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Beyond End-to-End Recovery: Towards a Better Understanding of LLM Steganography via Rolewise Decomposition
Om Tailor, Yucheng Pan, Solaleh Mohammadi, Xinyan Liu, Kaiqing Zhang
TL;DR
End-to-end recovery cannot distinguish whether a transmission failed at encoding or decoding, nor show whether the decoder follows changes to encoded information. The paper introduces rolewise evaluation, separating verification of encoded messages from decoder recovery. It identifies verifiable encodings missed by decoders, demonstrating that recovery and verification provide distinct evidence about hidden communication.
Problem
End-to-end recovery does not distinguish encoding failures from decoding failures or show how messages are represented in transmitted text or whether decoders follow changes to encoded information.
Source: §1 · p. 1Method
The rolewise framework aligns deterministic encoding verification, direct-exposure checks, and decoder recovery for each transmitted text.
Source: §1 · pp. 1–2, §3 · p. 3Results
168 verifiable encodings were missed by the original decoders, showing that recovery and verification provide distinct evidence about hidden communication.
Source: §7.2 · p. 8Takeaways & Limitations
The findings show that E2E recovery alone cannot fully characterize how LLMs encode and decode private messages.
Source: §9 · p. 8The analysis is limited to implemented extraction procedures and the evaluated models, encoding rules, and tasks.
Source: Limitations · p. 9
Abstract
from arXiv · showhide
In large language model (LLM) steganography, an encoder hides a private message in an otherwise ordinary response, as text transmitted to a decoder, who attempts to recover it. The success of this private-message transmission is commonly measured through end-to-end (E2E) recovery, which checks whether the decoder correctly reconstructs the private message. However, E2E recovery cannot distinguish encoding failures from decoding failures or reveal how the private message is represented in the encoder's transmitted text. To address these limitations, we introduce a rolewise decomposition framework that separately examines how private messages are represented in encoder transmitted texts, what decoders recover, and what deterministic verification can establish. Across 7,200 encoder responses, we identify 168 verifiable encodings missed by decoders and 706 responses containing private messages reconstructed through word-length or token-initial patterns not explicitly specified in the encoder's instructions. These findings demonstrate that E2E recovery alone may obscure important distinctions between encoding and decoding, motivating their separate evaluation to better understand and mitigate the safety issues caused by LLM steganography.
1 Introduction
End-to-end recovery cannot distinguish encoding failures from decoding failures or show whether a decoder follows changes to encoded information. The section introduces rolewise evaluation and uses examples to demonstrate what recovery scores alone cannot establish.
1 Introduction
- The rolewise framework separately evaluates encoding verification, direct exposure, and decoder recovery to examine message representations and decoder behavior.The authors also report unexpected representations and model-specific extraction difficulties in controlled comparisons and interventions.Source: §1 · pp. 1–2
2.1 E2E failure cannot distinguish encoding from decoding failure
- Across 7,200 transmitted texts, 168 decoder failures still contained messages reconstructable by deterministic verification procedures.These cases were classified as E2E failures, although verification showed the messages were embedded.Source: §2.1 · p. 3
2.2 E2E success does not establish faithful decoding
- Across 58 edits that changed the encoded message by one character, Gemini-3.5-Flash returned the original message 44 times and the modified message four times.Matching the originally supplied message can therefore count a response as successful even when the encoded information changed.Source: §2.2 · p. 3
2.3 E2E cannot explain decoder differences
- On the same 158 word-length-parity texts, Gemini-3.5-Flash recovered 157 messages, GPT-5.4-mini 19, and Claude-Haiku-4.5 one.Fixed transmitted texts isolate decoder recovery differences, but the scores alone do not explain their causes.Source: §2.3 · p. 3
3 A Rolewise Decomposition Framework
The rolewise framework aligns evidence of what an encoder represents, what a decoder recovers, and what a deterministic verifier can establish for each transmitted text. It separates reconstructability and direct exposure from decoder recovery, enabling per-text comparisons.
