Source-linked AI summary
ABF-Bench: A Verifiable Benchmark for Agentic Blockchain Forensics
Xiaohang Yu, Hejia Geng, William Knottenbelt
TL;DR
Tracing funds is difficult because adversaries split and route flows through exchanges, mixers, and bridges, and change tactics between incidents. ABF-Bench makes evidence-backed tracing a verifiable agent task; agents acquire evidence faster than fixed-order tracers, yet stop early and finish below breadth-first tracing.
Problem
Fund tracing supports anti-money-laundering compliance and incident response, but adversaries split and route flows through exchanges, mixers, and bridges, then change tactics between incidents.
Source: §1 · p. 1, §3.3 · p. 6Method
ABF-Bench turns real laundering incidents into interactive tracing tasks with retrieved-record evidence checks, auditable reference graphs, and an agent harness built around working memory.
Source: §1 · p. 3Results
Agents acquire evidence faster than fixed-order tracers and recognize custody those tracers miss, yet stop early and finish below breadth-first tracing.
Source: §9 · p. 17Takeaways & Limitations
Ledger-checkable verdicts make ABF-Bench a candidate environment for training agents with verifiable rewards beyond code and mathematics.
Source: §9 · pp. 17–18Comparisons vary the harness, model, and query policy together, and what agents might recover with their unused budget remains unmeasured.
Source: §8 · p. 17
Abstract
from arXiv · showhide
Blockchain forensics is adversarial and open-ended: money launderers split, swap, and bridge funds, cut their trail at mixers or custodial services, and change tactics from one incident to the next. Investigators must keep adapting their tracing in response. Yet the immutability of public ledgers preserves every recorded movement in public view, making much of the investigation independently verifiable. We introduce ABF-Bench, an interactive benchmark that makes evidence-backed fund tracing a verifiable agent task, in which every claimed movement must cite ledger records the agent retrieved. A case-to-task pipeline builds well-posed tasks across ledgers: conservative rules halt tracing wherever the records leave a continuation unresolved, and each task's reference graph is the answer those rules determine. Built from real laundering activity, the tasks combine multi-hop transfers, DeFi exchanges, cross-chain round trips, custodial and mixer deposits, and address poisoning. We also propose the ABF agent harness, built around a working memory, and evaluate it alongside general-purpose agents and fixed-order tracers. The harness reaches 75% edge recall, against 47% for Codex with the same model and 10% for Claude Code, which loses recall to overconfidence: it cites records it left unretrieved. Compared with fixed-order tracers, the harness acquires evidence faster than the best of them early in the budget and recognizes undisclosed custodial services that they walk past (89% vs. 0%), with 98% fidelity. However, agents tend to stop early and lose recall on larger tasks, which holds their final recall below the best tracer. Beyond exposing these gaps, ABF-Bench opens blockchain forensics to LLM agents as a verifiable domain, where the verdicts that score agents also offer potential training signals.
1 Introduction
ABF-Bench makes fund tracing an interactive, evidence-backed agent task and builds auditable tasks from real laundering incidents. Its harness outperforms general-purpose agents in final recall, while agents’ early stopping leaves breadth-first tracing ahead.
1 Introduction
- Investigators must adapt as launderers split flows, route funds across assets and ledgers, and change tactics, while keeping conclusions checkable by another investigator.Public ledger records make claimed movements verifiable, though locating and interpreting those records requires investigation.Source: §1 · p. 2
- Real adversaries supply difficult tracing instances, and public ledgers keep claims checkable, making fund tracing a potential verifiable-reward domain for agent evaluation and training.The paper situates this contribution alongside benchmarks that use mechanical checks and can double as training environments.Source: §1 · p. 2
- ABF-Bench turns real laundering incidents into tasks with auditable reference edges, combining multi-hop transfers, DeFi exchanges, cross-chain round trips, custody and mixer deposits, and address poisoning.Conservative rules determine each reference graph, and each reference edge has a verified witness retrievable within the query budget.Source: §1 · p. 3
- The benchmark evaluates evidence-backed tracing through a shared, metered interface where solvers submit operations with supporting records for verification against a hidden reference graph.An operation supported by its records remains valid even if the reference graph omits it.Source: §1 · p. 3
- The harness outperforms both general-purpose agents in final recall, including Codex on the same model, but agents stop early and breadth-first tracing achieves the highest final recall.The harness also acquires evidence faster than fixed-order tracers early in the budget and recognizes undisclosed custody they miss, at comparable validity.Source: §1 · p. 3
2 Related Work
Prior work supplies labeled transactions, protocol-specific links, incident reconstructions, and blockchain agents, but ABF-Bench compares evidence acquisition and tracing under metered access.
