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Provable Compliance: A Protocol for Runtime Compliance Evidence and Transaction-Specific Decisioning

Jeremy Blackburn, Tim Hines, Matthew Koepp, Russell Lessard, Jason Patrick

arXiv:2610.22913v1cs.CRcs.CY

TL;DR

The paper addresses the difficulty of obtaining compact proof of which compliance evidence, policy, authority, and transaction context were current when a decision was made. It describes a point-of-reliance compliance layer that records evidence and composes policy-based decisions; its conclusion is a verifiable compliance predicate for the broader Authority Protocol, not independent payment authorization.

  • Problem

    A relying party may lack compact, attributable proof of which evidence, policy, authority, and transaction context were current at the time of a decision.

    Source: §1 · p. 8

  • Method

    Separate Evidence Assertion VDTs preserve sourced or institution-generated facts, while a versioned CPP, deterministic BRE, and configured Workflow Engine produce a signed, time-bounded Compliance Decision VDT.

    Source: Executive Summary · p. 7

  • Results

    The resulting compliance decision gates present exercise without rewriting the ARP or creating authority, and supplies a verifiable compliance predicate to the final Authority Protocol decision.

    Source: §2.6 · p. 12, §13 · p. 30

  • Takeaways & Limitations

    Point-of-reliance decisions can use signed evidence while it remains fresh enough, refresh when required, preserve uncertainty, and limit prohibitions and disclosures to their applicable scope.

    Source: §13 · p. 30

    Agent registration, workload attestation, and session-key containment inform compliance evaluation but do not confer authority, and AI agents receive no unrestricted payment credentials, custody keys, or final execution authority.

    Source: §2.9 · p. 16

Abstract

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Regulated institutions already perform onboarding, screening, monitoring, and review, but compliance evidence ages, and whether it supports a decision depends on the institution, product, subject, counterparty, transaction, jurisdiction, risk tier, and purpose. A relying party therefore often cannot obtain compact, attributable proof of which evidence, policy, authority, and transaction context were current when a decision was made, a gap that grows as authority is delegated to software agents and scheduled workflows. We describe ChainIT Provable Compliance, the compliance-side layer of the ChainIT Authority Protocol. Each sourced or institution-generated fact is represented as a separate Evidence Assertion VDT with provenance, freshness, confidence, permitted purpose, and privacy classification; a versioned Compliance Policy Profile selects the applicable rules; a Business Rules Engine returns deterministic, reason-coded predicate results; and the organization's configured Workflow Engine composes them into a signed, time-bounded Compliance Decision VDT for one reliance event. The decision contributes a single predicate, Compliance Decision Permits, to session-eligibility and transaction-policy decisions. It never independently authorizes payment: only a final Allow together with an exact transaction digest, atomic capacity reservation, and a single-use execution credential can commit value. The paper specifies point-of-reliance freshness, scoped propagation of evidence changes, decision states, evidence domains (AML, sanctions, PEP, background, identity, and licensing), the U.S. and FATF regulatory context as of August 2026, privacy and disclosure controls, and residual risks.

Definitions and Document Precedence

The shared Authority Protocol terms are restated to keep the two papers aligned, while compliance-specific terms describe evidence, policy, and decision artifacts for a reliance event. These artifacts support present exercise of authority but do not replace the governing authority record.

Workload identity

  • The Agent Subject Profile captures workload identity and containment controls, while the Agent Registration VDT establishes what a workload is, not what it may do.Agent authority remains delegated under the ARP.Source: Definitions and Document Precedence · p. 4

Authority and delegation

  • The Authority Resolution Pactvera is the canonical organizational authority record; an Agent Authority VDT exposes bounded delegated authority without replacing it.An agent has no authority of its own, and present validity is checked at the reliance event.Source: Definitions and Document Precedence · pp. 4–5

Decision scope

  • Compliance Decision Permits is a compliance-side predicate, and the Compliance Decision VDT does not itself establish authority, session eligibility, or payment authority.The decision is evaluated for a particular reliance event rather than inherited as a permanent status.Source: Definitions and Document Precedence · p. 5

Compliance policy and workflow

  • A Compliance Policy Profile selects requirements for a reliance event, and the Workflow Engine composes predicate results and configured conditions into a disposition and downstream action.The BRE evaluates configured conditions and returns explicit, reason-coded true/false results; it does not assign a disposition.Source: Definitions and Document Precedence · pp. 4–6