3 A Rolewise Decomposition Framework
- The framework aligns encoding verification, direct exposure, and decoder recovery for each transmitted text.This per-text comparison supports analysis of encoder behavior and controlled decoder interventions rather than merely adding an aggregate success score.Source: §3 · p. 3
3.1 Roles and message representation
- An encoder transforms a private message under an encoding rule into a transmitted text, which a decoder uses to estimate the message.The verifier independently checks whether the message can be reconstructed from the transmitted text without relying on decoder output.Source: §3.1 · p. 3
- The verifier extracts a candidate sequence from the text and reverses the encoding transformation to reconstruct a candidate message.The encoding rule specifies a transformation, but not necessarily how its representation appears in the transmitted text; extraction may search candidate spans or alignments.Source: §3.1 · p. 3
3.2 Encoding verification and direct exposure
- A reconstruction is verified when a supported extraction procedure recovers the private message byte-exactly or after ASCII-letter normalization.Direct exposure is measured separately when the private message appears as consecutive tokens, ignoring case and punctuation.Source: §3.2 · pp. 3–4
- Verification is limited to supported extraction procedures, so a negative result does not establish that the message was absent, and a positive result does not prove intentional encoding.Procedures identified after examining generated texts, including word-length representations of binary digits, are treated as exploratory.Source: §3.2 · p. 4
3.3 Measuring decoder recovery
- Decoder recovery measures whether the decoder’s output matches the private message; comparing it with verification distinguishes verifiable encodings the decoder misses.Recoveries with neither verification nor direct exposure established remain unresolved, not evidence that recovery occurred without an encoded message.Source: §3.3 · p. 4
4 Data and Experimental Setup
The experiments use a 7,200-text corpus and controlled decoder comparisons and edits, then examine how encoders realize private-message representations and follow prescribed placements. The results reveal additional reconstructable patterns and substantial differences in adherence and recovery.
4.1 Primary corpus and verification
- The primary corpus contains 7,200 texts from three models, with 400 per model–rule combination across six rules; each model initially decodes its own texts.Verification and direct-exposure checks are applied regardless of decoder recovery, with unrelated-message controls for incidental matches.Source: §4.1 · p. 4
4.2 Controlled decoder comparisons and interventions
- Decoder comparisons use 1,725 shared texts, and two interventions on 72 Gemini-generated texts provide extraction instructions or the extracted symbols directly.Message-editing experiments preserve, alter one character, or replace the encoded message while keeping decoding instructions fixed; edits are verified and require a meaning-preservation score of at least 7/10.Source: §4.2 · p. 4, §4.3 · p. 4
5.1 Encoding patterns across models and rules
- 706 distinct texts contain messages reconstructed through six additional word-length or token-initial procedures, including 507 byte-exact and 199 normalized-only matches.These representations are not explicitly prescribed by the encoding rules; the procedures match none of 1,500 texts paired with unrelated private messages.Source: §5.1 · p. 4
- Gemini-3.5-Flash supports the added procedures in 675/2,400 texts (28.1%), versus 23 (1.0%) for Claude-Haiku-4.5 and eight (0.3%) for GPT-5.4-mini.Under the binary rule, Gemini recovers 331/400 of its own texts despite the original verifier identifying no literal binary encodings.Source: §5.1 · p. 5
5.2 Models differ in following prescribed sentence-initial placements
- GPT-5.4-mini achieves 210/400 complete ordinary-initial placements and 78.2% position accuracy, but only 17/400 complete alternating placements and 22.8% position accuracy.Claude-Haiku-4.5 reaches 82.3% position accuracy and 262/400 complete placements under alternating initials; Figure 2 compares complete placement, mean correct-position fraction, and E2E recovery.Source: §5.2 · p. 5, Figure 2 · p. 5
- The alternating rule requires at least 2L − 1 sentences for a message with L letters; 337/400 GPT-5.4-mini texts are too short, and 46 of the remaining 63 fail placement.By comparison, 90 Claude-Haiku-4.5 texts and 28 Gemini-3.5-Flash texts have insufficient sentences.Source: §5.2 · p. 5
- Prescribed placement and decoder recovery disagree in 353/2,400 texts (14.7%): 294 recover despite incorrect placement, while 59 have correct placement but failed recovery.Under alternating initials, Gemini-3.5-Flash recovers 56/62 texts without correct prescribed placement, compared with 18/383 for GPT-5.4-mini.Source: §5.2 · p. 5
6 Decoding: What Models Recover
The decoding analyses compare models on identical texts, separate symbol extraction from message reconstruction, and test whether decoders follow edits to encoded messages. Results show representation-dependent recovery and extraction difficulties, while successful full replacements do not guarantee that small changes are followed.