Tracing and anti-money laundering
- Bitcoin clustering and taint analysis infer relationships or allocate commingled value [1,27,28], while TRacer, Connector, ABCTracer, and AMLGuard address account, cross-chain, or incident-level tracing [5] [6] [7] [15].ABF-Bench scores recovered movements and acquisition of supporting records from seeds under metered ledger access.Source: §2 · p. 3
Datasets and agent evaluation
- Elliptic and Elliptic2 provide labeled transactions [3] [4], while LO-CARD and XSplicer evaluate protocol-level links [10] [16]; Table 1 compares settings by scored object, record access, and evidence checking.CryptoBench and AI-ABC cover broader cryptocurrency-agent tasks [13].Source: §2 · pp. 3–4, Table 1 · p. 4
Agentic blockchain forensics and verifiable agent benchmarks
- Agentic blockchain forensics studies LLM-led investigations [10] [12], while verifiable benchmarks score runs against fixed checks; ABF-Bench uses public-ledger evidence to evaluate fund-flow graphs.Other cited agent work includes transaction understanding and attack analysis [11] [9]; verifiable benchmarks include test suites, environment state, captured flags, and checkable answers [32] [33] [34] [35].Source: §2 · p. 4
3 Fund Tracing as a Verifiable Task
The section formalizes fund tracing as a task with declared records, scopes, operations, claims, and evidence rules, then explains how verification and adversarial tracing work.
3 Fund Tracing as a Verifiable Task
- The formalization defines tracing tasks, solver reports, and verifier verdicts, while excluding real-world attribution and speculative links between deposits and withdrawals.These boundaries distinguish recorded, evidence-backed movements from conclusions not determined by the task’s records and rules.Source: §3 · p. 4
3.1 Tasks and Reports
- Tasks specify ledger windows, tracing scope, commingling conventions, and admitted operations, whose evidence rules can require receipts and execution traces for exchanges.The current release scores ledger records; published incident addresses enter only as assumptions on seeds and membership.Source: §3.1 · pp. 4–5
- Fund states locate holdings by ledger, account, asset, and record position; claims assert amounts moving between states and cite records within a report grouped by operation.A tracing task combines admitted records, a finite seed set, a declaration, and admitted operation types.Source: §3.1 · p. 5
3.2 Verification
- The verifier judges cited records independently of the reference graph: supported operations are valid, contradicted claims invalid, and unsupported but uncontradicted claims indeterminate.The operation-type label is advisory; verdicts depend on claims and cited records.Source: §3.2 · pp. 5–6
3.3 Why Tracing Is Hard
- Tracing is difficult because investigators must search among branching leads, recognize protocol-specific operations and custodians, assemble evidence, and choose what to report.Fixed procedures settle these stages in advance, whereas investigators adapt to the case at hand.Source: §3.3 · p. 6
4 ABF-Bench
ABF-Bench defines a shared, budgeted environment for evidence-backed tracing, with conservative reference graphs and scoring that separates retrieved-evidence recovery from operation validity. Its design aims for well-posed, reproducible tasks whose scores reflect supported fund movements.
