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Forced Yet Free: What Magicians' Forcing Reveals Beyond Intentional Binding
Koichi Toida
TL;DR
Research on agency has focused on action–outcome relations, which do not directly explain why a choice is experienced as one’s own. The paper distinguishes intervention points, levels, and forms of agency to frame authorship binding; it concludes that forcing can preserve subjective authorship despite externally directed choice formation.
Problem
Action–outcome measures such as intentional binding do not directly establish why a particular choice is experienced as originating from the self.
Source: §II · p. 3, II.III. From Intentional Binding to… · p. 4Method
The paper distinguishes intervention points in the choice–action–outcome chain, Decision-, Action-, and Outcome-level self-attribution, and feeling versus judgment of agency.
Source: II.IV. The Forced-yet-Free Structure · p. 5Results
Forcing can preserve subjective authorship while externally influencing choice formation by selectively preserving, substituting, and redistributing agency cues.
Source: §V · p. 8Takeaways & Limitations
XR can bias choice probabilities through body-centred spatial affordances while keeping multiple options substantively available and allowing comparison and choice.
Source: §V · p. 8The account is conceptual and does not establish a dedicated behavioral or implicit index for authorship binding.
Source: IV.V. Scope Conditions and… · p. 8
Abstract
from arXiv · showhide
In magicians' forcing, spectators may experience a choice as self-determined even when that choice has been externally directed. Research on the sense of agency has developed largely around action-outcome relations, most notably intentional binding; however, the problem of choice authorship (why a particular choice is experienced as originating from oneself) must be treated as distinct. This paper integrates research on agency and forcing by distinguishing the locus of intervention within the choice-action-outcome chain, self-attribution at the Decision, Action, and Outcome levels, and the processes by which feeling of agency and judgment of agency are constructed. On this basis, a distinction is drawn between intentional binding, which concerns the temporal/causal relation between action and outcome, and the different binding problem exposed by forcing: the relation between a choice and its author. This theoretical relation is termed authorship binding. Authorship binding does not denote a new implicit measure; rather, it refers to the constructive relation through which a choice whose formation has been directed by external factors can nevertheless be experienced as originating from the self. Forcing can sustain this relation not by eliminating agency, but by selectively preserving, substituting, and redistributing agency cues. XR, in which body-centred spatial relations can be manipulated, is further conceptualised as a medium for extending the forced-yet-free structure into space.
I. INTRODUCTION: From Choice to Authorship
Magicians’ forcing can guide a spectator’s choice while preserving the experience of choosing freely, exposing a question of choice authorship distinct from action–outcome agency. The paper frames this problem through agency research and proposes a framework spanning interventions, levels of self-attribution, and XR.
I. INTRODUCTION: From Choice to Authorship
- Forcing guides spectators toward a particular choice while preserving their experience that they really chose it themselves (Pailhès et al., 2020).Experiments using multiple forcing techniques have likewise found that a subjective sense of free choice and agency can be preserved (Pailhès & Kuhn, 2020; Pailhès et al., 2021).Source: §I · p. 1
- Agency judgments draw on multiple cues, while low-level processing of self-generation, conscious mismatch detection, and explicit authorship should not be treated as one process.Delayed auditory feedback findings distinguish processing of temporal deviation, conscious delay detection, and reduced authorship (Toida et al., 2016; Bolt & Loehr, 2021, 2023; Han et al., 2025).Source: §I · pp. 1–2
- Intentional binding concerns action–outcome relations, but does not directly explain why a particular action was chosen or whether the choice is attributed to the self.Action choice has altered explicit agency ratings without altering temporal binding, while the number of available actions has also been reported to affect binding.Source: §I · p. 2
- Authorship binding names how a choice is attributed to the self, whereas intentional binding concerns the subjective temporal or causal relation between action and outcome.It is a constructive relation, not a new implicit measure; the paper asks why a particular choice is experienced as one’s own.Source: §I · p. 2
- Forcing manipulates which agency cues remain available and which causal relations are severed, making it a boundary case for authorship despite objective intervention in choice formation.The effect depends on preserving the spectator’s experience of authorship while destabilizing the causal explanation of how the choice formed.Source: §I · pp. 1–2
- The framework distinguishes intervention points in the choice–action–outcome chain, Decision-, Action-, and Outcome-level Agency, and XR manipulation of body-centred spatial relations.XR is conceptualized as a medium for dissociating choice formation from choice authorship through spatial relations.Source: §I · pp. 2–3
II. Agency Across Choice–Action–Outcome II.I. Targets, Levels, and Construction of Agency
Agency is constructed from multiple sources, and its distinct levels and measures cannot be treated as interchangeable. The paper separates the experience of agency from explicit judgments and distinguishes self-attribution to decision, action, and outcome.
