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CrACK: Adversarial Attacks on Cross-Model Consistency in Collaborative Vision Foundation Models

Feifei Liu, Jintao Cheng, Chi Man Vong, Xiaoyu Tang

arXiv:2609.07499v1cs.CV

TL;DR

Collaborative VFM pipelines rely on unverified semantic consistency between models, while existing vision attacks focus on individual models. CrACK attacks the inter-model interface at inference time without changing pixels, weights, or training data. Across four pipelines and eight benchmarks, it causes severe degradation while standalone VFM outputs remain unchanged, with corruption also affecting downstream reasoning.

  • Problem

    Collaborative VFM pipelines consume intermediate outputs without verifying semantic consistency, while existing vision attacks target individual models rather than their shared interface.

    Source: §1 · pp. 2–3
  • Method

    CrACK attacks the inter-model interface at inference time through CLIP-guided affinity inversion and a max-distance label permutation, without modifying pixels, weights, or training data.

    Source: §1 · p. 3
  • Results

    Across four pipelines and eight benchmarks, CrACK reduces Trident’s average mIoU from 45.8 to 1.55 with ASR 98.2%, and LLaVA-1.5-13B POPE from 87.4 to 58.3, while VFM outputs stay unchanged.

    Source: §1 · p. 3, §5 · pp. 12–13
  • Takeaways & Limitations

    Per-model robustness does not imply system robustness, and the inter-model feature interface should be treated as a first-class security boundary.

    Source: §5 · p. 13

    ACI requires interception of SAM intermediate features and read-only access to a CLIP patch-token extractor, so pure black-box settings are not covered.

    Source: §5 · p. 13

Abstract

from arXiv · show

Training-free collaborative pipelines that integrate Vision Foundation Models such as CLIP, SAM, and DINO achieve strong open-vocabulary dense prediction and are increasingly deployed in safety-critical applications. The security of these systems is commonly assumed to follow from the robustness of their individual models. We challenge this assumption. We identify a vulnerability shared by every collaborative pipeline: each model consumes the intermediate output of another without verifying semantic consistency, an unverified premise that we term the semantic-spatial alignment dependency. Existing adversarial attacks target a single model and overlook this premise, leaving the inter-model interface entirely unguarded. We propose CrACK (Cross-model Adversarial Consistency attack), an inference-time attack that exploits this interface without modifying any input pixel, model weight, or training data. CrACK operates in two stages: Adversarial Affinity Contradiction Injection corrupts the cross-modal affinity matrix by inverting SAM encoder features under the guidance of CLIP patch-level semantics, and Semantic Interface Poisoning steers the prediction through a max-distance label permutation derived from CLIP text embeddings. Experiments on four collaborative pipelines across eight benchmarks show that CrACK causes catastrophic degradation while every individual model continues to produce its unchanged standalone output, rendering per-model defenses structurally blind. The corruption further cascades into large vision-language model reasoning, driving models such as LLaVA to produce erroneous responses from visually intact inputs. Our results show that the security of a collaborative AI system cannot be reduced to the robustness of its components, and that inter-model feature interfaces must be treated as first-class security boundaries.

1 Introduction

Collaborative VFM pipelines combine intermediate representations for open-vocabulary dense prediction, but do not verify their semantic consistency across model boundaries. CrACK targets this unguarded interface at inference time rather than altering the image or individual models.

1 Introduction

  • Collaborative VFM pipelines are used for open-vocabulary dense prediction, including safety-critical applications, yet their inter-model interfaces assume semantic alignment without verification.The paper calls this premise the semantic-spatial alignment dependency.Source: §1 · p. 2
  • Existing input-level and backdoor attacks target single models, leaving the inter-model feature interface unaddressed.Input perturbations can be diluted as features pass through a second VFM; backdoor attacks require training-pipeline access.Source: §1 · pp. 2–3
  • CrACK attacks the interface without changing input pixels, model weights, or training data, using CLIP-guided affinity inversion and a max-distance label permutation.ACI inverts the SAM-derived affinity matrix using CLIP patch-level similarity; SIP uses CLIP text embeddings to steer predictions toward distant classes.Source: §1 · p. 3
  • CrACK is evaluated on four collaborative VFM pipelines across eight segmentation datasets, with additional experiments showing generalization to multimodal reasoning.The downstream evaluation uses a visual question answering task.Source: §1 · p. 3

2 Related Work

Prior work develops collaborative open-vocabulary segmentation pipelines and attacks vision models at the input or training stage. The related work distinguishes these approaches from CrACK’s focus on the inter-model feature interface.

Collaborative Vision Foundation Model Frameworks

  • Collaborative segmentation frameworks use attention substitution, DINO spatial priors, or SAM-derived affinity for feature aggregation.MaskCLIP, ProxyCLIP and NACLIP, and Trident exemplify the three categories, respectively.Source: §2 · pp. 3–4

Adversarial Attacks on Vision Models

  • The reviewed collaborative frameworks leave runtime consistency at the inter-model interface unverified, and the reviewed vision attacks do not target that interface.CrACK identifies this cross-model feature interface as its attack surface.Source: §2 · p. 4
  • Vision-model attacks perturb raw pixels or implant backdoors through poisoned data or fine-tuning, with each approach targeting a single model.The text notes input perturbations may be diluted through a second VFM, while backdoors require access to a training pipeline.Source: §2 · p. 4

3 Method

CrACK targets the aggregation and prediction interfaces of collaborative vision foundation model pipelines while leaving model weights and input pixels unchanged. Its two stages corrupt affinity-based feature fusion and permute predicted labels to create semantic contradiction.