4 ABF-Bench
- The benchmark pairs tracing tasks with a shared evidence environment, verifier, and reference retrieval solver; its reference graph and witnesses remain hidden.The solver’s retrieval plan calibrates budgets rather than exposing the answer.Source: §4 · p. 6
4.1 Design Goals
- Tasks are well-posed when instructions determine the reference answer, every edge has a retrievable witness, and unresolved continuations trigger conservative halts.The verifier accepts any evidence satisfying the operation rules, including valid alternatives to the reference witness; records and scoring are deterministic across solvers.Source: §4.1 · pp. 6–7
4.2 Interaction Under a Budget
- Solvers choose ledger queries or submit a report under a shared query budget, with internal computation and working memory treated as part of the solver policy.The public input includes seeds, block windows, hop cap, followed bridges, disclosed stops, available actions, submission rules, and budget; query costs and budgets are known in advance.Source: §4.2 · p. 7
4.3 The Reference Graph
- Tracing halts at custody or unsupported bridge continuations, while purity excludes commingled holdings once outside value arrives.A mixer deposit establishes entry but leaves the exit unresolved; on Bitcoin, purity is assessed over non-dust inputs.Source: §4.3 · p. 8
4.4 Scoring
- Edge recall counts recovered reference edges only when the report is valid and every cited record was retrieved; fidelity separately measures operations accepted by the verifier.Macro-averaged recall is primary, failed runs remain in the average, and valid downstream edges count even when upstream operations are rejected; precision also penalizes submitted out-of-scope edges.Source: §4.4 · pp. 8–9
- The query budget is calibrated from the reference solver’s retrieval actions plus one activity listing per distinct source holding.Budgets remain fixed after graph amendments, and the reference plan fits within the budget on every retained task; query counts measure evidence access, while token and monetary costs are reported separately.Source: §4.4 · p. 9
5 From Incident to Benchmark
The case-to-task pipeline builds cross-ledger reference graphs through nested iterations, then reviews and filters seed-rooted regions for release. The released suite follows the Bybit theft across Ethereum and Bitcoin and contains tasks with diverse tracing stages and boundaries.
5 From Incident to Benchmark
- Within each ledger, Ethereum alternates frontier expansion with record replay until no new holdings or unresolved membership decisions remain; Bitcoin uses transaction replay under input-membership rules.Replay can reveal holdings outside discovered paths or extend tracing windows, feeding expansions back into the next round.Source: §5 · p. 9
- Across-ledger linking supplies destination-ledger entry records, while return deliveries can change earlier membership and trigger a fresh build; repeated pairs signal convergence and older pairs signal oscillation.Human reviewers audit graphs and evidence and record seed, boundary, and rule revisions between builds.Source: §5 · p. 10
5.1 The Released Task Suite
- The Bybit-theft suite follows activity for 90 days across Ethereum and Bitcoin, including transfers, DeFi exchanges, cross-chain round trips, custodial and mixer endpoints, and poisoning activity.Seeds derive from the FBI notice and Bybit’s published incident addresses.Source: §5.1 · pp. 10–11
- 33 of 58 authored tasks pass the release filter, which excludes unsettled interpretations and requires verifier-accepted witnesses for retained reference edges.Tasks are selected for operation diversity, crossings, boundaries, and branching, with pairwise overlap capped at 25% of the smaller graph’s edges.Source: §5 · p. 10, §5.1 · p. 11
- Released tasks exercise all four tracing stages; one holding fans out to 28 reference edges, and 113 edges stop into undisclosed custody versus nearly three times fewer into disclosed custody.Tasks disclose 20 custodians and leave the rest for solvers to recognize.Source: §5.1 · p. 11
6 The ABF Agent Harness
The ABF agent harness leaves tracing decisions to the LLM agent and organizes investigation around working memory, tools, and prompt heuristics. Its components track open work, support report preparation, and guide evidence-grounded tracing and stopping.
- Working memory records confirmed operations as findings, unresolved questions as leads with dispositions, and observations as notes for later use.The agent maintains this representation of investigation progress.Source: §6 · p. 11
- Harness tools operate on working memory, preview submissions for checks, and compact context through summarization.Source: §6 · p. 11
- Five prompt heuristics guide control-of-funds tracing, look-alike address checks, record-grounded citations, continued investigation, and submission of every valid edge found.The harness is designed for blockchain forensics across cases, protocols, and services, and is inspired by LOCARD [10].Source: §6 · pp. 11–12
7 Experiments
The experiments compare evidence acquisition, adaptability, and reliability across agents and fixed-order tracers. The harness leads early in evidence recall, but early stopping and task complexity constrain its final results.