II. Agency Across Choice–Action–Outcome II.I. Targets, Levels, and Construction of Agency
- Self-attribution is constructed from multiple information sources, and agency is distinct from body ownership.The experience that a body is one’s own is not identical to the experience of causing its movement.Source: §II · p. 3
- Feeling of agency is a pre-reflective experience, whereas judgment of agency integrates sensorimotor cues with context, beliefs, and inference.Smooth sensorimotor correspondence can preserve a local feeling while judgments about why a choice occurred vary with prospective cues, outcomes, context, and retrospective inference.Source: §II · p. 3
- Decision-, Action-, and Outcome-level Agency describe whether a decision, bodily action, or external consequence is attributed to the self, and one level cannot be inferred from another.A participant can retain action and outcome agency after being directed to choose, or retain decision agency when a virtual hand’s trajectory is automatically corrected.Source: §II · p. 3
- Explicit authorship, temporal binding, and behavioral choice are not proxy measures for one another.Action choice has changed explicit agency ratings without changing temporal binding, while available-option count has also been reported to affect binding.Source: §II · p. 3
II.II. Predictive and Retrospective Agency
Agency reflects prospective cues, including action-selection fluency, and retrospective information, including feedback and goal achievement. The paper therefore treats agency as a construction from multiple cues rather than a direct readout of action–outcome correspondence.
II.II. Predictive and Retrospective Agency
- Sensory feedback correspondence informs agency, but temporal evaluation can update with environmental statistics and is not fixed.Sustained auditory-feedback delay recalibrates subjective simultaneity toward the experienced delay distribution (Toida et al., 2012, 2014).Source: II.II. Predictive and Retrospective… · p. 3
- A Bayesian causal-inference account links perceived action–outcome timing to common-cause belief, observed time difference, signal uncertainty, and temporal prediction.The account can explain temporal compression, but not all observers follow one Bayesian strategy, and it is not presented as the sole established mechanism.Source: II.II. Predictive and Retrospective… · p. 3
- Agency judgments integrate action–feedback correspondence with selection fluency, outcome consistency, goal achievement, and the plausibility of a causal explanation.Decision authorship, perceived freedom, and perceived external influence may correlate, but they are not synonymous.Source: II.II. Predictive and Retrospective… · pp. 3–4
II.III. From Intentional Binding to Authorship Binding
The paper distinguishes authorship of a choice from the causal relation between an action and its outcome. Forcing exposes how these relations can diverge while a choice remains experienced as one’s own.
