under tight perturbation constraints.
Source: §1 · pp. 1–2, §3.4 · p. 4Method
CIVA extracts a low-rank value-subspace from offline critic-guided PGD probes and optimizes only its coefficients online with EMA smoothing.
Source: §1 · p. 2, §4.1 · p. 5, §4.2 · p. 6Results
CIVA consistently yields stronger performance degradation than prior attacks across DMC walker walk, Atari Pong, and Crafter; on DMC walker walk, Drop% is 26.07%.
Source: §1 · p. 2, §5.2 · p. 7, §6 · p. 9Takeaways & Limitations
Critic-aligned low-dimensional perturbations provide an effective attack surface for recurrent world-model agents while supporting temporal coherence and efficient online optimization.
Source: §4.2 · p. 6, §5.2 · p. 8, §6 · p. 9CIVA assumes a white-box online setting, access to the victim critic and clean rollouts, and evaluation on a single backbone, DreamerV3.
Source: §3.1 · p. 3, §6 · p. 9
Abstract
from arXiv · showhide
Visual world-model agents such as DreamerV3 act through a recurrent latent state rather than a single observation, which weakens frame-wise observation attacks and makes their perturbations vary sharply over time under a strict per-frame perturbation constraint. We study white-box, causal, online attacks on such agents and propose Critic-Induced Value-Subspace Attacks (\textbf{CIVA}). Our key observation is that, along a rollout, critic-guided perturbations concentrate in a low-dimensional subspace induced by the victim's own critic. Based on this observation, CIVA first probes the frozen victim offline with critic-guided PGD and extracts a low-rank value-subspace by SVD. At test time, it optimizes only the subspace coefficients, smooths them with an exponential moving average (EMA), and maps them back to pixels. This design attacks value-sensitive recurrent dynamics while keeping the online optimization cheap and temporally coherent. Extensive experiments on DMC walker walk, Atari Pong, and Crafter show that CIVA consistently outperforms five recent methods; on DMC walker walk, it achieves the largest reward drop of 26.07\% while keeping temporal variation low, with TempAbs of 0.646.
1 Introduction
Visual world-model agents act through recurrent latent dynamics, making conventional frame-wise attacks poorly suited to shaping influence over time. CIVA addresses this mismatch with a critic-induced low-dimensional subspace and causal online optimization, achieving stronger degradation across visual control tasks.
- CIVA yields stronger and more stable degradation than representative observation-space baselines while preserving favorable temporal smoothness and perceptual similarity.Source: §1 · p. 2
- Recurrent latent dynamics make attacks that independently degrade individual frames poorly matched to visual world-model agents.Source: §1 · pp. 1–2
- CIVA extracts a low-rank, victim-aware perturbation basis offline and performs efficient causal online optimization with temporal smoothing inside that subspace.Source: §1 · p. 2
- CIVA evaluates attack effectiveness, action-distribution shift, temporal variation, and perceptual similarity on DMC walker walk, Atari Pong, and Crafter.Source: §1 · p. 2
2 Related Work
Prior work establishes adversarial vulnerability and develops stronger attacks and defenses for deep RL, but most attacks optimize directly in pixel space and target frames separately. Related low-dimensional and temporally coordinated methods motivate structured attacks, while CIVA focuses on recurrent world-model dynamics.
- Adversarial attacks on deep policies include robust observation, real-time, universal, policy-aware, detectability-aware, and policy-distribution-based methods.Source: §2 · p. 2
- Most prior attacks optimize directly in pixel space and effectively target each frame separately, unlike attacks designed for recurrent latent dynamics.Source: §2 · p. 2
- Robust RL primarily studies training agents to remain reliable under perturbations, whereas this paper studies strong causal observation attacks against visual world-model agents.Source: §2 · p. 3
- Universal, low-frequency, subspace, and temporally coordinated attacks show that effective perturbations can occupy structured or smoother spaces than raw pixels.Source: §2 · p. 3
3 Threat Model
The threat model attacks a frozen DreamerV3 agent through current image observations in a white-box, causal, online setting. The design must suppress return under tight compute and perturbation constraints while balancing temporal smoothness and visual naturalness.