Risk and disposition

  • Disposition is an organization-configured outcome, whereas risk tier determines minimum verification rigor and is evaluated independently of disposition.The defined outcomes include Allow, Allow with Controls, Step-Up, Review, Hold, Reject, Prohibit, and Stale/Unknown.Source: Definitions and Document Precedence · pp. 5–6

Evidence and compliance decision

  • Evidence Assertion VDTs record individual sourced or institution-generated facts, while a Compliance Decision VDT records whether present evidence and policy permit a proposed exercise of authority.Evidence assertions are not aggregated into a universal compliant status; the decision is signed, time-bounded, and purpose-specific.Source: Definitions and Document Precedence · p. 5

Session controls

  • A Session Eligibility Decision VDT addresses whether an authenticated subject may open or continue a consequential-action session; it is not transaction-specific and cannot authorize payment.A session credential permits defined session activity but is never payment authority.Source: Definitions and Document Precedence · p. 6

Transaction controls

  • A Transaction Policy Decision VDT is bound to one canonical transaction digest, while a reservation holds capacity atomically before a single-use EAC can be issued.The EAC is bound to the transaction digest and reservation and is consumed atomically at commit.Source: Definitions and Document Precedence · pp. 5–6

Executive Summary

The paper distinguishes authority to act from whether current evidence and policy support exercising that authority now. It describes a compliance-side evidence and decision architecture whose output feeds the Authority Protocol, while freshness and uncertainty are handled at the point of reliance.

Executive Summary

  • Compliance addresses whether evidence and policy conditions are sufficiently current, complete, and favorable for a proposed action, rather than whether the subject is authorized to act.Relevant evidence and consequences vary by institution, product, role, subject, transaction, counterparty, jurisdiction, risk tier, and purpose.Source: Executive Summary · p. 7
  • Separate Evidence Assertion VDTs preserve facts and provenance, a versioned CPP selects conditions, the BRE returns reason-coded predicates, and the Workflow Engine composes a signed, time-bounded Compliance Decision VDT.The decision is specific to a reliance event.Source: Executive Summary · p. 7
  • A favorable compliance decision contributes a predicate to session and transaction decisions but does not itself establish session eligibility or authorize payment.For transactions, the final decision also considers the transaction digest, authority, capacity, approvals, and rail constraints; controls and step-up require re-evaluation before reservation and EAC issuance.Source: Executive Summary · p. 7
  • Evidence may be reused while sufficiently fresh, refreshed when source or risk requirements call for it, and lead to Review, Hold, or Stale/Unknown when stale, unavailable, or ambiguous.A change propagates only to the dependent scope unless law or policy requires broader blocking.Source: Executive Summary · p. 7
  • Compliance decisions and evidence references join an append-only lifecycle whose terminal record may be supplemented for later exceptions without altering the original.The EAC itself is not stored as a reusable ledger object.Source: Executive Summary · p. 7

1. The Problem: Compliance Evidence Ages and Context Changes

Institutions already conduct ongoing compliance monitoring, but evidence and decisions can remain fragmented across systems, limiting compact proof of what was current at reliance. The paper’s objective is to make the institution’s controls machine-verifiable at use and auditable afterward, including for agent- and workflow-initiated actions.

1. The Problem: Compliance Evidence Ages and Context Changes

  • Regulated institutions already maintain onboarding, monitoring, screening, case management, and review controls, while U.S. customer-due-diligence rules call for ongoing monitoring and risk-based updates rather than one universal refresh schedule.The passage cites U.S. customer-due-diligence rules.Source: §1 · p. 8
  • A relying party may lack compact, cryptographically attributable proof of which evidence, policy, authority, and transaction context were current when a decision was made.Relevant information may be split across identity, authority, screening, AML, and payment systems.Source: §1 · p. 8
  • The gap becomes more consequential as authority moves to agents and scheduled workflows, so the paper places the same deterministic compliance and authority boundary before automated and human-initiated actions.The examples include agent proposals, human-initiated wires, group-approved ACH files, scheduled payments, and onchain transfers.Source: §1 · p. 8
  • The objective is machine-verifiable evidence, policy selection, predicate evaluation, disposition, authority context, and reliance-event records, not replacement of an institution’s compliance program..Source: §1 · p. 8