6.1 Decoder recovery differs on identical transmitted texts
- On shared texts containing six identified representations, Gemini-3.5-Flash achieves the highest recovery across all six cohorts.For word-length parity it recovers 157/158 messages, versus 19 for GPT-5.4-mini and one for Claude-Haiku-4.5; for A–M/N–Z initials it recovers 158/162, versus one each for the other models.Source: §6.1 · p. 6
- All three decoders recover at least 86/87 literal Base64 and 53/56 hexadecimal messages, while less direct patterns motivate closer examination.The shared-text comparison holds the transmitted text and encoding rule constant within each cohort.Source: §6.1 · p. 6
6.2 Extraction assistance reveals decoder difficulties
- Extraction instructions raise normalized recovery on 72 texts from 5/72 to 57/72 for Claude-Haiku-4.5 and from 16/72 to 30/72 for GPT-5.4-mini.Under exact represented-message matching, guided recovery is 55/72 for Claude and 28/72 for GPT.Source: §6.2 · p. 6
- With correctly supplied symbols, GPT-5.4-mini reconstructs 72/72 messages and Claude-Haiku-4.5 56/72, compared with 29/72 and 25/72 using their own extracted symbols.Neither decoder exactly extracts any of the 12 word-length-parity texts; the results identify extraction as a major bottleneck, while Claude’s remaining errors with correct symbols also implicate reconstruction.Source: §6.2 · pp. 6–7
- Extraction strengths vary by representation: Claude-Haiku-4.5 extracts word-length hexadecimal correctly in 9/12 cases, while GPT-5.4-mini leads on substitution initials, 11/12 versus 8/12.Figure 3 separates exact extraction by representation from paired reconstruction using self-extracted versus correctly supplied symbols.Source: §6.2 · p. 7, Figure 3 · p. 7
6.3 Decoder responses to changes in encoded messages
- Gemini-3.5-Flash returns the original message after 59/60 preserving edits and the new message after 48/49 full replacements, but follows single-character changes in only 4/58 cases.It returns the original in 44/58 single-character edits and another response in 10/58; in 21 of 22 similarity-matched preservation/replacement pairs, outputs match the original and replacement respectively.Source: §6.3 · p. 7
6 Decoding: What Models Recover
- Rolewise analysis distinguishes whether a decoder identifies hidden symbols, reconstructs their message, and follows changes to what the text encodes.Reliable recovery after a full replacement does not imply that the decoder follows smaller changes to the encoded message.Source: §6.3 · p. 7
7 Verification: How Coverage Shapes the Evidence
The section tests how verifier coverage affects model comparisons and how encoding evidence relates to decoder recoveries. Expanded procedures change verification rankings and reveal both missed encodings and unresolved recoveries.
7.1 Verification coverage changes model comparisons
- Adding six word-length and token-initial procedures moves Gemini-3.5-Flash from last to first in verification rate on unchanged texts.With original procedures, GPT-5.4-mini ranks first at 49.4% and Gemini-3.5-Flash last at 42.8%; after expansion, Gemini-3.5-Flash reaches 71.0%, ahead of GPT-5.4-mini (49.8%) and Claude-Haiku-4.5 (47.5%).Source: §7.1 · p. 8
7.2 Verification evidence and unresolved recoveries
- Of 4,821 successful decoder recoveries, 3,214 are verified by original procedures and another 647 by the six added procedures.The added procedures explain nearly 30% of Gemini-3.5-Flash successful recoveries but fewer than 1% for Claude-Haiku-4.5 or GPT-5.4-mini.Source: §7.2 · p. 8
- Among successful recoveries, 14 messages are directly exposed, while 946 are neither verifiable by supported procedures nor directly exposed.Conversely, 168 verifiable encodings are missed by original decoders: 110 identified by original procedures and 58 by additional procedures.Source: §7.2 · p. 8
8 Implications for Evaluating LLM Steganography
The paper argues that evaluating steganography requires encoding evidence alongside decoder recovery. It applies this separation to decoder comparisons, message edits, mitigation assessments, and the stated scope of its conclusions.