Victim Model
- The victim is a pretrained DreamerV3 policy whose recurrent world model, actor, critic, weights, and environment dynamics remain fixed during attack.Source: §3.1 · p. 3
Threat Model
- The attacker may modify only the current image observation and cannot alter actions, rewards, environment state, or recurrent latent state.Source: §3.2 · p. 3
- The attack is white-box and causal: current and past observations are available, and each perturbation must be produced before the next environment step.Source: §3.2 · p. 3
Objective
- Because environment rewards are nondifferentiable, optimization uses victim-exposed differentiable surrogates rather than true reward gradients.Source: §3.3 · p. 4
Challenges
- The main challenges are recurrent dilution, the cost and jitter of full-pixel per-frame PGD, and the budget–effectiveness–stealth trilemma.Source: §3.4 · p. 4
4 Method
CIVA derives a critic-induced value-subspace from offline critic-guided PGD perturbations, then performs online attack optimization in its low-dimensional coefficients. EMA smoothing, pixel-space projection, and causal deployment provide temporal coherence, validity, and efficiency.
4.1 Offline Value-Subspace Discovery
- CIVA uses offline critic-guided PGD probes and SVD to construct a low-dimensional value-subspace from the victim critic’s attack gradients.Source: §4 · p. 4, §4.1 · pp. 4–5
- Each stacked perturbation direction empirically drives the victim critic toward lower predicted value rather than representing an observation or hand-crafted prior.Source: §4.1 · pp. 4–5
- The basis Vr contains the top-r singular vectors and is frozen offline; with r = 32 ≪ D = 12288, online search uses a shared victim-aware direction set.Source: §4.1 · p. 5
4.2 Online Subspace Attack
- Online PGD optimizes subspace coefficients instead of full pixel coordinates, while lifting, projecting onto the ℓ∞ ball and pixel range, and re-projecting back to coefficients.Source: §4.2 · p. 6
- EMA smoothing trades strength for temporal smoothness as ρ increases, while smoothing within the critic-effective subspace preserves attack-direction alignment.Source: §4.2 · p. 6
- The causal deployment procedure warm-starts from the previous post-EMA coefficients, uses a few subspace-PGD steps, and feeds the perturbed observation to the victim.Source: §4.2 · p. 6
5 Experiment
Experiments evaluate CIVA against five observation-space attackers across DreamerV3 tasks, measuring reward suppression, behavioural deviation, temporal coherence, visual stealth, and ablation effects. CIVA achieves strong attack effectiveness while maintaining low temporal variation, with critic-induced alignment and EMA contributing substantially.
Experimental setup
- Experiments cover DMC walker walk, Atari Pong, and Crafter using frozen DreamerV3 victims, a shared ℓ∞ per-frame budget of 24/255, and five baselines.Evaluation reports reward, Drop%, Action-KL, TempAbs, and perceptual similarity; Crafter results are deferred to Appendix A.2.Source: §5.1 · pp. 6–7, §5.2 · p. 7
Attack effectiveness
- 26.07% Drop% is CIVA’s highest result on DMC walker walk, exceeding UAP-RL’s 23.25% while reaching the lowest attacked reward of 703.97.On Atari Pong, CIVA reaches 85.71% Drop%, compared with 66.67% for MAD and below 25% for the other baselines.Source: §5.2 · p. 7
Behavioural deviation
- CIVA produces the strongest reported behavioural deviation, reaching Action-KL values of 1.130 on DMC and 0.184 on Pong.PA-AD reaches a higher DMC Action-KL of 1.35 but only a 17.38% reward drop, showing that KL alone does not determine reward degradation.Source: §5.2 · p. 8
Temporal coherence and visual stealth
- 0.646 and 0.394 are CIVA’s TempAbs values on DMC and Pong, roughly 10× lower than per-frame baselines while preserving strong reward suppression.CIVA also keeps SSIM within 0.04–0.30 of MAD and reduces online attack latency by roughly an order of magnitude through 32-dimensional optimization.Source: §5.2 · p. 8
Policy decision shifts
- CIVA consistently changes the dominant Atari Pong action in representative examples, whereas Illusory can shift logits without changing the selected action.The action-selection changes help connect distributional shifts to reward degradation at decision-critical frames.Source: §5.3 · p. 8
Ablation study
- 6.90% Drop% with a random rank-matched basis and 12.61% with full-pixel critic-PGD show that low rank or critic guidance alone is insufficient.The ablation attributes the gain to aligning a low-rank basis with critic-sensitive directions.Source: §5.4 · p. 9
- 1.7496 versus 0.646 TempAbs shows that removing EMA nearly triples temporal variation, despite a marginal +0.77 percentage-point effectiveness gain.Replacing critic-value gradients with reward-head gradients reduces effectiveness to 4.84%, indicating that smoothness alone does not preserve functional attack strength.Source: §5.4 · p. 9
6 Conclusion
CIVA is a critic-induced value-subspace attack for visual world-model agents under tight online and ℓ∞ constraints. Across diverse visual control tasks, it produces stronger performance degradation than prior attacks, while its scope is limited to white-box access, clean rollouts, and a single DreamerV3 backbone.