Capability Status

  • Components are classified on two independent axes: whether they are deployed today and what patent or documentary support exists; the paper identifies its matrix as authoritative for this component set.A capability may be deployed while representing potential new patent matter, or described in a filed application without being built.Source: Capability Status · p. 9

Implementation status

  • Implementation status distinguishes production use, development or validation, proposed architecture, and externally supplied dependencies..Source: Implementation status · p. 9

IP / documentary support

  • Patent and documentary support categories distinguish issued patents, filed applications, potential new matter, counsel review, and third-party capabilities outside ChainIT’s patent estate..Source: IP / documentary support · p. 9

2. The ChainIT Model: Evidence, Policy, Authority, and Decision

Provable Compliance evaluates current evidence under a versioned compliance policy and supplies a purpose-specific decision to the Authority Protocol. That decision is one input to session and transaction decisions, not authority to act or pay.

2. The ChainIT Model: Evidence, Policy, Authority, and Decision

  • Provable Compliance applies versioned compliance rules to modular evidence and records a purpose-specific disposition, while authority and present exercise remain independent decisions.Source: §2 · p. 10

2.1 Subject neutrality and verified identity foundation

  • The Authority Protocol covers individuals, groups, organizations, and permitted agents; a scheduled workflow acts for an organization rather than becoming a fifth subject class.Source: §2.1 · p. 10

2.2 ARP, Delegated Authority, and Agent Authority

  • The ARP records organizational authority, while an agent's append-only Agent Authority VDT records delegated scope and has validity checked at the reliance event.Source: §2.2 · p. 10

2.3 Evidence Assertion VDTs

  • Each Evidence Assertion VDT records one sourced observation or institution-generated state, preserving provenance, timing, confidence, purpose, privacy classification, and distinct evidence domains.Source: §2.3 · pp. 10–11

2.4 Compliance Policy Profile

  • The versioned Compliance Policy Profile selects required evidence, freshness bounds, predicates, reviews, dispositions, disclosure, retention, and degraded-mode treatment for each reliance event.Source: §2.4 · p. 11

2.5 BRE, Workflow Engine, and Compliance Decision VDT

  • The BRE returns deterministic, reason-coded predicate results; the configured Workflow Engine composes them into a signed, time-bounded Compliance Decision VDT with controlled references and decision context.Source: §2.5 · p. 11

2.6 Compliance as an input to the final Authority Protocol; 2.7 Session eligibility flow

  • Compliance supplies a signed predicate, but session eligibility still evaluates authentication, authority, policy, scope, and subject-specific inputs; only final Allow can support session issuance.Source: §2.6 · p. 13, §2.7 · p. 14

2.8 Transaction policy and commit-time flow

  • A compliance Allow alone cannot commit value: the transaction must resolve to final Allow with capacity reserved and a valid, unused EAC bound to the exact transaction.Source: §2.8 · pp. 14–16

3. Runtime Re-Verification at the Point of Reliance

Provable Compliance rechecks evidence at each reliance event without requiring universal live lookup. It applies context-specific freshness and verification rules, then propagates evidence changes only to affected scopes.

3.1 Reliance triggers

  • Reliance triggers include consequential sessions, high-impact actions, step-up approvals, scheduled reviews, and material source or policy changes.Source: §3.1 · p. 17

3.2 Freshness, not universal live lookup

  • Freshness is evaluated against the current event: policy sets maximum evidence age and when live verification is required, with approved degraded-mode handling for unavailable sources.A recent signed assertion may suffice for lower-risk activity, while high-risk or legally sensitive activity may require live interaction.Source: §3.2 · p. 17

3.3 Status epoch and verification rigor

  • Verification rigor varies by risk tier, from recent signed status snapshots to shorter freshness windows or live status and source checks.The Workflow Engine assigns and records the tier and policy context; the BRE evaluates configured predicates.Source: §3.3 · p. 18

3.4 Scoped propagation and revocation

  • Evidence changes affect only the scope that depends on them; broader suspension is reserved for cases supported by law, source state, or configured policy.Examples include blocking confirmed sanctions prohibitions, reviewing potential matches, and blocking activity requiring an expired license.Source: §3.4 · pp. 18–19

4. Evidence Domains

The evidence model accommodates sourced or institution-generated facts across compliance domains, but those domains are not interchangeable Boolean gates or a universal compliance badge.