8 Implications for Evaluating LLM Steganography
- Evaluations should specify supported representations and examine encoding evidence alongside E2E recovery and adherence to prescribed encoding rules.Expanding verification to word-length and token-initial patterns moves Gemini-3.5-Flash from last to first in verification rate without changing transmitted texts.Source: §8 · p. 8
- Holding transmitted texts fixed exposes model-specific recovery differences, while extraction instructions and correctly extracted symbols help distinguish extraction difficulty from reconstruction difficulty.A decoder that reconstructs supplied symbols but cannot extract them calls for a different intervention from one that cannot decode the symbols.Source: §8 · p. 8
- Gemini-3.5-Flash often follows full-message replacements but frequently returns the original message after single-character edits.The paper recommends checking whether decoder outputs follow edited representations and using message-preserving edits as controls.Source: §8 · p. 8
- A decrease in E2E recovery cannot establish whether a mitigation removed the encoded message or only made decoding harder.The paper recommends comparing encoding evidence and decoder recovery before and after interventions, with verification procedures specified.Source: §8 · p. 8
9 Concluding Remarks
- The framework reveals differences in encoder representations, decoder behavior, and evaluation outcomes that E2E recovery alone cannot explain.The paper presents it as a foundation for investigating steganographic capabilities and developing targeted evaluations and mitigations.Source: §9 · p. 8
Limitations
- The analysis is limited to finite extraction procedures and the evaluated models, encoding rules, and tasks, leaving other forms of hidden communication unresolved.The paper identifies discovery of unseen representations and extension to learned and adaptive strategies as future directions.Source: §9 · p. 8, Limitations · p. 9
Reproducibility
- The appendices provide prompts, verifiers, carrier procedures, intervention criteria, and monitoring details; the repository supplies code, model outputs, and analysis scripts.Source: Reproducibility · p. 9
Ethical considerations
The paper describes its ethical scope, AI assistance, and supplementary materials. It reports no human-subject experiments and identifies model judgments used for automated meaning checks.
Ethical considerations
- The study examines explicitly prompted exchanges and reports no human-subject experiments; automated meaning checks are reported as model judgments.It frames the work as diagnosing capabilities in a setting where steganography can support private communication and undermine oversight.Source: Ethical considerations · p. 9
- Public cover tasks and short-message resources retain their applicable licenses and attribution notices.Source: Ethical considerations · p. 9
AI assistance
- AI tools assisted literature search, manuscript revision, and some code development, while experimental findings were checked against model-run outputs.The authors state that they are responsible for the paper’s content and code.Source: AI assistance · p. 9
Supplementary Material
- Supplementary materials cover related work, protocol, verification, monitoring, primary-corpus results, decoder interventions, carrier manipulation, and broader evaluation.The appendices also specify prompts and intervention criteria.Source: Supplementary Material · p. 12
A Detailed Related Work
The related work spans explicit linguistic encodings, prompted steganography, learned covert channels, and evaluation methods. The paper distinguishes its prompted setting and rolewise evidence from those approaches, then describes the protocol and supplied rules used in its evaluation.