7.1 Hypotheses
- The hypotheses test whether agents acquire evidence efficiently, recognize operations and undisclosed custody, and assemble and report evidence reliably against fixed-order tracers.The authors characterize evaluated solvers on this suite and leave whether the hypotheses hold for agents generally open.Source: §7 · p. 12, §7.1 · p. 12, §7.5 · p. 14
7.2 Solvers; 7.3 Setup
- Fixed-order tracers expand activity under breadth-first, depth-first, or largest-incoming-amount order; agents use the shared evidence interface, with the harness and Codex holding model and reasoning effort fixed.The comparison uses 31 of 33 released tasks; headline results use the first round.Source: §7.2 · pp. 12–13, §7.3 · p. 13
7.4 Main Results
- 0.75 versus 0.47 edge recall separates the same-model harness and Codex, while breadth-first tracing ranks highest and shows at least 0.88 is attainable.The harness beats breadth-first tracing on only 7 of 31 tasks.Source: Table 3 · p. 13, §7.4 · pp. 13–14
- Harness recall falls from 0.82 on the smallest task third to 0.69 on the largest, and its recall correlates more with fan-out than edge count (ρ = −0.66 vs. −0.41).Across repeated runs, within-task recall standard deviation is 0.18 for the harness and 0.17 for Codex, while mean recall agrees within 0.01.Source: §7.4 · p. 14
7.5 Where Agents Gain and Lose
- At quarter budget, harness evidence recall is 39% versus 35% for the best-in-hindsight tracer; that tracer overtakes after 54% of budget.At its own stopping point, the harness leads the best-in-hindsight tracer on 26 of 31 tasks.Source: §7.5 · pp. 14–15, Figure 4 · p. 15
- The tracer overtakes after 54% of budget; the harness leaves 53% unused, with unexamined branches holding a quarter of its and over half of Codex’s reference edges.What continued querying would recover remains unmeasured.Source: §7.5 · p. 15
- The harness claims 83% of retrieved operations versus bfs’s 85%; agents stop at three quarters or more of eligible undisclosed-custody points, unlike tracers, which stop at none.Bfs reaches more reference edges into those points than the harness, 87% against 63%.Source: §7.5 · p. 15, Figure 5 · p. 16
- Harness and Codex reach bfs fidelity, and agents omit at most 2.5% of retrieved transfers; Claude Code cited unretrieved records in 29 of 31 runs.Under the retrieval condition, Claude Code’s fidelity falls to 0.23, while the harness and Codex remain at 0.98.Source: §7.5 · p. 16
8 Limitations
The evaluation is bounded by a single public incident, conservative rules that stop at unresolved continuations, and comparisons that vary multiple system components together. What agents would recover with unused query budget remains unmeasured.
- The suite covers one incident, so how far the findings carry to other cases remains to be tested.Source: §8 · p. 17
- The incident is public and predates the evaluated models, which may have encountered it during pre- or post-training.Source: §8 · p. 17
- Tracing rules halt when records leave a continuation unresolved, so edge recall covers only a conservative subset of incident flows.Source: §8 · p. 17
- The comparisons vary harness, model, and query policy together, while recovery with agents’ unused budget remains unmeasured.Source: §8 · p. 17
9 Conclusion
Agents acquire evidence faster than fixed-order tracers and recognize custody those tracers miss, but stop early and finish below breadth-first tracing. ABF-Bench makes evidence-backed tracing verifiable and may also support training with verifiable rewards.
- ABF-Bench turns a real laundering incident into well-posed cross-chain tasks, and the ABF harness outperforms general-purpose agents, including Codex with the same model.Source: §9 · p. 17
- Agents acquire evidence faster than fixed-order tracers and recognize custody they miss, yet stop early and finish below breadth-first tracing.Source: §9 · p. 17
- Ledger-checkable operation verdicts and real-adversary difficulty make ABF-Bench a candidate environment for training agents with verifiable rewards.Source: §9 · pp. 17–18