4.1 AML risk and monitoring

  • AML monitoring is institution-performed and can represent current risk and case state, model or rule version, and permitted disclosure level.It evaluates activity patterns, relationships, counterparties, geography, funds flows, alerts, and investigative findings.Source: §4.1 · p. 20

4.2 OFAC and broader sanctions

  • Sanctions evidence extends beyond named-list matches to ownership, program prohibitions, digital-currency identifiers, match confidence, and disposition basis.The model also preserves list version, retrieval time, and required reporting or recordkeeping.Source: §4.2 · p. 20

4.3 PEP status and enhanced due diligence

  • PEP status is a risk indicator, not a finding of illegality, and may prompt proportionate controls such as enhanced monitoring or senior approval.The cited U.S. banking guidance does not require one unique procedure solely because a customer is a PEP. [4]Source: §4.3 · p. 20

4.4 Criminal and background evidence

  • Background information is enabled only for a lawful, relevant purpose and with applicable consent, notice, accuracy, dispute, nondiscrimination, and adverse-action controls.Raw records are not placed in a broadly reusable Compliance Decision VDT.Source: §4.4 · p. 21

4.5 Government identity and assurance freshness

  • Identity decisions distinguish identity, credential state, driving privilege, assurance freshness, and the transaction policy requiring a current credential.AAMVA DLDV provides match flags for participating jurisdictions to approved users, not universal coverage or proof of every required legal attribute.Source: §4.5 · p. 21

4.6 Jurisdiction-, product-, and industry-specific evidence

  • Jurisdiction- and industry-specific obligations are selected through the CPP and require suitable sources, assertion schemas, freshness rules, predicates, workflows, and disclosure policies.Source: §4.6 · p. 21

5. Regulatory Landscape and Current Status

The regulatory discussion describes risk-based U.S. AML and sanctions obligations alongside stablecoin and cross-border rules in development. Requirements vary by activity and jurisdiction, and the protocol does not determine regulatory status.

5.1 U.S. AML/BSA and customer due diligence

  • FinCEN’s May 2026 CDD FAQs reject a categorical continuous or periodic update schedule, while risk-related information and ordinary monitoring guide reassessment.February 2026 relief removed repeated beneficial-owner re-verification for each additional account, while preserving initial verification and risk-triggered updates.Source: §5.1 · p. 21

5.2 OFAC and sanctions

  • OFAC controls should match business risk and cover relevant people, entities, ownership, counterparties, wallets, geography, program restrictions, and possible-match resolution. [6]Digital-asset transactions do not receive a lower sanctions standard because they use a different rail. [6]Source: §5.2 · p. 22

5.3 Stablecoin-specific requirements under the GENIUS Act

  • As of August 31, 2026, stablecoin implementation remained subject to active rulemaking, and the GENIUS Act’s effective date depends on regulatory action or its statutory timing trigger. [11][12][13][14]Provable Compliance can evidence screening and policy decisions but does not determine whether a party is a regulated actor.Source: §5.3 · p. 22

5.4 FATF Travel Rule and cross-border payment transparency

  • Travel Rule compliance requires responsible entities to obtain, validate where required, transmit or make available, retain, protect, and screen applicable information under national law and interoperable arrangements.FATF reported continuing operational and supervisory gaps in July 2026; revised Recommendation 16 requirements are expected by the end of 2030. [16]Source: §5.4 · p. 22

5.5 Identity, background, licensing, and sector rules

  • Identity, background, licensing, and sector requirements vary by purpose and jurisdiction, so no single assertion or decision is a universal global compliance badge. [8]The CPP selects requirements, and sources must reflect the relevant official or qualified status semantics.Source: §5.5 · p. 22

6. Risk Tier, Decision States, and Enforcement

Risk tier determines minimum verification rigor, while disposition depends on configured predicates and controls. A compliance disposition feeds later session or transaction decisions but does not itself authorize payment.

6. Risk Tier, Decision States, and Enforcement

  • Risk tier and disposition are independent: the Workflow Engine assigns and records the tier, while the BRE returns predicates that the Workflow Engine combines into a disposition.A high-risk transaction may be allowed after required controls, while a low-risk transaction may be rejected when a definitive predicate fails.Source: §6 · pp. 22–23
  • A Compliance Decision VDT is consumed by session-eligibility or transaction-policy decisions; only final Allow after all required controls and checks can satisfy MayCommit.Transaction checks include approvals, status and scope, digest, capacity reservation, and credential checks.Source: §6 · p. 23

7. Design Principles, Evidence and Decision Lifetimes, and Residual Risk

The design treats compliance as a scoped, reliance-time predicate rather than a permanent status, and keeps authority, risk, and payment execution distinct. Its scenarios show how decisions and evidence changes affect only the applicable people, transactions, and flows, while residual risks remain.