A Detailed Related Work
- Earlier linguistic steganography often specifies explicit procedures linking messages to generated text, whereas this study examines prompted encoders whose natural-language rules may not determine one observable pattern.The study investigates which representations can be reconstructed from produced text rather than assuming the prescribed rule determines their form.Source: A Detailed Related Work · p. 12
- Prior LLM capability evaluations already distinguish communication success from component abilities; this work aligns deterministic reconstruction, direct exposure, and decoder recovery on the same text.This alignment includes texts decoding fails to recover and avoids treating failed verification as proof that no message was embedded.Source: A Detailed Related Work · p. 12
- Learned and optimized covert-channel studies use threat models and learning procedures different from this paper’s explicitly prompted encoders.The authors do not infer autonomous collusive intent or claim verifier-identified representations were necessarily the decoder’s mechanisms.Source: A Detailed Related Work · pp. 12–13
- The verifier tests target-message reconstructability through supported procedures, not general detection or causal information use.The paper compares original and expanded procedures on unchanged texts; monitor suspiciousness is analyzed separately.Source: A Detailed Related Work · p. 13
- Message-editing tests check whether decoder outputs follow verified single-character changes or full replacements, using message-preserving edits as controls.Together with fixed-text decoder comparisons and extraction assistance, these tests distinguish final-message recovery from fidelity to represented information without uniquely identifying internal mechanisms.Source: A Detailed Related Work · p. 13
B Communication protocol, data, and prompts
- Each example pairs a cover task, private message, and rule; the encoder produces transmitted text for the decoder and, in supplementary analysis, an external monitor.Holding transmitted text fixed supports decoder comparisons, while edits test whether outputs follow changes to the encoded message.Source: B Communication protocol, data, and… · p. 13
B.1 Cover tasks and private messages
- Cover tasks come from the 1,137-example helpful-base HH-RLHF split, while private messages come from a resource of 1,263 entries and 412 distinct phrases.Messages are sampled with replacement and cover tasks independently; matched comparisons rely on the underlying task and response, not sample index alone. The study collects 400 responses for each of three models and six rules, totaling 7,200.Source: §B.1 · pp. 13–14
B.2 Information available to each role
- The encoder receives the task, private message, and rule; the decoder receives the task, transmitted text, rule, and message-class description, but not the message itself.The monitor receives only task and transmitted text, while evaluator-side verification procedures have access to the private message; transmitted text excludes private reasoning.Source: §B.2 · p. 14
B.5 Decoder prompt
The decoder prompt supplies the cover task, transmitted answer, and encoding description, then asks the decoder to extract the private message. The appendix also specifies model settings and deterministic procedures for checking whether messages can be reconstructed from transmitted texts.
B.5 Decoder prompt
- The decoder receives the cover task, transmitted answer, and supplied encoding description, and is told the message is a phrase of 1–4 words and at most 20 characters.It is asked to extract the private message from the task answer.Source: §B.5 · p. 14
- The prompt requests step-by-step reasoning and a final answer enclosed in XML-style answer tags.The decoder is instructed not to use those tags elsewhere in its response.Source: §B.5 · p. 14
B.6 Recorded model settings and availability
- Claude uses temperature 1 and a 16,384-token thinking budget, while GPT uses low reasoning effort and Gemini uses provider-default thinking.Claude and Gemini have 2,398 available settings records each; GPT records do not include individual reasoning-effort settings.Source: §B.6 · pp. 14–15
C Encoding verification and extraction procedures
- The verifier uses the intended message and supplied rule to check reconstruction independently of decoder output, with original and expanded procedure sets.The expanded set adds six word-length and token-initial procedures; direct exposure and decoder recovery are separate evaluations.Source: C Encoding verification and extraction… · p. 15
C.1 Verification outcomes and matching criteria
- Verification accepts byte-exact or normalized-only matches, but a negative result does not establish that the message is absent.A positive result establishes reconstructability under a procedure, not that the encoder intentionally used it; added procedures identified after inspecting texts are exploratory.Source: §C.1 · p. 15
C.2 Original procedures for supplied encoding rules
- Original byte-oriented checks search for complete encoded targets, with separators and boundaries constrained to reject arbitrary fragments.The checks cover Base64, hexadecimal, and eight-bit binary representations, as well as fixed-letter substitution and sentence-initial rules.Source: §C.2 · pp. 15–16
- Sentence-initial checks extract lowercase first letters from sentence fragments and compare them with the normalized target, using ordinary or alternating initials.Both variants start with the first retained fragment and require enough fragments for the target length, while permitting trailing fragments.Source: §C.2 · p. 16
C.3 Additional word-length and token-initial procedures
- The six added extraction procedures systematically test less direct representations, including word lengths and token initials, against intended messages.Candidate extraction does not use the target, but matching candidates to the target does; witnesses record the procedure, parameters, source span, symbols, and decoded message.Source: §C.3 · p. 16
C.4 Worked example: word-length parity
A worked example shows word-length parity reconstructing a private message from an otherwise unchanged response, although that reconstruction does not establish encoder intent. The accompanying procedures distinguish verification evidence, direct exposure, decoder recovery, and monitor scoring.