- CIVA extracts a low-dimensional attack subspace from the frozen DreamerV3 critic and optimizes only subspace coefficients online with EMA smoothing.Source: §6 · p. 9
- CIVA consistently yields stronger performance degradation than prior attacks across diverse visual control tasks.Source: §6 · p. 9
- The method highlights the value landscape as a realistic adversarial surface of recurrent world-model agents.Source: §6 · p. 9
- CIVA requires a white-box online setting, access to the victim critic and clean rollouts, and evaluation beyond a single DreamerV3 backbone remains unaddressed.Source: §6 · p. 9
A.1 Detailed Experimental Setup
The appendix details the reproducible CIVA pipeline, from frozen DreamerV3 checkpoints and hardware to offline subspace discovery, online attack evaluation, and metric definitions. Offline critic-guided perturbations are compressed into a fixed rank-32 basis, while deployment optimizes only low-dimensional coefficients.
Software and hardware environment
- All training and attack experiments run on a single NVIDIA RTX PRO 6000 Blackwell GPU with 96 GB of memory.The online attack optimizes α_t ∈ R^r with r=32 and can co-reside with the frozen victim.Source: §A.1 · p. 14
DreamerV3 victim training
- DreamerV3 checkpoints are trained independently for DMC walker walk, Atari Pong, and Crafter using the official implementation without architectural or loss modifications.The task configurations use 1.1×10^6, 5.1×10^7, and 1.1×10^6 training steps, respectively.Source: §A.1 · p. 14
- Victim parameters remain frozen during evaluation, and optimization uses only critic forward passes and gradients.Source: §A.1 · p. 14
Attack evaluation pipeline
- Stage B performs the online low-dimensional PGD attack using the discovered basis during a fresh episode.Source: §A.1 · p. 14
- Stage A rolls out a 200-step warm-up, generates M=600 critic-induced PGD perturbations, and applies truncated SVD to obtain a fixed rank-r=32 basis.The flattened perturbation matrix has D=12,288 dimensions, and the top right singular vectors are saved for evaluation.Source: §A.1 · p. 14
Metric definitions
- The appendix defines episode reward, Drop%, Action-KL, TempAbs, and SSIM for attacked episodes and specifies their task-dependent KL computation.Continuous DMC uses diagonal-Gaussian KL, while discrete Pong and Crafter use KL on softmax-normalised logits; smaller TempAbs indicates closer consecutive perturbations.Source: §A.1 · pp. 14–15
- SSIM is computed per channel with the default scikit-image implementation using a data range of 255, then averaged.Source: §A.1 · p. 15
A.2 Additional Results on Crafter
On Crafter, CIVA matches the strongest baseline in reward suppression while producing comparatively coherent and visually stealthy perturbations. Its critic-induced subspace also yields effective achievement suppression without requiring the largest action-distribution shift.
Attack effectiveness
- Crafter’s sparse, integer-valued achievement rewards make roughly 30% achievement-event suppression a substantial attack effect.Source: §A.2 · p. 15
- 29.70% Drop% ties UAP-RL as CIVA reduces episode reward from 10.10 to 7.10 on Crafter.This matches the strongest baseline and exceeds MAD, PA-AD, Illusory, and DAPGD.Source: §A.2 · p. 15
Behavioural deviation
- CIVA reaches an Action-KL of 0.326, while DAPGD reaches 1.960 yet achieves only a 9.90% reward drop.The result indicates that larger action-distribution change does not necessarily imply a stronger attack in sparse-reward Crafter.Source: §A.2 · p. 15
Temporal coherence and visual stealth
- 0.27 TempAbs makes CIVA the second-lowest method, while its 0.970 SSIM is at least 0.09 higher than every baseline.UAP-RL has TempAbs 0.00 but uses a fixed perturbation; CIVA remains adaptive per frame.Source: §A.2 · p. 16
A.3 Perturbation Visualization
Figure 4 compares perturbation magnitude maps for CIVA and three baselines across six representative Crafter frames. CIVA shows more spatially focused patterns with less scattered high-intensity responses.