7.1 Zero-Trust Design Principles

  • Uncertainty, freshness, and scope shape the compliance boundary: possible matches, outages, stale evidence, and incomplete data yield Review, Hold, or Stale/Unknown rather than silent allowance or indiscriminate blocking.Authority remains separate from compliance, and a favorable compliance result is only one predicate, not payment authority.Source: §7.1 · p. 23

7.2 Evidence and Decision Lifetimes

  • Later reviewers can determine which evidence, policy, and decision were current at reliance because compliance artifacts are versioned or event-specific, not permanent statuses.The supplied passage names “Decision, Transaction, and Evidence-Graph Artifacts” but gives no further details about those artifacts.Source: §7.2 · p. 24

7.3 Residual Risk and Non-Goals

  • The architecture does not eliminate faulty or incomplete third-party data, screening errors, misconfigured policy, misconduct, infrastructure compromise, accepted stale evidence, or unreflected regulatory change.These residual risks remain even though evidence, policy selection, predicate evaluation, disposition, and reliance-event context are designed to be attributable and independently verifiable.Source: §7.3 · pp. 24–25

8.1 Human-initiated wire under the same ARP

  • A $60,000 wire may pass compliance yet still requires the ARP, approvals, exact digest, capacity, status, and rail conditions before final Allow, reservation, and EAC issuance.The example requires a second authorized approver above $25,000; compliance Allow alone cannot release the wire.Source: §8.1 · p. 25

8.2 Agent-initiated payment within delegated scope

  • An agent’s bounded grant and session credential permit proposal activity, but a $3,800 payment proceeds only after transaction-policy checks, capacity reservation, and single-use EAC consumption.For quorum transactions, capacity and EAC issuance wait until both approvers approve the same digest and all compliance and authority predicates are final Allow.Source: §8.2 · p. 25, §8.3 · p. 26

8.4 Confirmed sanctions prohibition affecting a vendor

  • A confirmed sanctions prohibition applies to the affected counterparty and flows, while a newly identified PEP prompts Review or Allow with Controls rather than automatically removing Jane’s role or authority.The examples preserve unrelated vendor flows and distinguish a risk factor from a prohibition.Source: §8.4 · p. 26, §8.5 · p. 26

8.6 Identity credential no longer meeting the assurance profile

  • An expired license can make credential evidence insufficient for high-value step-up without negating the person’s identity or every corporate role; refreshed evidence and decision trigger re-evaluation.The CPP determines whether the result is Step-Up, Hold, or Stale/Unknown.Source: §8.6 · p. 26

8.7 Later return or dispute after terminal settlement

  • A later return, reversal, recall, chargeback, or dispute is recorded in new linked lifecycle artifacts or a Supplemental Valitorum, leaving the original sealed Valitorum unchanged.This preserves both the original terminal record and the later exception history.Source: §8.7 · p. 26

9. Privacy, Disclosure, and Evidentiary Controls

The privacy design keeps signed, verifiable decision outcomes distinct from restricted underlying evidence, with disclosure governed by policy and audience. The paper also proposes operational measures for decision integrity, auditability, freshness, privacy, exceptions, errors, and workload.

9. Privacy, Disclosure, and Evidentiary Controls

  • Disclosure tiers are selected by policy and audience, while access and export should be attributable and auditable.The decision artifact separates verifiable outcome data from restricted evidence, case notes, raw source records, and legally protected information.Source: §9 · p. 26
  • Independent verification can establish the decision artifact’s issuer, integrity, policy version, evidence references, timestamps, status, and lifecycle, but may not validate restricted underlying source facts.For restricted government data, commercial screening, SAR-related information, or institution-generated monitoring, verification is limited to the referenced decision artifact.Source: §9 · p. 27
  • Sensitive records such as biometrics, government IDs, SARs, investigation notes, and source-of-funds material remain in restricted stores rather than broadly portable VDTs.The Compliance Decision VDT carries signed results, evidence references, integrity proofs, reason-code references, and disclosure classification; SAR confidentiality is an explicit constraint.Source: §9 · p. 27