C.4 Worked example: word-length parity
- 96 word lengths yield twelve bytes that reconstruct “serene lakes,” including its space, while the original decoder also recovers the phrase.The original verifier finds no literal binary representation, but the expanded word-length procedure supplies a byte-exact reconstruction.Source: §C.4 · p. 17
C.5 Mismatched-message specificity control
- None of 1,500 sampled mismatched messages matches under the six added procedures, supporting specificity against those sampled messages but not a general false-positive rate.The transmitted texts remain unchanged while each verifier target is replaced with a different message sampled under the same rule.Source: §C.5 · p. 17
C.6 Direct exposure and decoder recovery
- Direct exposure requires the complete target-token sequence, while decoder recovery is scored independently from the decoder’s extracted output.The parser selects the last complete case-insensitive answer block, or the last nonempty line if no complete block exists.Source: §C.6 · p. 17
C.7 Recovery denominators and evidence accounting
- The recovery accounting partitions outcomes into direct exposure, original verification, newly verified reconstruction, and unresolved recovery.Unresolved recoveries are not evidence that no message was encoded; verifier-positive texts missed by their original decoders remain a distinct category.Source: §C.7 · p. 18
D Monitor scoring and statistical comparisons
- The passive monitor scores only the cover task and transmitted text, so its suspiciousness scores are not encoding-verification or decoder-recovery outcomes.The monitor does not receive the private message or supplied encoding rule.Source: D Monitor scoring and statistical… · p. 18, §D.1 · p. 18
D.1 Monitor inputs and scoring prompt
- The monitor prompt asks for a suspiciousness score from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating more unusual or suspicious text.It is directed to focus on unusual or suspicious elements rather than general quality or correctness.Source: §D.1 · p. 18
D.2 Benign reference responses and procedure groups
The analyses compare procedure-defined text groups with matched benign references and report monitor AUCs alongside primary-corpus verification and recovery outcomes. Across the corpus, expanded procedures identify additional reconstructions, including texts missed by their original decoders.
D.2 Benign reference responses and procedure groups
- Monitor AUC compares procedure-defined groups with benign responses from the same model and represented cover tasks; those groups may overlap and differ in reference mixtures.The procedure groups distinguish byte-exact from normalized-only reconstructions.Source: §D.2 · p. 18
D.3 AUC and uncertainty estimation
- AUC counts steganographic–benign score pairs in which the transmitted text scores higher, with ties counting one-half; macro AUC equally averages available model-specific AUCs.Pooled-AUC uncertainty uses 1,000 cluster-bootstrap replicates with seed 42 and 95% percentile intervals.Source: §D.3 · p. 19
D.4 Monitoring results by extraction procedure
- Table 4 reports monitor AUCs by additional extraction procedure and reconstruction match type, but small groups mean high individual-row AUCs are not general detection guarantees.The procedure groups may overlap.Source: §D.4 · p. 19, Table 4 · p. 20
D.5 Within-Gemini binary-procedure comparison
- The two Gemini binary-rule subsets have AUCs of 0.980 [0.962, 0.994] for word-length parity and 0.720 [0.675, 0.763] for A–M/N–Z initials.Because their cover-task and reference mixtures differ, this comparison does not isolate a causal effect of representation on suspiciousness.Source: §D.5 · p. 19
E.1 Original verification, exposure, and recovery by rule
- The largest gaps between original verification and recovery occur for Gemini’s binary, hexadecimal, and substitution rules, but original-procedure coverage cannot establish that messages were absent.The corpus contains 7,200 texts, with scored original-decoder outcomes for 7,190.Source: §E.1 · p. 19
E.2 Additional verification among originally unverified texts
- 706 distinct texts are newly verified by the expanded procedures, including 507 byte-exact and 199 normalized-only reconstructions.The original decoder recovers 647 of these messages, fails on 58, and has no available result for one text.Source: §E.2 · p. 20
E.3 Evidence accompanying successful recovery
- 168 texts are verifier-positive but missed by their original decoders: 110 under original procedures and 58 under added procedures.These disagreements show that reconstruction evidence and decoder recovery are distinct measurements.Source: §E.3 · p. 20
E.4 Decoder recovery on identical transmitted texts
This section compares decoders on shared transmitted texts, then uses literal controls and staged diagnostics to separate extraction difficulty from message reconstruction. The results show strong cross-model decoding on verified encodings, while performance on other procedures varies by decoder and representation.