3.1 Threat Model

  • CrACK models a collaborative pipeline as frozen VFMs extracting parallel features, fusing them at an aggregation interface, and matching the fused feature against CLIP text embeddings for segmentation.The attacker can intervene in aggregation glue code without changing model weights, forward functions, or input pixels; standalone VFM outputs remain clean.Source: §3.1 · pp. 4–5

3.2 The Proposed CrACK

  • CrACK attacks both the affinity aggregation step and the prediction interface in a single inference-time forward pass.ACI corrupts affinity at the feature level, while SIP poisons the label map consumed by downstream modules.Source: §3.2 · p. 5

3.3 Adversarial Affinity Contradiction Injection

  • ACI uses CLIP patch semantics to mix SAM features from dissimilar patches and invert affinity features and attention, making foreground features aggregate background features.Inverting only the features or only the attention is insufficient; ACI substitutes DINO features for DINO-based pipelines.Source: §3.3 · pp. 6–7

3.4 Semantic Interface Poisoning

  • SIP greedily constructs a bijective max-distance permutation from CLIP text embeddings and applies it to predicted labels, redirecting correct predictions toward semantically distant classes.When paired with ACI, the corrupted dense feature can propagate interface-level contradiction into erroneous downstream LVLM reasoning.Source: §3.4 · pp. 7–8

4 Experiments

Across four collaborative pipelines and eight segmentation benchmarks, CrACK causes severe degradation, and its corruption also degrades downstream LLaVA responses. Input-level defenses do not stop it, while ablations distinguish its two attack stages from unstructured destruction.

4.1 Experimental Setup

  • The experiments use four training-free pipelines across eight segmentation benchmarks, with CLIP ViT-B/16; downstream evaluation uses LLaVA-1.5-13B and the API visual-prompting protocol.Input-level baselines perturb pixels; CrACK instead acts at the aggregation interface. Segmentation uses mIoU and ASR, and downstream tasks use POPE accuracy and GPT-4o judge scores on MM-Vet and LLaVA-Wild.Source: §4.1 · pp. 8–9, §4.4 · p. 11

4.2 Attack Effectiveness on Open-Vocabulary Segmentation

  • CrACK caused the strongest degradation on every pipeline and dataset, reducing Trident’s average mIoU from 45.8 to 1.55.The result table covers four pipelines and eight benchmarks; the reported collapse also spans SCLIP, ProxyCLIP, and NACLIP.Source: §4.2 · p. 9, Table 1 · p. 10

4.3 Downstream LVLM Attack via Poisoned Visual Prompts

  • CrACK-corrupted prompts lowered LLaVA scores on all three benchmarks: POPE 87.4 to 58.3, MM-Vet 36.0 to 19.4, and LLaVA-Wild 73.4 to 38.7.All three corrupted-prompt scores were also below the LLaVA-only baselines.Source: §4.3 · p. 10, Table 2 · p. 11

4.4 Attack Stealthiness

  • Across no defense, Blur, JPEG, and Crop, CrACK mIoU stayed 2.88, 2.86, 2.87, and 2.82; PGD-CLIP’s ASR fell below 2%.For Crop, the defense reduced clean mIoU by 13.7, more than PGD-CLIP’s 2.65 mIoU attack drop, yet CrACK still reached 2.82.Source: §4.4 · p. 11, Table 3 · p. 11

4.5 Ablation Study

  • On Trident/VOC21, full CrACK reached mIoU 2.8 and ASR 100.00%; ACI alone reached mIoU 15.0 and ASR 66.76%, while SIP alone had ASR 100.00%.ACI targets feature-level affinity and SIP targets the prediction interface; the table compares these stages and their combination.Source: §4.5 · p. 11, Table 4 · p. 12
  • Against unstructured baselines, A=random reached 24.32 mIoU and 58.20% ASR, while ACI reached 15.0 mIoU and 66.76% ASR.The authors distinguish CrACK by its structured corruption: ACI preserves clean-affinity row-stochastic structure and sparsity statistics, while SIP’s permutation follows CLIP semantic geometry.Source: §4.5 · p. 12

5 Conclusion

CrACK degrades collaborative VFM pipelines while leaving individual VFMs’ standalone outputs unchanged. Its results support treating inter-model feature interfaces as security boundaries, with current access requirements limiting the attack’s scope.

5 Conclusion

  • 45.8 to 1.55 average mIoU on Trident, with 98.2% ASR across four pipelines and eight benchmarks.The corruption also cascades into LLaVA-1.5-13B, reducing POPE from 87.4 to 58.3 while every VFM produces its exact clean standalone output.Source: §5 · pp. 12–13
  • The results indicate that per-model robustness does not imply system robustness, and that inter-model feature interfaces should be treated as first-class security boundaries.Future work includes black-box or transfer-based CrACK extensions and interface-level consistency defenses that do not require retraining the VFMs.Source: §5 · p. 13
  • Current ACI requires interception of SAM intermediate features and read-only access to a CLIP patch-token extractor, leaving pure black-box settings outside its scope.The authors say this matches supply-chain and microservice-API threat models.Source: §5 · p. 13
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