II.III. From Intentional Binding to Authorship Binding
- Authorship binding concerns whether a decision is attributed to the self as its author, a different relation from whether an action caused an event.Earlier work linked action–event consistency to both temporal binding and reported authorship, but examined authorship over an action’s consequence.Source: II.III. From Intentional Binding to… · p. 4
- Authorship binding is the constructive relation through which representations or events are linked into a self-attributive structure, without implying temporal compression.It is related to, but not synonymous with, Decision-level Agency: one names a self-attribution relation, the other the level at which agency is experienced.Source: II.III. From Intentional Binding to… · p. 4
- Intentional binding concerns the Action–Outcome link, while authorship binding concerns the Self–Choice link.In ordinary voluntary action these relations tend to coincide; forcing can preserve self–choice attribution despite manipulated choice probability, or preserve control judgments despite severed action–outcome contingency.Source: II.III. From Intentional Binding to… · p. 4
II.IV. The Forced-yet-Free Structure
External influences can alter choices without necessarily eliminating the spectator’s experience of authorship. The forced-yet-free framework separates objective influence from self-attribution and distinguishes where intervention occurs, where agency is attributed, and how it is experienced.
II.IV. The Forced-yet-Free Structure
- External factors such as option arrangement, defaults, and social information influence choices, so influence alone does not establish that agency is absent.A first-person report of deciding for oneself likewise does not establish that external influence was absent.Source: II.IV. The Forced-yet-Free Structure · p. 4
- A selection force can strengthen one option’s action affordance and bias its choice probability without eliminating the alternatives.An affordance is an opportunity for action arising in relation to the actor’s bodily capacities.Source: II.IV. The Forced-yet-Free Structure · p. 4
- The forced-yet-free structure preserves authorship binding despite external causal influence, separating causes that shape choice formation from first-person attribution of the resulting choice.It does not adjudicate whether free will exists.Source: II.IV. The Forced-yet-Free Structure · p. 5
- The framework distinguishes intervention within the choice–action–outcome chain, self-attribution at Decision, Action, or Outcome, and feeling of agency versus judgment of agency.Feeling of agency is grounded in sensorimotor cues; judgment incorporates context, beliefs, and inference.Source: II.IV. The Forced-yet-Free Structure · p. 5
III. Engineering Agency Cues Through Forcing
Forcing can be analyzed as engineering agency cues, not simply as removing agency. Different techniques intervene at different points in the choice–action–outcome chain while preserving different cues that support authorship and the experience of a choice as one’s own.
III. Engineering Agency Cues Through Forcing
- Forcing is a family of techniques, and performance success also depends on factors such as trust, attention, memory, probability judgments, and information asymmetry.Agency-cue analysis is therefore a restricted account of forcing, not an explanation of every aspect of a magic performance.Source: III.I. What Does Forcing Change? · p. 5
- Selection forces bias choice probability while preserving genuine alternatives, spectator commitment, and the action–outcome contingency.In the Position Force, card position makes a particular card more likely to be selected, with reachability proposed as one contributing factor (Pailhès & Kuhn, 2021).Source: III.I. What Does Forcing Change? · p. 5
- Outcome forces sever the action–outcome contingency while leaving the spectator’s choice and action intact.In the Criss-Cross Force, the cut position does not determine the revealed card, yet many participants fail to notice and experience control over the outcome (Pailhès & Kuhn, 2020).Source: III.I. What Does Forcing Change? · p. 5
- Interpretive forces retrospectively change what a response means while preserving the response itself.In equivoque, a response is treated as choosing or eliminating an item to reach a predetermined outcome; participants nevertheless report choice, freedom, and agency (Pailhès et al., 2021).Source: III.I. What Does Forcing Change? · p. 5
- The three force types manipulate different relations, so their effects should be described by which relation changes, not only by success rates.Selection biases choice probability; outcome forces sever action–outcome contingency; interpretive forces alter response–meaning mapping.Source: III.I. What Does Forcing Change? · p. 5
- Forcing preserves genuine agency cues that can scaffold attribution of a manipulated choice or relation to the spectator.Selection leaves self-generated comparison, commitment, and action cues; outcome forces retain self-generated action, while interpretive forces retain the response but reconstruct its meaning.Source: III.II. How Are Agency Cues Manipulated? · p. 6
- A mind-reading effect requires the spectator to experience the choice as their own while the performer’s means of knowing it remain unclear.An imposed choice can look like guidance, while a choice not attributed to the spectator weakens the structure of having one’s mind read.Source: III.III. Why Does Forcing Look Like… · p. 6
IV. Extending Forcing into XR
The paper extends the forced-yet-free framework to XR, where body-centred spatial relations can bias choice while options remain available and users may retain agency cues. It argues that choice influence and choice authorship must be evaluated separately, while limiting the claims to a conceptual proposal rather than an established measure or demonstrated XR effect.