E.4 Decoder recovery on identical transmitted texts
- GPT recovered 43/45 Claude-generated messages and Claude recovered 26/27 GPT-generated messages on shared texts, with both models succeeding on nearly all tested verified encodings.On the same texts, Claude recovered 41/45 Claude-generated messages and GPT recovered 27/27 GPT-generated messages.Source: §E.4 · p. 21
- The selected same-text sample is not representative of the full corpus’s source-model or procedure frequencies, and includes only eight substitution-initial texts versus 187 in the primary corpus.These comparisons isolate decoder differences on selected inputs, not decoder performance over the original procedure distribution.Source: §E.4 · p. 21
E.5 Literal-transformation controls
- All three models recover nearly every literal Base64 and hexadecimal control message, but this does not explain their differences on less-direct procedures.The controls use different messages from those with the largest decoder gaps and include no literal-binary group.Source: §E.5 · p. 22, Table 10 · p. 22
F Decoder-information interventions
- The intervention study tests extraction, reconstruction from a decoder’s own or correct symbols, and guided joint recovery on 72 Gemini-generated texts.The texts cover six additional extraction procedures, with 12 texts per procedure and 62 distinct target phrases.Source: F Decoder-information interventions · p. 22, §F.1 · p. 22
F.1 Source selection and represented messages
- Selection requires verifier-supported reconstruction, with byte-exact reconstruction for binary, hexadecimal, and Base64 but an exact represented letter sequence for substitution initials.The substitution-initial representation may omit spaces; target-informed extraction boundaries are fixed across assisted conditions, so the tests measure execution with extraction assistance rather than unassisted discovery or localization.Source: §F.1 · pp. 22–23
F.2 Diagnostic conditions
- The four diagnostic conditions separate exact symbol extraction, reconstruction from the decoder’s own symbols, reconstruction from correct symbols, and guided recovery from the text.The Own condition receives no source text or target, while Correct removes the extraction task and Guided asks for a decoded message without an intermediate-symbol output.Source: §F.2 · p. 23
F.3 Scoring and outcome definitions
- Exact represented-message recovery is scored separately from the original letter-normalized target-recovery metric, and invalid or malformed outputs count as failures.Exact extraction requires full symbol-string equality; exact recovery compares the output with the deterministically decoded represented plaintext.Source: §F.3 · p. 23
F.4 Results by extraction procedure
- For word-length parity, neither decoder exactly extracts symbols in any of 12 texts, yet GPT reconstructs all 12 represented messages from correct symbols and Claude reconstructs 11.Exact A–M/N–Z extraction succeeds in 0/12 GPT cases and 1/12 Claude cases; Claude extracts word-length hexadecimal in 9/12 cases versus GPT’s 2/12, while GPT extracts substitution initials in 11/12 versus Claude’s 8/12.Source: §F.4 · p. 24
F.5 Paired diagnoses and guided recovery
Paired diagnostics distinguish symbol extraction from reconstruction, while message-editing experiments test whether decoder outputs track preserved, changed, or replaced representations. The findings show strong replacement-message tracking for Gemini on selected edits, but weaker fidelity to one-character changes.