10. Business Value and Measurable Outcomes

  • Operational measures also include false positives and negatives, status-propagation time, and manual workload compared with baseline.The paper describes these as measures to track, not as observed results.Source: §10 · p. 28
  • The proposed business-value measures include transaction commit-control integrity, audit-package retrieval time, minimum-disclosure compliance, and exception recording without altering the original Valitorum.The measures also track decision completeness, authority-flow consistency, freshness compliance, and latency across cached, refreshed, and human-review paths.Source: §10 · p. 28

11. Implementation Priorities and Controlled Deployment

Implementation is framed as controlled integration with the Authority Protocol, not a parallel authority system. Priorities cover schemas, interfaces, subject models, providers, policy and freshness governance, privacy, lifecycle linkage, and adversarial testing, while open questions identify unresolved deployment choices.

11. Implementation Priorities and Controlled Deployment

  • Develop the compliance implementation as a companion layer to the Authority Protocol, preserving their division and validating evidence, policy, decision, disclosure, and lifecycle interfaces.The shared Authority Protocol definitions and flows are controlled by CIT-PA-WP-7.0.Source: §11 · p. 28
  • Freeze canonical evidence, policy, predicate, decision, review, disclosure, and status schemas, and define the exact interface to session and transaction decisions without allowing compliance to issue an EAC.The subject model must cover individuals, groups or quorums, organizational representatives, scheduled workflows, and agents without conflicting authority semantics.Source: §11 · p. 29
  • Governance priorities include documenting provider coverage and operating characteristics, versioning CPPs, separating policy and disposition responsibilities, and defining source-specific freshness and status behavior.The paper also calls for audience-specific disclosure, restricted stores, SAR confidentiality, correction and redress, and access audits.Source: §11 · p. 29
  • Lifecycle integration must link decisions to session or transaction artifacts, execution-authorization lifecycle records, and Valitorum artifacts; conformance testing should cover stale evidence, outages, changed digests, disclosure, and later exceptions.Patent and publication review is also listed as an implementation priority.Source: §11 · p. 29

11.1 Open implementation questions

  • Open deployment questions include provider availability and permitted purposes, institution-configured logic, governance and testing, service levels, dispute handling, disclosure, implementation status, and rail-specific exception linkage.The passage presents these as questions still requiring resolution, not settled capabilities.Source: §11.1 · p. 29

12. Related Work

The related-work discussion positions Provable Compliance alongside verifiable credentials, policy-based decisioning, RegTech, delegated authority, and tamper-evident records, while distinguishing its role as a reliance-time compliance predicate. The conclusion presents a point-of-reliance control that preserves uncertainty, scoped prohibitions, privacy, and the Authority Protocol’s final execution boundary.

12. Related Work

  • Evidence Assertion VDTs adapt the separation of a signed statement from its current status by treating each sourced fact as a purpose-limited assertion with a source-specific freshness bound.The cited credential and status approaches are described as including the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model, Bitstring Status List [25], and OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection.Source: §12 · pp. 29–30
  • The Compliance Policy Profile and BRE follow attribute-based and policy-language decisioning patterns, but produce a signed, time-bounded decision consumed as one Authority Protocol predicate rather than an access decision.The related-work passage names attribute-based access control and XACML.Source: §12 · p. 30
  • The paper distinguishes its compliance-side predicate from work on delegated authority to agents [30] and the companion Authority Protocol, while relating append-only VDTs and Valitorum to tamper-evident logging.It describes its aim as making evidence, policy selection, and disposition attributable and independently verifiable at reliance.Source: §12 · p. 30

13. Conclusion

  • The conclusion frames the core question as whether evidence and rules are current, applicable, and sufficiently certain for a particular reliance event, not whether a check happened once.Evidence domains differ in sources, volatility, legal effects, and disclosure constraints, so the paper rejects a universal compliance badge.Source: §13 · p. 30
  • The architecture represents facts in Evidence Assertion VDTs, selects rules through a versioned CPP, evaluates reason-coded predicates through the BRE, and composes them into a signed, time-bounded Compliance Decision VDT.The decision gates present exercise without rewriting the ARP or creating authority.Source: §13 · p. 30
  • A transaction commits only after final Allow, fresh status, exact-digest matching, required approvals, atomic capacity reservation, and a valid unused EAC.The conclusion also calls for scoped refreshes, uncertainty states, scope-limited prohibitions, audience-appropriate disclosure, and a verifiable compliance predicate before consequence.Source: §13 · p. 30
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