IV. Extending Forcing into XR
- Spatial design variables include distance, body-relative direction, reachability, object orientation, movement amplitude, and motor cost.These variables shape which actions are prepared and which objects appear available, even when multiple options remain formally and substantively available.Source: IV.I. Embodied Space Shapes Choice… · p. 6
- A VR supermarket study found that visual-salience changes altered product choice without a clear difference in decision-making experience, but did not directly measure agency or authorship binding.It therefore suggests, but does not establish, that behavioral choice changes need not correspond one-to-one with changes in subjective decision experience.Source: IV.I. Embodied Space Shapes Choice… · p. 6
- XR can manipulate body-centred spatial relations such as distance, reachability, posture, and motor cost to strengthen one object’s action affordance.This extends the forced-yet-free structure of the stage-based Position Force into egocentric space.Source: IV.II. Biasing Choice While Preserving… · p. 7
- XR can vary option availability, physical selectability, relative ease of selection, and self-attribution separately to test when authorship binding is preserved or breaks down.Its value is the ability to manipulate these relations while preserving option meaning and substantive availability.Source: IV.I. Embodied Space Shapes Choice… · p. 6, IV.II. Biasing Choice While Preserving… · p. 7
- XR forcing operates through option location, reachability, and movement requirements rather than conversational steering.Earlier AI forcing used question-driven narrowing and related conversational techniques, with VR as the participant-designed task environment.Source: IV.III. Forcing, AI, and XR · p. 7
- The paper’s contribution is to map forcing interventions onto agency levels and feeling versus judgment of agency, then extend the framework to egocentric spatial design.Prior work has already connected forcing with agency in magic and goal-directed AI (Pailhès & Kuhn, 2020; Pailhès et al., 2021; Wen et al., 2026).Source: IV.III. Forcing, AI, and XR · p. 7
- XR interactivity does not establish that option choice formed independently of environmental design, and environmental influence alone does not establish that Decision-level Agency was lost.The framework therefore calls for evaluating choice influence and choice authorship separately.Source: IV.IV. Theoretical and Ethical… · p. 7
- High subjective authorship does not establish ethical legitimacy when XR choices are biased without users recognizing the guidance.Evaluation should also consider influence purpose, benefits, option availability, reversibility, transparency, contestability, and withdrawal.Source: IV.IV. Theoretical and Ethical… · p. 8
V. CONCLUSION: Toward Engineered Agency
Authorship binding describes how a choice shaped by external intervention can still be experienced as originating from the self. Forcing selectively preserves, substitutes, and redistributes agency cues, and XR can extend this structure into body-centred space.
V. CONCLUSION: Toward Engineered Agency
- Authorship binding is the constructive relation through which an externally influenced choice can still be attributed to the self as its author.It concerns choice authorship, distinct from intentional binding’s temporal or causal relation between action and outcome, and is not a new implicit measure.Source: §V · p. 8
- Forcing can preserve comparison, commitment, or self-generated action while selectively biasing choice, severing action–outcome contingency, or changing a response’s meaning.It redistributes agency cues rather than eliminating agency, allowing objective influence and subjective authorship to coexist.Source: §V · p. 8
- XR can bias choice through body-centred spatial affordances while leaving alternatives available for comparison and choice.The paper frames XR as a medium for separating choice influence from authorship, Action-level from Decision-level Agency, and causal binding from authorship binding.Source: §V · p. 8