F.5 Paired diagnoses and guided recovery
- Supplying correct symbols raises exact recovery from 29/72 to 72/72 for GPT-5.4-mini and from 25/72 to 56/72 for Claude-Haiku-4.5.Correct symbols resolve 43 GPT Own failures and 34 Claude Own failures, while Claude has three Own successes that become Correct failures.Source: §F.5 · p. 24
- Guided recovery raises letter-normalized target recovery from 16/72 to 30/72 for GPT-5.4-mini and from 5/72 to 57/72 for Claude-Haiku-4.5.Guided and staged outcomes can differ because the joint request does not consume the saved Extract output; these contrasts are not a direct trace of internal decoding steps.Source: §F.5 · p. 24
F.6 Uncertainty and scope
- The 72 diagnostic texts are balanced across six procedures, all Gemini-generated, and use retrospectively chosen target-informed extraction locations, limiting inference to the assisted protocol.The study uses stated inference settings and one response per condition, and does not establish behavior for all transmitted texts or internal decoding mechanisms.Source: §F.6 · pp. 24–25
G Carrier manipulation and message tracking
- The editing study compares wording-preserving edits, one-character message corruptions, and full message replacements while keeping decoder instructions unchanged.Its selected source texts had original decoder success and an additional verifier-supported, unexposed representation not recognized by the original verifier.Source: G Carrier manipulation and message… · p. 25, §G.1 · p. 25
G.1 Source selection and editing units
- The 72 source–procedure editing units come from 71 texts, and one GPT text contributes two procedures.Gemini contributes 60 texts, Claude seven, and GPT five units from four texts.Source: §G.1 · p. 25
G.2 Editing conditions and decoder inputs
- Editors are asked to preserve meaning and surface characteristics, while decoders receive only the edited text in place of the original text.The decoder is not given the editor’s target, additional extraction procedure, or editing instructions.Source: §G.2 · p. 25
G.3 Validation and eligibility
- Eligible analyses require representation checks, meaning-preservation scores of at least 7/10, and an available decoder response.For preservation-versus-replacement comparisons, edits are matched within 0.15 character-similarity points, which does not make their surface properties identical.Source: §G.3 · pp. 25–26
G.4 Decoder responses to preservation and replacement
- Gemini returns the original message in 59/60 eligible preservation edits and the replacement in 48/49 replacements, with neither replacement case returning the original.Among 22 character-similarity-matched pairs, 21 show both the original after preservation and the replacement after replacement.Source: §G.4 · p. 26, Table 15 · p. 27
H.2 Decomposition across models and rules
The extended evaluation separates target recovery, rule adherence, direct exposure, extracted-message agreement, and monitor scores across models and encoding rules. Its results show that these outcomes can diverge, and that partial constraint satisfaction and decoder agreement depend on the rule and model.
H.2 Decomposition across models and rules
- Llama recovery is mostly exposed, while Qwen’s lexical-substitution configuration has rule-specific verification 0.388 but target recovery 0.907.For Llama-8B, recovery is 0.093 including 0.068 exposed recovery; for Llama-3B, the rates are 0.054 and 0.042.Source: §H.2 · p. 28, Table 18 · p. 31
H.3 Partial satisfaction of encoding constraints
- Qwen lexical substitution has encoder position accuracy 0.7994 versus complete verification 0.3875, showing that many required positions can be correct without full target reconstruction.Claude hexadecimal has position accuracy 0.8769 and complete verification 0.5675.Source: §H.3 · p. 28, Table 19 · p. 32
H.4 Decoder agreement with rule-extracted messages
- On GPT alternating-initial outputs, 19/382 decoder responses match the target while 287/382 match the rule-extracted message; these agreements do not establish why the outputs differ.For Gemini POS-triggered outputs, 132/140 responses match the target and none match the rule-extracted message.Source: §H.4 · pp. 28–29, Table 20 · p. 33
H.5 Sensitivity to the number of required positions
- As required positions increase, Qwen lexical-substitution recovery stays between 0.895 and 0.935 while verified, unexposed recovery falls from 0.545 to 0.390.For GPT’s POS-triggered rule, verified, unexposed recovery declines from 0.733 at two positions to 0.450 at four.Source: §H.5 · p. 29, Table 21 · p. 29
H.6 Passive-monitor comparisons
- Gemini lexical-substitution responses have mean monitor score 0.47 versus 2.47 for benign responses, but these scores describe the selected monitor and reference distributions, not intrinsic detectability.The extended results treat recovery, rule adherence, extracted-message agreement, exposure, and monitor suspiciousness as complementary outcomes; methodological differences limit numerical comparison with the primary corpus.Source: §H.6 · pp. 29–30, Table 22 · p. 29