- Each row represents an attack method, and brighter colors indicate larger perturbation intensity across six representative Crafter frames.Source: §A.3 · p. 16
- Compared with MAD, PA-AD, and Illusory, CIVA concentrates perturbations on a smaller set of task-relevant regions.The visual comparison complements the quantitative temporal-coherence and SSIM results in Table 5.Source: §A.3 · p. 16
A.4 From Full-Space Attacks to Value-Aligned Subspaces
The appendix defines a shared white-box threat model in which an attacker perturbs each current image observation under an ℓ∞ budget before the next environment step.
- All baselines and CIVA share a white-box setting with access to the victim policy and critic.The victim policy is πθ and its critic is vψ.Source: §A.4 · p. 16
- At step t, the attacker observes the clean frame ot and outputs δt before the victim receives the clipped perturbed image.The attacked observation is ˜ot = clip(ot + δt, 0, 255).Source: §A.4 · p. 16
- Each perturbation satisfies the per-frame constraint ∥δt∥∞≤ε.The projection ΠBε enforces the ℓ∞ budget.Source: §A.4 · p. 16
- The victim’s latent state is produced recurrently from past observations, so the attack operates on observations while the policy acts through latent dynamics.Source: §A.4 · p. 16
A.4.1 MAD: Maximum-Action-Deviation Attack
MAD attacks a victim policy by maximizing the divergence between clean and perturbed action distributions independently for each frame.
- MAD maximizes the KL divergence between the clean and attacked action distributions.Its objective is LMAD(δ; ot) = KL(πθ(· | ot) ∥πθ(· | ot + δ)).Source: §A.4.1 · p. 17
- For discrete policies, the objective uses categorical KL on softmax outputs.Source: §A.4.1 · p. 17
- For Gaussian policies, the action-distribution divergence has a closed-form expression.Source: §A.4.1 · p. 17
- MAD initializes δ to zero and iteratively applies projected gradient ascent within the ℓ∞ budget.Each iteration computes the gradient of the KL objective and projects δ onto the permitted ball.Source: §A.4.1 · p. 17
A.4.2 UAP-RL: Universal Adversarial Perturbation for RL
The appendix contrasts full-pixel or shared perturbation baselines with CIVA’s critic-aligned subspace, temporal smoothing, and spectrum-based rank selection, while stating assumptions and limitations.
A.4.2 UAP-RL: Universal Adversarial Perturbation for RL
- UAP-RL learns one perturbation offline from clean observations and reuses it on every frame.Because the same δu is applied throughout a rollout, its temporal variation is zero by construction.Source: §A.4.2 · p. 17
- The five baselines operate in full pixel space and treat frames independently, except UAP-RL, which sacrifices per-frame adaptivity for temporal consistency.CIVA instead shares a critic-induced subspace across frames and smooths its coefficients over time.Source: §A.4.5 · p. 18
A.4.6 CIVA: Critic-Induced Value-Subspace Attack
- Critic gradients factor through the visual encoder Jacobian and latent critic gradient, placing their first-order directions in a low-dimensional structure when latent dimension is much smaller than pixel dimension.The factorization is f = Jenc(o)⊤∇sv(s), with s ∈Rds and ds ≪D.Source: §A.4.6 · p. 19
- The top r=32 singular values explain over 95% of spectral energy on every tested task, matching DreamerV3’s latent dimension.The passage attributes this concentration to smoothly changing encoder Jacobians across neighboring frames.Source: §A.4.6 · p. 19
- CIVA’s critic-induced basis captures value sensitivity rather than raw appearance variance, unlike a PCA basis built from observations.Source: §A.4.6 · p. 19
- O(Lv σr+1(∆)2) bounds subspace-attack suboptimality when the singular spectrum decays quickly and test frames remain near the probed distribution.The bound compares the full-pixel optimum with its closest row in the probed perturbation matrix.Source: §A.4.6 · p. 19